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Catch Me If You Can: Post – Daimler Transnat ional 
Lit igat ion 
Thiago Amparo and Alexandra Horváthová
LLM, Central European University
I. INTRODUCTION
‘The result is to shield foreign corporations from actions in American courts—although 
they have structured their affairs so as to reap vast profits from American markets—
and to deprive plaintiffs, including those who allege grave human rights abuses, of 
access to justice.’ (Reinhardt, J., dissenting, In: Bauman v. Daimler Crysler Corp, 579 
F.3d 1088, 1098 (9th Cir. 2009).
In recent years, a number of multinational companies have been reported 
for alleged human rights violations,1 yet only a limited amount of them 
have been investigated. Governments, the international community 
and stockholders often close their eyes to reality.2 Only recently has the 
international community even begun to openly talk about the human rights’ 
violations of transnational corporations.3 In June 2011, the United Nations 
Human Rights Council unanimously endorsed the UN Guiding Principles on 
1. In 2013, there have been cases connected to corporations such as Walmart or The Gap for exploiting workers 
for cheap labour. For NGO archives on corporate human rights violations see generally, Human Rights Watch, 
Corporation and Human Rights, available online at <http://www.hrw.org/topic/business/corporations>, as 
well as the hub Business and Human Rights Centre, available online at <http://business-humanrights.org> 
accessed 25 May 2014.
2. For example; the World Bank’s private sector lending arm, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) has 
invested in a palm oil and food company implicated in serious rights abuses in Honduras. After concluding 
the investigation, the IFC rejected some of the findings and did not actively participate in solving the raised 
concerns, available online at <http://www.oxfam.org/ en/pressroom/pressrelease/2014-01-10/world-bank-
funding-company-implicated-human-rights-abuses-honduras> accessed 26 May 2014.
3. In 2005, John Ruggie was named the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative on business and human 
rights.
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Business and Human Rights.4 
However, for many, it was not enough.5 During the 24th Session of UN 
Human Rights Council in September 2013, the representative of Ecuador 
proposed a draft declaration entitled ‘Elaboration of an international legally 
binding instrument on Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with respect to human rights,’ initiating the process for a 
binding UN instrument on business and human rights, in order to stipulate 
the obligations of transnational corporations in the field of human rights 
and provide for the establishment of effective remedies for victims in cases 
where domestic jurisdiction is apparently unable to provide them.6 During 
the 26th Session of UN Human Rights Council, two resolutions were tabled 
for adoption; one prepared by Ecuador and South Africa and the other 
drafted by Norway.7 
4. The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights were proposed by the UN Special Representative 
on business and human rights John Ruggie, and endorsed unanimously by the UN Human Rights Council.
5. In 2013, the Regional Forum on Business and Human Rights for Latin America and Caribbean Ecuador 
proposed a binding international legal tool enforcing the corporations’ human rights violations.
6. See the ‘Statement on Behalf of a Group of Countries at the 24th Session of the Human Rights Council’, 
available online at <http://business-humanrights.org/en/binding-treaty/un-human-rights-council-sessions> 
accessed 23 November 2014. The African Group, the Arabic Group Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Kyrgyzstan, Cuba, 
Nicaragua, Bolivia, Venezuela and Peru supported this declaration. Furthermore, more than 600 non-
governmental organisations formed a ‘treaty alliance’ to support it. See <http://www.treatymovement.com> 
accessed on 25 November 2014. Yet large human rights NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International did not join this initiative. For Human Rights Watch, ‘There need to be stronger human rights 
rules for business, but the UN’s decision to move ahead with the development of an international treaty that 
only covers transnational corporations is compromised by the opposition of key governments and its narrow 
mandate. The UN’s decision is too narrow since it only focuses on transnational corporations and will not 
address national or other businesses that should also be required to respect human rights.’ See <http://
business-humanrights.org/en/binding-treaty/un-human-rights-council-sessions> accessed 27 November 2014.
7. The Resolution of Ecuador and South Africa, signed in addition by Bolivia, Cuba and Venezuela is available 
online at <http://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/hrc-26_dr_bhr_ecuador.
pdf> accessed 25 November 2014. Norway’s resolution is available online at <http://www.norway-geneva.
org/Humanrights/Statements/26th-Session-of-the-Human-Rights-Council/Item-3-Promotion-and-protection-
of-human-rights/Business-and-Human-Rights-Resolution-/#.VHc_PIdzZD8> accessed 25 November 2014.
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In a divided vote,8 on the 26th of June 2014, the UN Human Rights Council 
adopted the resolution proposed by Ecuador and South Africa. Although the 
draft of the UN treaty is still being debated, the US and EU, together with 
Norway, have been openly voicing their opposition with threats of reducing 
their foreign direct investments.9 Thus, it is only to be seen what kind of 
tool, if any, the UN will ultimately adopt. Until then, the multinational 
corporations are only directly bound by national legislation,10 despite 
criticisms against the voluntary nature of obligations of companies proposed 
by the UN mechanisms, and their moral as well as legal foundations which 
should, otherwise, motivate the adoption of binding rules.11 But why are the 
transnational corporations of a concern for human rights violations in the 
first place? And subsequently, why is it that the supposedly human rights-
oriented states should oversee and enforce the human rights irrespective of 
where the atrocity took place? 
In most of the cases, a powerful multinational company moves its production 
outside of its country of origin due to fundamental disparities in terms of cost 
of production. There, farther away from its own law enforcement bodies, 
8. Twenty states were in favour, namely: Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, China, Congo, Cuba, Ethiopia, India, 
Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Morocco, Namibia, Pakistan, Philippines, Russian Federation, 
South Africa, Venezuela and Vietnam. Fourteen states were against: Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Macedonia, Montenegro, Republic of Korea, Romania, United Kingdom and 
United States of America. Thirteen countries abstained: Argentina, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Gabon, Kuwait, Maldives, Mexico, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, United Arab Emirates. More information 
available online at <http://business-humanrights.org/en/binding-treaty/un-human-rights-council-sessions > 
accessed on 27  November 2014.
9. Thalif Deen, ‘After Losing Vote, US-EU Threaten to Undermine Treaty’ Inter Press Service News Agency 
(United Nations, 28 June 2014) <http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/06/after-losing-vote-u-s-eu-threaten-to-
undermine-treaty/> accessed 25 November 2014.
10. ibid.
11. For a constructive criticism of the current stage of the international standards on business and human 
rights, see Surya Deva and David Bilchitz (eds), Human Rights Obligations of Business: Beyond the Corporate 
Responsibility to Respect? (Cambridge University Press 2014).
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courts, and stockholders, a company exploits arguably weaker legal systems 
and governments that often do not provide sufficient protection for workers, 
children, women, rural communities, and others. In the worst-case scenario, 
a company is directly involved in mass atrocities, including torture, killings, 
genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity.12 Human rights violations 
involving corporations are widespread, and they represent the need for 
appropriate legal remedies, judicial and others, that are able to grasp the 
transnational nature of such violations. Yet none of the leading human rights 
jurisdictions hereafter analysed (United States, United Kingdom, and 
Australia) have offered one. The trend (employed by the US) is towards 
limiting (including importantly under procedural grounds) the ability of 
victims to use those forums as an adequate remedy.13 
In this article, we highlight the recent jurisprudential developments of key 
human rights litigation involving corporations. First, we will analyse the 
US Alien Tort Claims Act 1789 (hereafter, ATCA 1789) and its related 
litigation. Then, we will highlight two essential grounds, on which the US 
Supreme Court has halted the corporate liability for human rights violations, 
namely (a) limitations to ‘subject matter’ jurisdiction and (b) ‘general’ 
12. Such allegations have been levelled against Shell and Chevron for their operations in Nigeria, or Exxon 
operations in Indonesia or BP in Colombia. For some of the cases filed in the US see Doe v Unocal Corp 963 F 
Supp 880, 883 (C.D. Cl. 1997) (alleging Unocal and Total SA of complicity in acts of torture, forced labor and 
forced relocation); Rio Tinto Plc v Sarei, (2013) 671 F.3d 736 (alleging that Rio Tinto, an Australian mining 
group, on the island of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea was complicit in war crimes and crimes against 
humanity committed by the army during a secessionist conflict). The case was dismissed on the 28th of June 
2013 in the light of Kiobel case, decided by the US Supreme Court in April 2013 limiting the presumption of 
extraterritoriality of the Alien Tort Claims Act.
13. The UN Human Rights Council established a ‘Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises’ (hereinafter UN Working Group). On April 10th 2012, the UN 
Working Group outlined as one of its strategic considerations ‘[t]he need for greater access by victims of 
business-related human rights abuse to effective remedies, which is urgent both in and of itself, as well as an 
important opportunity to drive implementation by setting the right incentives.’ Office of the High Commissioner 
of Human Rights, Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations
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jurisdiction.14 Subsequently, we analyze the court’s reasoning and present 
the effects of the decisions on the transnational corporate human rights 
litigation, and more importantly, which doors the US Supreme Court left 
open for future litigation. Furthermore, we explore alternative approaches 
and solutions in England and Australia. Ultimately, in light of the US, 
English and Australian reluctance on corporate liability, we invite the states 
to reflect on their own obligation to protect human rights and effectively 
regulate the activities of corporations that violate human rights in their 
extraterritorial operations.
II. ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT: BRIEF HISTORY & PRESENCE
The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA 1789) has its origins in the Judiciary Act 
of 1789 as one of the first laws enacted by the First Congress in 1789.15 The 
aim of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was to guarantee the availability of criminal 
and other business enterprise (United Nations, HRC 2029) Available online <http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Issues/Business/ A.HRC.20.29 _ AEV.pdf> accessed 27 November  2014.
14. One of the most essential questions of law is whether a court has jurisdiction to decide a given case; (1) 
whether it has jurisdiction over the person (in personam) and (2) over the subject matter (in rem). In simple 
terms, the subject matter jurisdiction (often referred to as general jurisdiction) regards the jurisdiction over 
the issue/subject in controversy. Depending on the constitution or relevant procedural legislation the general 
jurisdiction may be granted to all courts or distributed among specialised courts. In the US the state courts 
have general jurisdiction, which means that they can hear any case except those prohibited by state law 
and those allocated to federal courts. For certain issues, the federal courts hold exclusive jurisdiction such 
as bankruptcy. The personal jurisdiction is the power of the case over the parties involved. Before a court 
can hear a case, it is required that the party has a certain minimum contact with the forum of the court, see 
International Shoe v Washington 326 US 310 (1945). Personal jurisdiction may be waive-able once the party 
appears before the court and does not object the lack of court’s jurisdiction over it.
15. The ATCA 1789 was a direct response to enforce those international law rules that directly regulated 
individual conduct. See William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (4th edn, G Chase 1923) 
881. According to Blackstone: ‘Offences against the law of nations can rarely be the object of the criminal 
law of any particular state. For offences against the law are principally incident to whole states or nations’ in 
which case recourse can only be had to war… But where the individuals of any state violate this general law, 
it is then the interest as well as the duty of the government, under which they live, to animadvert upon them 
with a becoming severity that the peace of the world may be maintained.’
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and civil remedies against individual violators of the ‘law of nations.’16 The 
‘law of nations,’ can be compared to today’s customary international law.17 
Although the ‘law of nations’ in the late 18th century referred only to three 
offences, namely: violation of safe conduct, interference with ambassadors, 
and piracy on the high seas, the US Second Circuit after almost two centuries 
unexpectedly broadened the scope of the ATCA 1789 in the Filartiga case,18 
and thus, the applicability of the ATCA 1789 has been revived.19 
The First Congress intended the ATCA 1789 to be a limited jurisdictional 
statute. However, in both the Filartiga and Sosa v Alvarez Machain cases,20 
the US courts acknowledged that the development in international law 
16. The original language of the statute (28 USCA §1350) reads that, ‘[t]he district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States.’ Also, at this point in time, the individual states had to communicate relevant 
international norms to their citizens and all others within their jurisdiction and consequently ensure that the 
violators of these norms were punished. See Anne-Marie Burley, ‘The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary 
Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor’ (1989) 83 Am J Int’l L 461, 476; For more on ‘law of nations’, see Sarah 
Joseph, Corporations and Transnational Human Rights Litigation, vol 4 (Hart Publishing 2004) 22–33.
17. Blackstone defines the law of nations as ‘a system of rules… established by universal consent among the 
civilised inhabitance of the world; in order to decide all disputes which… must frequently occur between two 
or more independent nations, and the individuals belonging to each.’ See Blackstone 66, William Blackstone, 
Commentaries of the Laws of England: A Facsimile of the First Edition of 1765-1769 (University of Chicago 
Press 1979) .
18. The US Second Circuit court as well reflected on the definition of ‘law of nations’ in current setting. 
In the case of Filartiga v Pena-Irala, 630 F 2d 876 (2d Cir 1980) 886, the US Supreme Court did not 
ultimately resolve this knot, but settled with evolving standard for determining which torts are actionable 
under international law. Later, the cause of action in Filartiga was reaffirmed and extended in the Torture  
Victim Protection Act 1991, 28 USC §1350 App.
19. Although the Filartiga case is very unfortunate, it helped to start a new phase in the protection of human 
rights outside one’s own borders. For more see a piece written by a brother of a victim of torture in Paraguay, 
Dolly Filártiga, ‘American Courts, Global Justice’ NY Times (New York, 30 March 2004) <http://www.
nytimes.com/2004/03/30/opinion/american-courts-global-justice.html> accessed  25 May 2014.
20. Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 542 US 692 (2004). In Sosa, a Mexican national brought a claim against the US 
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) for allegedly violating his civil rights as the DEA kidnapped him in Mexico 
and brought him to trial to the US for the murder of a DEA agent. In this case, the first ATCA 1789 decided 
by the US Supreme Court, the court noted that ATCA 1789 was to be used only for a ‘relatively modest 
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should be recognised in the ATCA 1789.21 Despite  the fact that the US 
Supreme Court in Sosa v Alvarez-Machain cautiously adopted a restrictive 
approach to possible causes of action under the ATCA 1789, the later US 
courts broadened the scope of the ATCA 1789 in instances when the human 
rights violation breached customary international law.22 Some US courts have 
applied a stricter standard, under which a breach of ‘the law of nations’ has 
to be ‘specific, universal and obligatorily condemned.’23 However, this test 
does not emanate from international law. Thus, as a majority of US courts 
have confirmed, the courts should apply the dynamic definition of human 
rights protected by the ‘law of nations.’ Human rights, protected under the 
ATCA 1789, should be interpreted contemporarily and the concept should 
continue to develop.24 
set of actions alleging violations of the law of nations’ and it advocated that federal courts should restrain 
themselves in constituting new causes of actions under ATCA 1789, see Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 124 S Ct 
2739, 2759-2761 (2004).
21. See Filartiga v Pena-Irala, 630 F 2d 876, 884 (1980). In determining which sources were relevant to 
customary international law, the Second Circuit discussed the sources, from which customary international 
law could be derived, namely the usage of nations, judicial opinions, and the work of jurists. Citing the 
Paquette Habana, 175 US 677 (1900), which reaffirmed that ‘where there is no treaty and no controlling 
executive or legislative at or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized 
nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators… who have made themselves 
peculiarly well acquainted with the subject of which they treat.’ Given the referral to ‘universal renunciation 
in the modern usage and practice of nations,’ the Second Circuit held that the district court had subject 
matter jurisdiction under the ATCA 1789. Although in the Sosa case, the US Supreme Court did not consider 
the ‘illegal detention of less than a day, followed by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt 
arraignment’ as a violation of customary international law, the US Supreme Court instructed lower courts to 
consider whether international law extended the scope of liability for a given norm to the perpetrator being 
sued, if the defendant is a private actor, such as a corporation or individual, see Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 542 
US 692, 732 (2004).
22. As Filartiga itself clearly stated. Jordan J Paust, ‘Human Rights Responsibilities of Private Corporations’ 
[2002] 35 Vand J Transnat’l L 801, 824.
23. This standard has been particularly popular in the Ninth Circuit since Forti v Suarez-Mason 672 F Supp 
1531 (ND Cal 1987).
24. Although there are some judges supporting originalist position, the majority of the US decisions support 
the dynamic and evolving concept of human rights. See Tel-Oren v Libyan Arab Republic 726 F 2d 774 (DC 
Cir 1984) 812-16.
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After reflecting on the Filartiga case, US Congress adopted the Torture 
Victim Protection Act 1992 (TVPA 1992) in 1992.25 The TVPA allows 
victims of certain international law violations, or their representatives, to 
bring a civil suit against those responsible in federal district court. There 
has been some doubt whether the TVPA is applicable to corporations, 
given the Beanal v Freeport-McMoran26 and Sinaltrainal v Coca Cola27 cases. 
Nevertheless, in the light of recent case law, corporations are subject to 
the TVPA suit as Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in the Kiobel case 
indicated (see below). Although the US Supreme Court still has not ruled 
on the issue.
In recent years, there has been considerable litigation connected to the 
ATCA 1789, where plaintiffs have wished to use this legal instrument as a 
human rights remedy for violations involving corporations. Consequently 
they face jurisdictional challenges, both as to the personal jurisdiction as 
well as the subject matter jurisdiction. Concerning the expanding personal 
jurisdiction, in 1995 the Second Circuit rendered a decision in Kadic v 
Karadzic, addressing for the first time the responsibility of non-state 
actors.28 The court concluded that the international law applies to all actors, 
including private citizens.29 Thus, this extends the application of the ATCA 
1789 to corporate defendants. Since then, some have hoped that the US 
would become a battleground for litigating human rights violations involving 
25. Pub L 102-256 HR 2092.
26. Beanal v Freeport-McMoran Inc, 969 F Supp 362 (ED La 1997) 382-83, where the court found that the 
corporations could not be held liable and on appeal the Circuit Court did not explicitly state its opinion, see 
197 F 3d 161 (CA5 La, 1999), 169.
27. Sinaltrainal v Coca Cola 256 F Supp 2d 1345 (SD Fla 2003) 1359 or Estate of Rodriguez v Drummond 256 
F Supp 2d 1250 (WD Al 2003) 1266-67.
28. Kadic v Karadzic (1995) 70 F 3d 232. This case involved claims of extensive human rights abuses, including 
torture, war crimes and genocide against Radovan Karadzic.
29. ibid [241-43].
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corporate entities,30 given that the US is the only jurisdiction with a statute 
that creates a specific statutory claim for human rights violations.31 Yet, this 
aspiration has been halted by the Kiobel case as far as extraterritoriality is 
concerned, and the Daimler case as it is related to general jurisdiction.
III. US LIMITATIONS TO TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION: 
GENERAL JURISDICTION AND SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
a. US Standard on General Jurisdiction: Goodyear and Daimler cases and 
the Unclear ‘Exceptional Cases’
In the United States, general jurisdiction or all-purpose jurisdiction is currently 
governed by two recent US Supreme Court cases: Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, SA v Brown32 and Daimler AG v Bauman.33 Justice Ginsburg 
handed down both cases, before an unanimous court in Goodyear, and for 
a majority court in Daimler AG which included a combative concurring 
30. In Doe I v Unocal Corp, 963 F Supp 880, the district court found a corporation liable for acts of slavery 
and forced labor. In Beanal v Freeport-McMoRan 969 F Supp 3623, the district court held a company liable 
for genocide.
31. There are number of reasons, why the US represents such an appealing jurisdiction. One, the US rules on 
personal jurisdiction allow a plaintiff to sue an individual who is only temporarily present in the US, if they 
are served with a lawsuit during their stay (e.g. Pena Irala or Radovan Karadzic). Although the US is not 
the only legal system that recognises additional grounds for jurisdiction, the US procedural rules happen to 
function in a manner that permits civil human rights litigation brought by aliens, which took place in another 
country to proceed more easily than elsewhere. For more on the transnational jurisdictional systems, see Hans 
Smit, ‘Common and Civil Law Rules of In Personam Adjudicatory Authority: An Analysis of Underlying 
Policies’ (1972) 21 Int’l & Comp LQ. Another reasons are the legal costs, possibility of contingency fees 
or liberal discovery procedure see Beth Stephens, ‘Corporate Liability: Enforcing Human Rights Through 
Domestic Litigation’ (2000) 24 Hastings Int’l & Comp L Rev 410. In our opinion it is also the pursuit of jury 
trial and punitive damages that render the US court system more appealing.
32. US Supreme Court, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, SA v Brown, 131 S Ct 2846 (2011), decided on June 
27th, 2011. All page numbers in this case from now on are from the following version, available at <http://
supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/564/10-76/> accessed 27 May  2014.
33. Daimler AG v Bauman, 134 S Ct 746 (2014).
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opinion by Justice Sotomayor, as detailed below. In these two cases, the US 
Supreme Court sets limits to general jurisdiction.
By general jurisdiction in the US, as opposed to jurisdiction derived from 
the specific controversy at stake, this article refers to ‘instances in which the 
continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial 
and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising 
from dealings entirely distinct from those activities,’34 as defined by the 
Court itself in International Shoe Co v Washington. In other words, as far 
as transnational human rights litigation is concerned, general jurisdiction 
is relevant once it allows state courts in the US to decide on causes of 
action that occurred elsewhere, (e.g. in foreign countries, as long as a certain 
connection between the corporate activities (usually, a local subsidiary) and 
the forum state can be established).
The Goodyear and Daimler cases explore exactly how close these connections 
need to be in order to justify general jurisdiction before state courts. In 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, SA v Brown, (Goodyear case) the 
background story concerns a bus accident in France caused by a defect in 
a tire produced by a foreign subsidiary of Goodyear USA in Turkey, which 
victimized two young boys originally from North Carolina. The transnational 
nature of this case is clear from its outset; the case enquires whether general 
jurisdiction before US state courts covers activities of foreign subsidiaries 
that occurred outside of the forum state, or of the US for that matter. 
In the Court’s words, the issue in the Goodyear case was defined as follows: 
‘are foreign subsidiaries of a United States parent corporation amenable to 
34. International Shoe v State of Washington, 326 US 310 (1945) 318.
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suit in state court on claims unrelated to any activity of the subsidiaries in 
the forum State?’35 The legal basis of the Goodyear case was the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, within which the jurisdictional 
exercise ‘over out-of-state corporation must comply with ‘traditional notions 
of fair play and substantial justice.’’36 Such expression was first outlined in 
Milliken v Meyer37 of 1940, and quoted by the Justices in International 
Shoe38 and Goodyear.
In the Goodyear case, the US Supreme Court set a clear limitation to general 
jurisdiction. Notably, the Court established a ‘continuous and systematic’ 
standard (hereafter, Goodyear approach), as follows: 
A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) 
corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the 
State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the 
forum State.39 
In the case the US Supreme Court held that courts in North Carolina 
could not exercise general jurisdiction since the commercialization in North 
Carolina of some tires produced abroad did not constitute a ‘continuous and 
systematic’ affiliation with the forum state.. 40 
The Daimler case, decided on this terms, went a step further than Goodyear 
in setting further limits on general jurisdiction. As expressed by Cornett 
and Hoffheimer:
Daimler AG [case] is a game changer. In advancing the policy goal of giving corporations 
35. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, SA v Brown, 131 S Ct 2846 (2011), 1.
36. ibid, 2.
37. Milliken v Meyer, 311 US 457(1940) 463.
38. International Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310 (1945) 316.
39. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, SA v Brown, 131 S Ct 2846 (2011), 2.
40. ibid.
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the power to control states where they must answer legal claims, the Court shrinks 
the places of general jurisdiction against many large corporations to one or two states. 
The news media understandably greeted Daimler AG as restricting the existing law of 
personal jurisdiction.41 
Accordingly, Daimler departs from the Goodyear approach, based on 
‘continuous and systematic’ affiliations with the forum state, and then further 
restricts general jurisdiction rules.42 
As far as its factual background is concerned, Daimler is an ‘odd’ case 
from a procedural standpoint. It concerned allegations of human rights 
violations, including illegal detention, torture and kidnapping, committed 
by Argentinian security agencies in collaboration with one of Daimler’s 
subsidiary’s in Argentina, during the Dirty War in the 70s-80s in that 
country against the plaintiffs, Argentinean workers at Daimler’s subsidiary. 
The transnational nature of the case is clear: there are three countries 
involved; first, Germany, the place of incorporation of Daimler AG, where 
its main place of car manufacturing is located; second, Argentina, where 
the alleged violations took place in MB Argentina’s plant, a subsidiary of 
Daimler AG; and finally, the United States, where the law suit was presented 
by connecting Mercedes Benz USA (MBUSA), a corporation from Delaware 
which serves as Daimler’s indirect subsidiary, and California state, where 
MBUSA largely operates.
The plaintiffs chose California for two complementary reasons. First, as 
41. Judy M Cornett and Michael H Hoffheimer, ‘Good-Bye Significant Contacts: General Personal Jurisdiction 
after Daimler AG v Bauman’ [2014] Ohio St LJ, Forthcoming 1, 4.
42. As pointed out by Bernadette Bollas Genetin, ‘In summary, Bauman has restricted general jurisdiction 
primarily to a corporation’s states of incorporation and principal place of business. It has, moreover, indicated 
that a defendant’s ‘continuous and systematic’ forum contacts will rarely arise to the level of general 
jurisdiction.’ In: Bernadette Bollas Genetin, ‘The Supreme Court’s New Approach to Personal Jurisdiction’ 
[2015] SMU L Rev forthcoming, U of Akron Legal Studies Research Paper No 14-05, 35.
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Justice Ginsburg notes in Daimler, ‘under California’s long-arm statute, 
California state courts may exercise personal jurisdiction ‘on any basis not 
inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.’43 
Second, as pointed out in an amicus brief by the German Institute for 
Human Rights (Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte, DIMR) presented 
in the Daimler case, the most convenient forum would be the US, since 
‘German courts would apply the harsh limitation period of the ‘lex loci 
damni’, and German law imposes additional logistical and financial hurdles 
on non-European plaintiffs that effectively close off the German courts to 
the respondents in this case.’44 
In Daimler, there was a debate between Justice Ginsburg writing for the 
majority of the Court and Justice Sotomayor in her concurring opinion 
regarding what was the very issue at stake in the case.45 The Court had 
granted a quashing order in Daimler to address the following question: 
‘whether it violates due process for a court to exercise general personal 
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based solely on the fact that an 
indirect corporate subsidiary performs services on behalf of the defendant 
in the forum State.’46 Framing the issue like this, in light of Sotomayor’s 
concurring opinion, would have led the Court to a more individualised enquiry 
on the extent of MBUSA’s contacts in California in order to establish that 
California serves as a forum state as far as those contacts are imputable to 
43. Daimler AG v Bauman, 134 S Ct. 746 (2014), 6 (Justice Ginsburg).
44. Brief of the Amici Curiae German Institute for Human Rights and Other German Legal Experts in Support 
of Respondents, Daimler AG v Bauman, 134 S Ct. 746 (2014), available at <http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/
wp-content/uploads/2013/09/11-965-bsac-German-Institute-for-Human-Rights-and-other-German-Legal-
Experts.pdf> accessed 27 May 2014.
45. For a snapshot of this debate see footnote 16 in Justice Ginsburg’s opinion, in: US Supreme Court, Daimler 
AG v Bauman, 134 S Ct 746 (2014), 18.
46. Daimler AG v Bauman, 134 S Ct 746, 766 (2014) (Justice Sotomayor).
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Daimler. 
Yet the Court went further and analysed whether in general Daimler is ‘at 
home’ or not in California. Justice Ginsburg justifies this approach in light 
of the Goodyear standard. While deciding generally on all eventual general 
jurisdiction cases in California against Daimler, Justice Ginsburg states that 
‘in short, and in light of our path marking opinion in Goodyear, we perceive 
no unfairness in deciding today that California is not an all-purpose forum 
for claims against Daimler.’47 Such a broad framing of the issue at stake in 
Daimler was subject to heavy criticism outside of the courtroom by legal 
commentators48 in the aftermath, as well as from the judicial bench with 
Justice Sotomayor’s qualification of this approach as a ‘deep injustice.’49 
In responding to the issue framed as to whether Daimler is ‘at home’, in 
light of Goodyear, in California, Justice Ginsburg strikes a clear-cut limit to 
the exercise of state jurisdiction. The governing part of her opinion is that: 
With respect to a corporation, the place of incorporation and principal place of business 
are ‘paradigm bases for general jurisdiction.’ (…) Those affiliations have the virtue 
of being unique – that is, each ordinarily indicates only one place – as well as easily 
ascertainable.50  
47. Daimler AG v Bauman, 134 S Ct 746, 760 (2014), footnote 16 (Justice Ginsburg).
48. As William Baude puts it: ‘Readers of the Supreme Court’s decision yesterday in Daimler Chrysler v. 
Bauman may have learned two things: First, it is increasingly difficult to establish general jurisdiction over a
corporation for conduct unrelated to the forum; second, the Court ultimately resolves the issue it wants to, 
which may not be the one the parties focused on,’ In: William Baude, ‘Opinion recap: A stricter view of 
general jurisdiction’ SCOTUSblog (US 15 Jan 2014) <http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/01/opinion-recap-a-
stricter-view-of-general-jurisdiction/> accessed 27 May 2014.
49. For Justice Sotomayor, injustice lies on the fact that: ‘the majority’s approach unduly curtails the States’ 
sovereign authority to adjudicate disputes against corporate defendants who have engaged in continuous and 
substantial business operations within their boundaries,’ Daimler AG v Bauman, 134 S Ct 746, 772 (2014) 
(Justice Sotomayor).
50. Daimler AG v Bauman, 134 S Ct 746, 760 (2014) (Justice Ginsburg).
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With those words, Justice Ginsburg sets a clear shift in the general jurisdiction 
approach in the US: it indicates it is not enough anymore to have ‘continuous 
and systematic’ affiliations with the forum state as in Goodyear, but rather 
the place of incorporation and principal place of business which would serve 
as clear-cut paradigms. 
Yet here comes the tricky part of the Daimler standard advanced by the 
court. Although the post-Daimler literature has established that those 
paradigms constitute the current standard in terms of general jurisdiction,51 
Justice Ginsburg made it clear, although in a footnote, the possibility of ‘an 
exceptional case’, in the following words: 
We do not foreclose the possibility that in an exceptional case, (…), a corporation’s 
operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of 
business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at 
home in that State.52 
From the standpoint of transnational human rights violations claims brought 
using the ATCA 1789, the Daimler approach, by restricting general jurisdiction 
primarily to the place of incorporation or to the principal place of business, 
leaving aside exceptional cases, brings a series of difficulties for future 
applicants. First, although the Court in Daimler sought to clarify the 
Goodyear standard, it left an undefined53 category of ATCA 1789 exceptional 
cases. In this category, US state courts could exercise under the Due Process 
Clause general jurisdiction, even when the respective state forum is not the 
51. Cornett and Hoffheimer (n 44).
52. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S Ct 746, 761 (2014), footnote 19 (Justice Ginsburg).
53. As Donald Earl Childress III puts it: ‘[One of the criticism is that] the Court did not define the term 
‘exceptional circumstances.’ Of course, one wonders whether what is ‘exceptional’ is in the eye of the district 
court. This thus presents the possibility for creative lawyering and continued uses of general jurisdiction 
beyond what the Court appears to intend,’ In: Donald Earl Childress III, ‘General Jurisdiction after Bauman’ 
(2014) 66 Vanderbilt Law Review En Banc 197, 202.
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place of incorporation or the main place of business for the company. The 
question of what kind of cases would fit into this category remains open.
Second, upon reading Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor’s exchange in the 
Daimler case, it becomes clear that the US Supreme Court approach to 
general jurisdiction, in particular in cases involving large companies, has 
been dancing around two background issues: first, how to approach the 
matter of being at home in a world with large multinationals that can 
be considered either at home anywhere or nowhere; and second, how to 
conceptualize legal certainty in the current economic scenario of global 
companies. This is particularly relevant in light of the ATCA 1789 and its 
use as a remedy for worldwide human rights violations involving companies. 
In this sense, Justice Ginsburg seems to be worried, in light of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, with the lack of legal certainty 
in terms of general jurisdiction. Justice Ginsburg is explicit in this regard 
by stating that:
exorbitant exercises of all-purpose jurisdiction would scarcely permit out-of-state 
defendants ‘to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to 
where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.54 
In an ironic reply, Justice Sotomayor recalls that ‘Americans have grown 
accustomed to the concept of multinational corporations that are supposedly 
‘too big to fail’; today, the Court deems Daimler ‘too big for general 
jurisdiction.’’55 
This exchange reveals a judicial search for certainty, by focusing on local 
54. Daimler AG v Bauman, 134 S Ct 746, 761 (2014) (Justice Ginsburg).
55. Daimler AG v Bauman, 134 S Ct 746, 764 (2014) (Justice Sotomayor).
Queen Mary Law Journal Thiago Amparo and Alexandra Horváthová 17
paradigms of the corporate ‘home’, while struggling with increasingly 
spread corporations. In a sharp critique to the Daimler decision, Cornet 
and Hoffheimer defies Justice Ginsburg’s approach by stating that:
[W]hile her opinions restricting general jurisdiction evidence concern for the burdens 
facing corporations, they express no similar concern for the hardships they will impose 
on injured individuals. In a rush to protect defendants from the perceived evils of forum 
shopping, the Court gives corporations unprecedented power to predetermine what 
states or countries they can be sued in—and what law will apply against them.56 
This suggests that a human rights approach to corporate responsibly would 
have led the court, at least, to also take into consideration the lack of access 
to justice and the problems regarding legal certainty for victims rather than 
focusing solely on the corporations.
b. US Standard on Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Kiobel case
A further limitation to transnational litigation regarding human rights 
violations involving companies is related to ‘subject matter jurisdiction’. 
Again, in a previous case, Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co,57 decided 
in April 2013, the US Supreme Court rejects the trend towards using the 
ATCA 1789 as a transnational remedy for human rights violations. As seen 
above, Daimler imposes restrictions to general jurisdiction, by relying on 
local approaches to jurisdiction (main place of business or of incorporation).
In Kiobel, the question was different from the Daimler case. Yet, the 
rejection of the transnational nature of the ATCA 1789 persists. The former 
case concentrated on subject matter jurisdiction, in particular, on the 
extraterritorial application of the ATCA 1789. Accordingly, in Kiobel, the 
56. Cornett and Hoffheimer (n 44) 5.
57. Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, 133 S Ct 1659 (2013).
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Court framed the issue in the following terms; ‘the question presented is 
whether and under what circumstances courts may recognise a cause of action 
under the Alien Tort Statute, for violations of the law of nations occurring 
within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.’58 The 
factual background in Kiobel concerns allegations that non-US companies 
aided and abetted the Nigerian government in committing human rights 
violations in Nigeria through oil exploration. The petitioners were aliens 
that now live in the US after being granted asylum.
Chief Justice Roberts, authoring the Kiobel decision, adopts a strictly 
originalist approach to the question of extraterritorial application of the 
ATCA 1789. Here, an originalist approach is defined as the method of 
constitutional interpretation that seeks the original intent of the normative 
text at stake.59 Apart from the furious debate originalism has produced 
among constitutional scholars,60 the US Supreme Court has often sought 
to establish the original intent of a legal provision, by consulting historical 
documents, such as the files of the First Congress which adopted the ATCA 
1789 in order to assess what the framers of certain provision intended with 
its adoption.
This established the holding in Kiobel, which strikes as a prime example of 
originalist interpretation. After rejecting a textual reading of the expression 
‘law of nations’ as incorporating an extraterritorial approach to the ATCA 
1789,61 Chief Justice Roberts holds, writing for the Court, that the text 
58. ibid. 
59. ibid.
60. For a defence of originalism, see: Antonin Scalia, ‘Originalism: The Lesser Evil’ (1989) 57 University of 
Cincinnati Law Review 849. For a critique of originalism, see for instance: Robert C Post and Reva B Siegel, 
‘Originalism as a Political Practice : The Right’s Living Constitution’ (2006) 75 Fordham Law Review 545.
61. According to the Chief Justice Roberts: ‘To begin, nothing in the text of the statute suggests that Congress
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and the history of the ATCA 1789 does not overcome the ‘presumption 
against territoriality.’62 Chief Justice Roberts arrives at this conclusion by 
emphatically supporting an originalist approach to the ATCA 1789, reading 
‘law of nations’ as concerned primarily with ‘violation of safe conducts, 
infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.’63 Reading this 
provision in such an originalist way, the Court sees that nothing in the ATCA 
1789 overcomes the presumption against its extraterritorial application.
Yet, the Court went further by leaving an important door open for future 
litigation. At least, three aspects in Kiobel signal that the ATCA 1789 might 
otherwise be applied extraterritorially and that certainly it applies to US 
companies. First, Chief Justice Roberts established a ‘touch and concern the 
territory of the United States’64 standard. In this sense, a future case might 
be able to prove that it is related (or touches and concerns) to the US to the 
necessary extent, overcoming the presumption against the extraterritorial 
application of the ATCA 1789. Accordingly, as the literature has come to 
recognise,65 Kiobel does not prevent holding US companies accountable for 
their actions against aliens that violate the law of nations (leaving aside the 
difficulty of convincing the court that this legal category includes international 
intended causes of action recognised under it to have extraterritorial reach. The ATS covers actions by aliens 
for violations of the law of nations, but that does not imply extraterritorial reach—such violations affecting 
aliens can occur either within or outside the United States. Nor does the fact that the text reaches ‘any civil 
action’ suggest application to torts committed abroad; it is well established that generic terms like ‘any’ or 
‘every’ do not rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality.’ Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, 133 S 
Ct 1659 (2013), 7.
62. ibid.
63. Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013), 8.
64. Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, 133 S Ct 1659 (2013), 14.
65. According to Beth Stephens, for instance: ‘Holding U.S. citizens accountable for violations of international 
law, no matter where committed, would not have a negative impact on foreign affairs. Similarly, denying safe 
haven to non-citizens who have relocated to the United States is consistent with U.S. foreign policy interests,’ 
Beth Stephens, ‘Extraterritoriality and Human Rights After Kiobel’ (2013) 28 Md J Int’l L 256, 273.
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human rights law or part of it). Second, Justice Kennedy, in his very brief 
concurring opinion, is clear that future cases might apply extraterritorially in 
line with the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, even when ‘other cases 
may arise with allegations of serious violations of international law principles 
protecting persons.’66 Third, in their concurring opinion, Justice Breyer, joined 
by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan, make it clear which cases were 
primarily addressed by the ATCA 1789. Accordingly, they list the necessary 
conditions as follows: 
(1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an American national, 
or (3) the defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely affects an important American 
national interest, and that includes a distinct interest in preventing the United States 
from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or 
other common enemy of mankind.67 
Apart from Justice Breyer’s concern with impunity of human rights violators, 
it is possible to infer from Kiobel, as much as from Daimler, that the Court 
struggles with the transnational nature of human rights violations. Chief 
Justice Roberts’ focus on interests that ‘touch and concern’ US territory, 
as a reference point for ATCA 1789-based human rights litigation, is both 
imprecise and not solidly grounded. Of course, it is clear that US companies 
are still liable for human rights violations even under a narrow reading 
of Kiobel, yet the court fails to strike a balance between human rights as 
being one of the core concerns of contemporary US foreign policy and the 
impunity of alleged human rights violators worldwide. The court, again in 
Kiobel, goes local: it grounds its argumentation in US interests and history 
in an originalist way, thus avoiding the need to address in a serious manner 
the transnational nature of human rights violations. Yet Kiobel’s ‘touch and 
concern’, as much as Daimler’s ‘exceptional circumstances,’ leaves the door 
66. Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, 133 S Ct 1659 (2013), 1 (Justice Kennedy).
67. Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, 133 S Ct 1659 (2013), 7.
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partially open for transnational human rights litigation, despite the further 
obstacles both approaches pose for future litigators.
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
When researching other possible venues for transnational human rights 
violations, the intuition leads towards other common law countries as 
England, Canada, South Africa or Australia. In this article, we focused 
on two countries, England and Australia. Countries, where some issues 
of transnational human rights litigation have already arisen, but with no 
significant result.68 Yet in light of Daimler and Kiobel we have spotted in 
each jurisdiction some particularities which could serve as a source for other 
jurisdictions when enforcing human rights, irrespective of the perpetrator.
a. England
England has not been extensively exposed to transnational corporate 
human rights litigation. Yet English courts can exercise their extraterritorial 
jurisdiction for actions of English companies, as well as of non-English 
companies, that carry out business ‘to a definite and, to some reasonable 
extent, permanent place’69 within English jurisdiction. In England, a foreign 
company is deemed present within the jurisdiction if it has a business 
establishment there,70 regardless of whether the claim is directly connected 
68. The UK has adopted for transnational tort cases the Private International Law Miscellaneous Provisions 
Act 1995, under which there have been number of cases brought against the British TNCs. Yet the application 
of this Act is limited. See generally Sarah Joseph, Corporations and Transnational Human Rights Litigation 
(Hart Publishing, 2004) 113-117.
69. Littauer Glove Corp v F W Millington (1920) Ltd (1928) 44 TLR 746 (KB Div) 747 and Adams v Cape 
Industries [1990] Ch 433 (CA) 468.
70. Adams v Cape Industries [1990] Ch 433 (CA), 469.
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to this establishment.71 In a very old case from the beginning of 20th 
century, the court, in order to show the connection with England, had 
been satisfied with the presence of the company in England for nine days 
while it had been participating in an exhibition in London.72 Furthermore, 
a foreign corporation may be exposed to the English legal system via its 
agent or subsidiary.73 Thus, although English courts seem to have more 
extraterritorial power than the US courts, given the US’ stricter application 
of due process standard which requires closer ties between the US and 
the foreign corporate activities at stake, as demonstrated in Goodyear and 
Daimler for the establishment of jurisdiction, they also have to take into 
consideration the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union.74 
Moreover, even if the corporation has a branch or a subsidiary in England, 
the forum non conviniens doctrine (hereinafter ‘FNC’) will be consequently 
applied. According to the Spiliada case, English courts will dismiss the 
case if ‘another available forum, having competent jurisdiction, which is 
the more appropriate forum’ exists.75 In their determination of ‘the more 
appropriate forum,’ English courts adopted a three-element test. First, 
courts take into account the parties and their interests. Second, they assess 
71. Companies Act 2006 and the Overseas Companies Regulation 2009, ss 34, 37.
72. Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Actien-Gesellschaft für Motor und Motorfahrzeugbau Vorm Cudell & Co 
[1902] 1 KB 342 (CA).
73. Arnaud Nuyts, ‘Study on Residual Jurisdiction: General Report’ (2007) 36 et seq <http://ec.europa.eu/
civiljustice/news/docs/study_residual_jurisdiction_en.pdf> accessed on 27 May 2014.
74. Case C-281/02 Andrew Owusu v NB Jackson, 2005 ECR OJ C 106, para. 42, according to which a 
defendant has to foresee before which court it may be sued.
75. Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex [1987] AC 460 (HL). Under the English FNC, it has to be shown that 
some other forum is clearly more appropriate. Even if this ‘appropriateness’ is only limited time-wise. Even 
if the forum would not otherwise have a jurisdiction, it will be deemed available (see Lubbe v Cape Plc [2000] 
1 WLR 1545 (HL).
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the nature of the subject matter. Third, courts reflect whether ‘substantive 
justice’ will be achieved in that other forum.76 The third part of the test is 
from our perspective the most important, and in the Kiobel and Daimler 
cases indicate the US Supreme Court’s failure to reflect on this important 
aspect and if one concedes they did, for the sake of the argument, it was 
more in terms of providing legal certainty to the corporation rather than 
any substantial consideration regarding access to justice of the victims, 
as detailed above. Seeking justice has been one of the fundamental policy 
reasons for adopting the ATCA 1789, and yet it has virtually disappeared 
from the inks of the Justices of the US Supreme Court.77 
b. Australia
The Australian legal system is from many perspectives similar to the 
English. Yet the waters of transnational human rights litigation remain 
fairly untested given the current status of Australian law. In this part, we 
briefly reflect on a few issues, which render Australia, to certain extent, 
unattainable for human rights litigation.
First of all, Australia does not consider customary international law as a 
part of its common law.78 Thus, a statute providing action on the basis 
of corporate human rights violations has to be adopted in order to allow 
76. Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex [1987] AC 476 (HL). Recently, two cases have emphasised the significance 
of the ‘justice’ limb, see Connelly v RTZ [1998] AC 854 (HL) and Lubbe et al v Cape plc [2000] 4 All ER 
268 (HL).
77. The ATCA 1789 enabled foreign citizen so seek justice for injuries caused by state parties, see Richard 
L Herz, The liberalizing Effects of Tort: How Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute Advances 
Constructive Engagement (2008) 21 Harv Hum Rts J 207, 211.
78. Nulyarimma v Thompson (1999) 96 FCR 153 (FCA).
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transnational human rights litigation. Accordingly, such a bill, the Corporate 
Code of Conduct Bill was introduced in the Australian Senate on September 
6th 2000.79 Yet this statute did not pass and in addition the Parliamentary 
Joint Statutory Committee on Corporations and Securities found the Bill to 
be ‘impracticable, unworkable, unnecessary and unwarranted.’80 Therefore, 
the only claims which can be submitted to the Australian courts are statute- 
specific, e.g. environmental law. In connection to environmental protection, 
an Australian company, BHP, was sued in 1997 for water pollution in Papua 
New Guinea.81 Although, the case had been settled, the defendant did not 
seek dismissal on the grounds of forum non conveniens, given that Australia 
applies a higher standard of this doctrine. The defendant has to prove 
that Australia is ‘clearly [an] inappropriate forum’ in order to stay the 
proceeding.82 Thus, once the Parliament of Australia decides that the issue 
of human rights protection by the corporation is of a ‘practicable, workable, 
necessary and warranted’ nature, the courts will be most likely able to hear 
a case. The Australian rule on the choice of law may remain a challenge, 
given that the court applies the site of the tort as applicable law in all 
foreign tort cases.83 
In conclusion, unless the Parliament of Australia actively engages its role in 
79. Corporate Code of Conduct Bill (2000-2002) Available at <http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/
C2004B01333> accessed 28 May 2014.
80. More on the Australian Corporate Code of Conduct Bill see Surya Deva, ‘Corporate Code of Conduct 
Bill 2000: Overcoming Hurdles in Enforcing Human Rights Obligations against Overseas Corporate Hands of 
Local Corporations’ (2004) 8 Newcastle L Rev 87.
81. Dagi v BHP [1995] 1 VR 428 (SCt Vic).
82. Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538.
83. Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v Zhang (2002) 210 CLR 491 (HCA) 520. Some courts have 
emphasised the consideration of the acts causing an injury while others the place of injury. See e.g. Puttick v 
Tenon Ltd (2008) 83 ALJR 93.
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human rights protection, vis-à-vis corporate violations, victims will remain 
with limited legal remedies.
V. CONCLUSION
Each and every state has a clear human rights obligation to place an effective 
restraint on activities within its territory that violate human rights84 and to 
those individuals who are subject to a state’s jurisdiction.85 As emphasised 
in Daimler and Kiobel, these were not conventional cases. Yet the decisions 
were protective of the US judicial system and US interest and not of human 
rights, contrary to the repeatedly declared US foreign policy’s priority 
to protect human rights.86 Nevertheless, in both cases, the Court left the 
door partially open for future cases to be analysed – cases which would be 
less procedurally problematic if plaintiffs are able to frame their cases as 
exceptional ones as explained above.
Furthermore, in Kiobel the US Supreme Court underlines the local 
character of these proceedings, by confirming a strict presumption against 
84. See e.g. Article 2 of both the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966. Moreover, there are number of articles devoted 
to the responsibility of home state for violation of human rights by its companies, e.g. Steven R Ratner, 
‘Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility’ (2001) 111 Y  LJ 443; M Sornarajah, 
‘Linking State Responsibility for Certain Harms Caused by Corporate Nationals Abroad to Civil Recourse 
in the Legal Systems of Home States’ in C Scott (ed), Torture as Tort (Hart Publishing 2001); Robert 
McCorquodale and Penelope Simons, ‘Responsibility beyond Borders: State Responsibility for Extraterritorial 
Violations by Corporations of International Human Rights Law’ (2007) 70 MLR 598.
85. See e.g. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1959, art 1(1); of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Right 1976, art 2(1).
86. Many US departments and organizations have repeatedly emphasised the importance of protection of 
human rights. Eg. the US Department of State established Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 
promoting human rights around the world. Nevertheless, the US Supreme Court has repeatedly decided not 
to serve as a tool for such promotion and protection.
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extraterritoriality in Daimler, the court refers to the place of incorporation or 
principal place of business as main reference points for general jurisdiction. 
Yet, which business operates today from exclusively one place? The narrow 
approach that the Court has undertaken contravenes worldwide integration, 
the nature of present global business. In most cases, the defendants are not 
small of medium-sized companies. They are all multinational companies 
operating in almost all continents. The place of incorporation is only a 
formal requirement and business operations may even be carried out in 
‘the cloud’. Thus, the court should have been more flexible, rather than 
restrictive and more sensitive than formalistic.
Moreover, the argument of the US Supreme Court in Daimler regarding 
limiting the court’s jurisdiction by the Due Process Clause of the US 
Constitution seems highly arbitrary in light of other procedural rules.87 Of 
course, a corporation has to know where it can be sued, yet US courts should 
also reflect better on the transnational nature of human rights violations 
involving corporations today, and consequently consider the lack of judicial 
remedies victims often face, as emphasised by the UN Resolution of June 
26th 2014. 
Presuming that the UN will not be in a position to adopt a ‘Business 
and Human Rights Treaty,’ the individual states should ultimately follow 
their own advice. As the UK delegate stated during the UN Human Rights 
Council in June 2014, ‘this issue is one of the rule of law, the national rule 
87. In the US under its federal procedural rules an alien can be sued only on the basis of his or her presence on 
the US soil, See eg Burnham v Superior Court of California 495 US 604 (1990). Under certain circumstances, 
having a property in the US as well provides jurisdiction to US court over a person, see Shaffer v Heitner 433 
US 186 (1977), where the US Supreme Court held that in case of assertion of jurisdiction over defendant’s 
property has to also meet the standard of ‘minimum contacts’. Yet left open the question whether owning the 
property as a sole reason would grant jurisdiction to the court.
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of law in individual states.’88 Human rights should be protected on all levels, 
international, national and local. As multinational corporations become 
more globally powerful and literally omnipresent, so should the rule of law 
and protection and enforcement of human rights. As far as the jurisdictions 
have been analysed are concerned, developed countries’ legal systems seem 
to challenge human rights advocates to ‘catch them if they can.’89 In relation 
to transitional litigation on human rights, those advocates have not seen the 
light of the rule of law proudly andoften rhetorically professed within the 
legal circles in the Global North. 
88. UN Web TV, ‘Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises with respect to human rights’, United Nations (26 June 2014) HRC 26 L22 
<http://webtv.un.org/search/ahrc261.22rev.1-vote-item3-37th-meeting-26th-regulat-session-human-rights-
council/3643474571001?term=humanrights%20council&cort=date> accessed 23 November 2014. The ICC 
also states in a press release that ‘no initiative or standard with regard to business and human rights can 
replace the primary role of the state and national laws in this area.’ International Chamber of Commerce, 
‘ICC disappointed by Ecuador Initiative adoption’ International Chamber of Commerce (Paris, 20 June 2014) 
<http://www.iccwbo.org/News/Articles/2014/ICC-disappointed-by-Ecuador-Initiative-adoption/> accessed 
24 November 2014.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Under a Closed Material Procedure (CMP), a tribunal or court receives 
evidence or material from one party1 that remains undisclosed to the other 
parties while still allowing the court and the party in whose possession the 
material is to rely on the said material. CMPs are now an increasing feature 
in cases ranging from immigration, employment and planning proceedings 
to matters involving the foremost subject of national security. It must be 
noted that such procedures are an exception to the rule of law and the 
common law tradition. Lord Denning succinctly propounded; ‘…if the right 
to be heard is to be a real right which is worth anything, it must carry with 
it a right in the accused man to know the case which is made against him. 
He must know what evidence has been given and what statements have 
been made affecting him: and then he must be given a fair opportunity to 
correct or contradict them.’2 Yet, the UK Supreme Court dealt with no 
fewer than six CMPs related cases in its first 30 months.3 
In light of the Justice and Security Act 20134 (JSA 2013) coming into force, 
1. The party making the application for the case to be heard in a CMP.
2. Kanda v Government of Malaya [1962] AC 332.
3. Michael Fordham, ‘Secrecy, Security and Fair Trials: The UK constitution in Transition’ (2012) 17 JR 187, 
3.
4. HM Government, Justice and Security Act 2013.
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the question is whether CMPs are actually required, and if so, should they 
be extended beyond national security claims to civil litigation claims?
This essay will outline the existing and potential contradictions caused by 
the use of CMPs, as well as the arguments put forward by the government 
in justifying its need to pursue and further extend CMPs. The Justice and 
Security Bill (‘Bill’)5 provoked important discussions, some of which have 
been laid to rest by the Act. The JSA 2013 has generated some case law 
despite only coming into force a few years ago, which reflects a trend of 
the courts. It will be seen, in the course of this article that the Courts have 
leaned towards the more practical approach of protecting national security 
interests.
II. BACKGROUND
CMPs developed from the landmark European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) case of Chahal v United Kingdom.6 Chahal was denied access to 
the underlying materials used by the British executive to detain him within 
the UK. The Strasbourg Court allowed the appeal of Chahal on grounds of 
violation of article 3 and 5(4) of the ECHR. The Court then observed that 
the Canadian system of dealing with sensitive material in court was a ‘more 
effective form of judicial control’7 and that a ‘…substantial measure of 
procedural justice’8 must be kept in mind while balancing national security 
concerns.9 The UK Home office wanted to deport Mr Chahal to India for 
5. The Act originated in Justice and Security Green Paper, published on 3 October 2011, which later became 
the Justice and Security Bill 2012-13.
6. Chahal v United Kingdom (1996) ECHR 413.
7. ibid [131].
8. ibid.
9. ibid.
Queen Mary Law Journal Sameer Rohatgi 31
certain security reasons. At the time, the law in the UK did not allow for 
any appeal of such a deportation order and only permitted the right to have 
the order reviewed by an Advisory Panel, whose opinion was not binding on 
the Home Secretary. The Home Secretary could decide how much information 
would be released to the person being deported and he did not have to 
provide any reasons for the same. The UK Government lost the case in the 
ECtHR as the Court found that these procedures in the UK were in breach 
of articles 5(4)10 and 1311 of the Convention. The UK procedure was 
incompatible with article 5(4) as the Advisory Panel was not considered to 
be a ‘Court’. This gave rise to the creation of a quasi-judicial body in the 
UK called the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC).12
Recently, the Supreme Court in Al Rawi13 defined closed material 
procedures as a process where a party is permitted to withhold disclosure 
of certain sensitive material from the other parties, and in such cases, the 
court permits disclosure to an appointed ‘special advocate’ (representing 
the other parties) and where appropriate, the court itself.14 This withheld 
material is referred to as closed material and for it to be termed as so, 
such material must be contrary to public interest.15 ‘Public interest’ for the 
purposes of this definition was said to include matters affecting national 
security, international relations of the UK, the prevention or detection of 
crime and any other circumstances where disclosure is likely to harm the 
10. Article 5(4) says that anybody who is detained (Mr Chahal was detained prior to being deported) is 
entitled to have his order of detention ‘decided speedily by a court.’
11. Article 13 provides for ‘an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation 
has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.’
12. Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (SIAC).
13. Al Rawi v The Security Service [2011] UKSC 34.
14. ibid [2] (Neuberger MR).
15. ibid.
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public interest.16 Amnesty International was particularly concerned that 
this definition of public interest had a very wide import and would facilitate 
extensive use of the CMP mechanism even in cases where the State need not 
employ it.17 They felt that this blanket protection would be tantamount to 
a ‘very real impediment to securing genuine accountability for human rights 
violations.’18 This was an area that deeply concerned various international 
human rights organisations. The entrenched principle of open justice, which 
affords a party the right to know information leveled against them was 
being compromised for a supposed greater good. The main tug of war in 
this CMP debate is between the preservation of open and natural justice on 
the one hand, and the protection of national security interests on the other.
III. OPEN JUSTICE AND THE PII PROCEDURE
The open justice principle encompasses the rights of all parties subject to legal 
proceedings, together with those of the media and public, in promulgating a 
uniform public hearing that ensures no man or state organ is above the law, 
and that every man is held accountable for his actions.19 Open justice is a 
cardinal principle of our legal jurisprudence and is essential in the conducting 
of a fair trial. Open justice has been regarded as a constitutional principle20 
from the early times of Scott v Scott,21 where in-camera proceedings were 
held to be a violation of justice.22 The above rationale allows for confidence 
16. ibid [2] (Neuberger MR).
17. Amnesty was particularly worried about ‘de-facto claim to secrecy for the Security and Intelligence Services 
by allowing all material originated or handled by them to be automatically defined as ‘sensitive’ and so 
presumably placed into a closed session.’ Page 6 of the Amnesty International UK response January 2012.
18. ibid.
19. Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine [1979] AC 440, 45 (Lord Diplock).
20. Tariq v Home Office [2011] UKSC 35 [2012] 1 AC 452, [108-9] (Lord Brown).
21. Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417 (Lord Shaw of Dunfermline).
22. ibid.
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in the administration of justice. 
The principle of open justice allows the accused to know, in entirety, the case 
of the opponent against him, and therefore allows him to present his defense 
to all the averments sought by his opponent. Open justice also includes a 
larger intangible benefit, which is that the public is educated and informed 
by the open information. This generates a further social benefit of ‘public 
confidence in the integrity of the court system and understanding of the 
administration of justice.’23 The Chief Justice of Canada, Beverly McLachlin 
PC, in response to a question on whether open justice included accessibility 
to information, said very simply, ‘the law belongs to the people.’24 The use 
of secret evidence is prima facie irreconcilable with the principles of open 
justice, and as Lord Atkin famously remarked, ‘justice is not a cloistered 
virtue: she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful...comments 
of ordinary men.’25
However, the exception to the principle of open justice was expounded in the 
seminal case of Conway v Rimmer,26 through the concept known as Public 
Interest Immunity (PII). The modern origins of the procedure can be traced 
to the case of Duncan v Cammell Laird,27 a Second World War case where 
99 servicemen were killed during a submarine test and their next of kin 
decided to sue the manufacturers for negligence in design. The Admiralty 
intervened and certified28 the submarine’s design plans and the House of 
23. Attorney General (Nova Scotia) v MacIntyre [1982] 1 SCR 175, 185 (Justice Dickson).
24. Openness and the Rule of Law, Remarks of the Rt Hon Beverly McLachlin Chief Justice of Canada, at the 
Annual International Rule of Law lecture series 10th January 2014.
25. Ambard v Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago [1936] AC 322.
26. Conway v Rimmer [1968] AC 910.
27. Duncan v Cammell Laird [1942] AC 624.
28. Equivalent to a ministerial certificate.
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Lords held that a court of law has no business questioning such a ministerial 
certificate.29 However, the court soon overruled this approach. In Conway v 
Rimmer, a case on an employment dispute rather than national security, the 
House of Lords held that such a blanket protection (by way of a ministerial 
certificate) cannot be allowed in civil litigation and the Court would be the 
ultimate arbiter of whether any material should be disclosed or not. Under 
the present system of PII, if a party to litigation claims that they are not 
under an obligation to disclose certain material, the court must carry out 
a judicial balancing exercise, known as the ‘Wiley balance,’30 between the 
value of public interest in non-disclosure vis-à-vis that in disclosure, ie. in 
the administration of justice. Although the Wiley balance originates from 
Conway v Rimmer, it was only in 1996 that the government announced a 
crucial change in procedure, where ‘class’ protection31 would be done away 
with and all claims henceforth would be scrutinised to assess the real harm 
caused to public interest in the disclosure of the material.32 The Wiley 
balance requires the public authority in question (such as the minister in 
the Wiley case) to consider the aforementioned competing public interest 
in disclosure and non-disclosure and give a certificate to that effect to the 
court.33 Thereafter, the court decides whether disclosure should be withheld 
or whether an alternative to full disclosure exists.34 The Wiley balance is 
not being applied to the application of CMPs under the current statutes-
29. However, the Lords allowed the negligence claim to proceed on merits and later found that no negligence 
had been committed.
30. R v Chief Constable of West Midlands, ex parte Wiley [1995] 1 AC 274.
31. Before 1996, documents such as Ministerial minutes, were a class of documents that could never be 
disclosed even if the content of those documents was completely harmless. Conway v Rimmer [1968] AC 910, 
952 (Lord Reid).
32. See Adam Tomkins, The Constitution after Scott (OUP 1998) 197-9.
33. A Tomkins, ‘Justice and Security in the United Kingdom,’ 47 Israel L Rev 3, 6.
34. See R (Serdar Mohamed) v Secretary of State for Defence [2012] EWHC 3454.
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particularly SIAC35 (under the Terrorism and Prevention Investigation 
Measures Act 2011) and in the Investigatory Powers Tribunals (IPT). The 
procedure followed by the IPT is much stricter than that of the SIAC. 
In the IPT, there is a blanket protection on disclosure of all sensitive or 
secret material irrespective of whether its contents are considered to be 
non-harmful.36 Furthermore, if a claim is rejected by the IPT, no reasons 
are supplied.37
At this point, a clear distinction must be drawn between undisclosed material 
and closed material (secret evidence); the former concept is one where the 
judge or decision maker is not made privy to the said material while reaching 
a conclusion. Therefore, in a PII case, the material (in its entirety) that is 
removed from the proceedings is undisclosed material. In the case of secret 
evidence, the material is admitted on the record if it has been relied on 
and does not need to be disclosed to the suspect. Thus, in a PII case, the 
information contained in the undisclosed material is less significant, though 
not insignificant, as it could potentially contain exculpatory material.
The two significant differences between the two procedures are: (a) in PII 
cases, the court conducts a balancing exercise between the competing public 
interests, while in a CMP, absent any equivalent balancing exercise, the 
court’s task is to exclude any material that may harm public interest; and 
(b) in PII cases, if the balance tilts towards non-disclosure, the material is 
35. The Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) was created by the Special Immigration Appeals 
Commission Act 1997. It deals with appeals in cases where the Home Secretary exercises their statutory 
powers to deprive an individual of their British citizenship, deport an individual from the UK, or revoke an 
individual’s immigration status on the basis of withheld material, the disclosure of which would jeopardise 
either national security and/or the relationship between the UK and some other country.
36. See IPT Ruling on Article 6 IPT/01/62 and IPT/01/77, 23 Jan. 2003.
37. ibid.
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excluded from the trial altogether whereas in a CMP, the ‘closed’ material 
still remains available to the court and can be relied on by one party.38
Prima facie, the equality or fairness balance tilts towards the use of the PII 
procedure as opposed to CMPs. It must also be borne in mind that both 
procedures aim to protect slightly different interests. The PII procedure 
seeks to achieve fairness between the parties where, after material has been 
excluded on the request of one party, even that party cannot rely on it. 
Therefore the adversarial component of common law justice remains intact 
as the parties remain on an equal footing. In a CMP, the focus is on securing 
justice at any cost. Hence, the propensity to mislead an otherwise impartial 
judge is a real possibility as the ‘closed material’ is untested and one-sided.39 
Material that has been kept away from the eyes of the accused and is 
only scrutinized by the judge is, in the adversarial nature of our court 
proceedings, uncontested by the other side and therefore, remains untested 
in the scheme of an adversarial court process. 
Under the JSA 2013, once a section 6(1) declaration has been initiated,40 
section 8(1) requires the court ‘to give permission for material not to be 
disclosed if it considers that the disclosure of the material would be damaging 
to the interests of national security.’41 Hence, once the ‘CMP trigger’ has 
been pulled, the court cannot conduct a balancing exercise of interests and 
is required to permit the withholding of any material that may compromise 
national security from the non-government party. The court cannot disclose 
38. Human Rights Joint Committee, Report on the Justice and Security Green paper, HL paper 286, 32, [97].
39. Liberty’s Committee stage briefing on Part 2 of the Justice and Security Bill in the House of Commons; 
January 2013.
40. Section 6(1) of the Act permits the court to make a declaration that the ‘proceedings are proceedings in 
which a closed material application may be made to the court.’
41. Justice and Security Act 2013, s 8(1)(c).
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the information even if it feels it would be in the interest of open justice. 
Serious implications flow from these aspects of the Act as they amount to 
creating a fetter on the courts discretion in a situation where the court 
may want to disclose the sensitive material irrespective of the damage such 
disclosure would cause to national security.42 An amendment to provide this 
very discretion to the judge was accepted by the House of Lords during the 
report stage.43 This amendment would have ensured that the judge would 
determine whether a claim for PII could be made out in the first place, and 
only after this determine whether a fair determination could be made by 
other means. This would have increased the court’s flexibility and allowed 
for a balancing of interests.
 
IV. A DENIAL OF NATURAL JUSTICE?
Lord Dyson, giving the leading judgment in Al Rawi, spelled out the 
principles of natural justice, namely that a party must know all details 
of the case levelled against him and that he be given the opportunity to 
respond to the allegations and evidence led against him. He also added that 
the parties must be given access to the courts judgment along with reasons 
for it.44 JUSTICE, in its report, similarly concluded that CMPs do not 
allow for significant features of a fair trial such as the right to an adversarial 
hearing and the equality of arms principle.45 The equality of arms principle 
affords an opportunity to all parties to have knowledge of and challenge 
the evidence brought against them in court, with a view to influencing the 
42. For example, a situation where the court feels that although disclosure would cause harm to national 
security, disclosure of the material would result in greater preservation of justice.
43. Amendment 35, House of Lords Report Stage, November 2012.
44. Al Rawi (n 13) [12-13].
45. Justice, Secret Evidence (London: Justice, 2009), [416-418].
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court’s judgment.46 The opposing view on this proposition (in support of 
CMPs or the pragmatists) is that as long as the judge has access to all the 
evidence, he is bound to be in a better position to achieve a fair result. 
However, Lord Kerr responded to the above proposition by pointing to a 
‘central fallacy of the argument’; ‘[e]vidence which has been insulated from 
challenge may positively mislead.’47 CMPs can be undemocratic in so far 
as they deny the public the right to scrutinize judicial decision-making. 
They can be used to cover up serious, albeit infrequent, wrong doings of 
intelligence agencies and lead to a drop in professional standards if evidence 
goes by unchallenged.
The government justifies a departure from open and natural justice,48 by 
pointing to certain statutory exceptions such as protecting the interests of a 
child,49 justice50 and national security.51  The irony contained in justifying a 
departure from natural and open justice, by citing the ‘interests of justice’ 
in Rule 39.2(3)(g), is not to be missed. The government alludes to the 
exception in Article 6 ECHR, which also permits an exception to public 
hearings for national security concerns.52 The case of Carnduff v Rock53 
is the exception the government alluded to, where the claim of a police 
informer for money was held to be unjustifiable by the Court stating that in 
order to achieve a fair hearing, the court would have to disclose confidential 
material for which the public interest in withholding the information was 
46. Lobo Machado v Portugal [1996] ECHR 15764/89, [31].
47. Al Rawi (n 13), [93](Lord Kerr).
48. Justice and Security Green Paper, October 2011, [1.9, 5].
49. CPR Rule 39.2(3)(d).
50. CPR Rule 39.2(3)(g).
51. CPR Rule 39.2(3)(b).
52. Kennedy v UK (2011) 52 EHRR 4, [188].
53. Carnduff v Rock [2001] EWCA Civ 680.
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greater than having the claim litigated openly.54 The argument for CMPs 
is that such cases would be litigated fairly if the court, without comprising 
confidential material, could use the material and reach a just conclusion. It 
has been admitted that if a CMP were introduced, it might not have been 
necessary to strike out such a claim,55 but bearing in mind that such cases 
are a rarity, it was considered a disproportionate response to introduce a 
‘fundamental change’ in civil litigation to allow CMPs.56 David Anderson 
QC, in an answer to a question, said that he was not aware of any other 
cases that were akin to Carnduff v Rock.57
It does seem that in a Carnduff-like case, a CMP would provide more 
flexibility and fairness as the government cannot always withdraw from 
litigating such cases from fear of disclosure of sensitive material as that 
would set a bad precedent of the government paying out unmeritorious 
claims. Lord Hope referred to this situation in Tariq and remarked that it 
‘would lead to the Government being seen as an easy target for unjustified 
claims.’58 The Carnduff situation remains a dilemma, which must be resolved 
by reviewing the practical situation on the ground and determining the 
frequency of such cases occurring. 
Post Al Rawi, CMPs cannot be invoked in judicial reviews,59 leading to 
certain immigration cases allowing an unwanted individual to enter the 
54. ibid.
55. Al Rawi v The Security Service [2011] UKSC 34, [116].
56. ibid [50].
57. Joint Committee on Human Rights, Legislative Scrutiny: Justice and Security Bill, Oral Evidence HC370–i–
iii 2012.
58. Home Office v Tariq [2011] UKSC 35, 79 (Lord Hope).
59. Al Rawi v The Security Service [2011] UKSC 34, [170]. Lord Clarke held that there was no principled basis 
for distinguishing between ordinary (tort) civil claims and claims for judicial review as ‘both may involve 
identical questions of law and fact.’ Therefore, he found that CMPs should not be allowed in either type of
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UK as the intelligence agencies would rather allow that than disclose the 
intelligence. A case concerning important principles of privacy and access 
to secret evidence was the ‘extraordinary rendition’ of Binyam Mohamed.60 
This case involved the ‘control principle,’ whereby intelligence received 
from another country is not released without the permission of the country 
from where the information originated, thereby allowing for a reliable and 
trustworthy relationship between nations.61 The basis for the existence of 
the control principle is that only the country from whom the information 
originated can fully understand the sensitivities at play in procuring the 
information and therefore they alone must remain in full control of its 
handling and dissemination.62 The intelligence agencies were concerned about 
the so-called Norwich Pharmacal principle,63 under which an application can 
be made for information from those who are not parties to a case but have 
been mixed up in wrongdoing, albeit innocently. The Norwich Pharmacal 
principle arose from a case of the same name where an owner of a patent of 
a chemical was aggrieved as the chemical was being imported into the UK 
without his permission. The aggrieved party (victim) applied for information 
pertaining to the identity of the importer (wrongdoer) from the Customs 
authorities (third party), but his request was declined. He then approached 
the Court where the House of Lords held that where a third party had 
become involved in unlawful conduct, they were under a duty to assist the 
person suffering damage by giving them full information and disclosing the 
identity of the wrongdoers.
case. This was however not followed by the Legislature as section 6 of the JSA 2013 now permits CMP in both 
ordinary civil claims as well judicial review cases.
60. R (Mohamed) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 1) [2008] EWHC 248 and 
(No 2) [2009] EWHC 152.
61. It is a principle of conduct, not of law.
62. HM Government, Justice and Security Green Paper, October 2011: Cm 8194.
63. Norwich Pharmacal Co & Others v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] AC 133.
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Mr Mohamed initiated a judicial review claim in the UK invoking the 
Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction of the English Courts to enable his US 
lawyer to rely on the information in the US proceedings.64 Under a Norwich 
Pharmacal order (NPO), a third party may be legally obliged to provide the 
victim with the information, pertaining to the wrongdoer, in its possession. 
This is the disclosure the Divisional Court (upheld by the Court of Appeal) 
permitted, where the third party were the UK intelligence agencies and the 
victim was Mr Mohamed who required the material for his defence in front 
of the US court proceedings against the US intelligence agencies.
An argument in support of CMPs is that if the court orders disclosure of 
information under a PII application, the intelligence agencies would have 
to risk compromising the information or withdrawing the claim completely, 
whereas in a CMP they would be able to safeguard the secrecy of the 
information while maintaining fairness of trial.65 Thus, even after a court 
has approved a NPO in favour of disclosure, the government resisting the 
disclosure order can make a PII application. However, if the Court rejects 
the PII application, then the government must disclose the information. 
A direct corollary of the above is that if the government loses the PII 
application in court, no ejector seat exists for the government to pull out at 
that stage. Therefore, in the post-PII stage, the government does not have 
a final safety net for the purposes of protecting evidence it deems too secret 
to disclose. The government will have to consider, at the pre-PII stage itself, 
the real possibility of losing a PII claim and the following open disclosure 
64. The judicial review claim was heard in a CMP by the Divisional Court, which ordered disclosure of the said 
information, subject to any PII claim the Secretary of State (SoS) might want to initiate. The information 
was subsequently released by an order of the US Court hearing a Habeas Corpus claim (brought by a number 
of Guantanamo detainees at the US District Court for the District of Columbia).
65. HM Government, Justice and Security Green Paper, October 2011: Cm 8194.
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of information, an important deciding factor in whether the risk of losing a 
PII application is worth it.
In the aftermath of the Binyam Mohamed case, where a UK court ordered 
the release of sensitive information procured from US intelligence agencies, 
the UK has been warned by other countries to safeguard the information 
they receive from the international community or else the information inflow 
would dry up. The Norwich Pharmacal principle is another example or 
aspect of privacy invasion66 which ushered in the pragmatism v principle 
debate, as the principle provides the court with discretion to legally bind 
a third party to release information pertaining to a particular case, as was 
done in Binyam Mohamed. However, in case of an NPO, the privacy of the 
innocent third party is invaded to meet the ends of justice. Nonetheless, 
section 17 of the JSA 2013 protects intelligence agencies from the courts 
power to order disclosure of ‘sensitive information.’67 
The next section deals with an important functional aspect of CMPs, the 
government appointed special advocates. Special advocates are provided to 
defend the non-government party in the closed proceedings. These advocates 
suffer from an inherent conflict of interest by reason of them being appointed 
by the government itself, often to oppose the government’s request for CMP.
V. THE SPECIAL ADVOCATES PROCEDURE 
Under closed proceedings, the government will divide its evidence into ‘open’ 
66. In the case of an NPO, the privacy of the intelligence is compromised as they are forced to release 
information even when they have not perpetrated the unlawful conduct. On the other hand, the information 
in their possession is a potential game changer for the (allegedly innocent) victim.
67. Justice and Security Act 2013, s 17.
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and ‘closed’ bundles, where the latter will not be provided directly to the 
other party but to a security-cleared special advocate assigned to represent 
the said party, appointed by the Attorney General. The concept of special 
advocates in the UK has Canadian origins,68 but was first implemented in the 
UK post the Human Rights Court case of Chahal v United Kingdom,69 where 
the court subtly advised the UK to follow such a procedure. In response, 
the UK enacted SIAC and the first statutory reference of special advocates 
was made in section 6 of the SIAC. Most practicing special advocates 
unanimously agree that the procedure has various practical problems, such 
as not having the power to rebut or adduce evidence presented in closed 
proceedings or mount challenges against objections to disclosure raised by 
the government.70 The fact that they are government-appointed is itself an 
existing contradiction which could lead to bias and undermine their efforts 
in ensuring a fair trial. Lord Hewart CJ (as he then was) famously remarked, 
albeit in a judgment not concerning CMPs, that ‘justice should not only 
be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.’71 The 
Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) said that it was ‘entirely fanciful’ 
to think that special advocates can cross examine expert evidence, and 
stressed that they have ‘no means of gainsaying the governments assessment 
that disclosure would cause harm to public interest.72 Lastly, the stifling 
restrictions imposed on communications between special advocates and the 
parties they represent do not ensure a substantial measure of procedural 
68. It has been argued that the European Court misinterpreted the Canadian procedure in the first place and 
secondly, it wrongly asked the UK to adopt its own misunderstood version of the Canadian procedure. For 
a general discussion, see D Jenkins, There and Back Again: The Strange Journey of Special Advocates and 
Comparative Law Methodology, Columbia Human Rights Law Review, 2011.
69. Chahal v United Kingdom (1996) ECHR 413.
70. M Chamberlain, ‘Special Advocates and Procedural Fairness in Closed Proceedings’ (2009) 28 CJQ 314.
71. The King v Sussex Justices [1924] 1 KB 256.
72. Joint Committee on Human Rights, 9th Report of 2009–10, HL 64, HC 395, 21, 59.
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justice.73 Lord Bingham remarked that special advocates would merely be 
‘taking blind shots at a hidden target.’74 Nevertheless, the main premise 
behind the use of special advocates, such as to effectively mitigate the 
prejudice resulting from non-disclosure of evidence, has received support from 
eminent jurists, such as Lord Carlile75 and Lord Hoffmann.76 In the MB case,77 
Lord Hoffmann found the special advocates procedures to be adequate and 
believed that they would always satisfy the demands of fairness. He felt that 
the Strasbourg Court had ruled on the point in Chahal v United Kingdom,78 
where the Court found the procedure in the Canadian courts satisfied the 
requirements of article 6 of the ECHR.79 According to him, this was the 
same procedure that was adopted in Britain.80 Therefore, Lord Hoffmann 
felt that the special advocate’s procedure was an apt mechanism to mitigate 
between the practical requirements of national security protection, as well 
the right to a fair trial enshrined in article 6. However, Lord Hoffmann fell 
into the minority on this point as the majority did not find that procedural 
justice is always served by the special advocate’s procedure.81
 
In view of the above, it does seem that the lack of administration of justice 
in the existing procedures governing special advocates outweighs the benefits 
afforded in terms of protection of national security interests by controlling the 
73. ibid [90].
74. Roberts v Parole Board [2005] UKHL 45 [18].
75. Lord Carlile, Fifth Report of the Independent Reviewer Pursuant to Section 14(3) of the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act 2005, March 2010.
76. MB v Security of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 46, [54] (Lord Hoffmann).
77. ibid.
78. Chahal v United Kingdom (1996) ECHR 413.
79. Although later the Grand Chamber of European Court held that the British procedure of special advocates, 
arising out of Chahal, was incompatible with article 6 of the Convention. A and Others v United Kingdom, 
49 Eur HR Rep 29 (2009).
80. MB (n 78).
81. ibid [74] (Baroness Hale).
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limited disclosure of sensitive evidence. The lack of communication between 
the special advocate and the accused makes it practically impossible for 
the accused to be given effective and meaningful protection.82 The fact that 
the special advocate cannot discuss the secret evidence with the accused 
means that the special advocate will never know if the accused had an 
alibi or innocent explanation for certain circumstances.83 Lastly, a special 
advocate only owes a duty towards the court and not towards his client. 
This is an enormous departure from the traditional fiduciary relationship 
shared between a client and his lawyer and it is unfair to the client to be 
represented by someone who does not owe him such a duty.
Taking cognizance of the inherent lack of justice and fairness in this 
procedure, the government has introduced a Special Advocate Support 
office, comprising of independently acting lawyers, in addition to the CAC’s84 
recommendation for training. There are instances where the contribution of 
special advocates has been determinative within the existing procedures, 
albeit in most instances the ‘exculpatory’ material produced by them does 
not lead to a change in the government’s assessment of the material. The 
CAC, now known as the Justice Committee, concluded in its 2005 report 
that the use of special advocates should only be resorted to in exceptional 
circumstances.85 Observing the rise in the number of cases using CMPs,86 it 
82. Special Advocates’ Memorandum on the Justice and Security Bill submitted to the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights, 14 June 2012, [19.1].
83. M Chamberlain, ‘A barrister who’s worked in secret courts since 2003 describes a twisted system of justice 
worthy of Kafka’ MailOnline (England 13 March 2012) <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2114162/
Closed-material-procedure-Barrister-describes-twisted-justice-worthy-Franz-Kafka.html#ixzz3LO2lQte2> .
84. House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee, 7th Report, 2004-2005, 3 April 2005.
85. ibid [55].
86. Ministry of Justice, Written Ministerial Statement (22 July 2014) <http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-
vote-office/July-2014/22July2014/27-JUSTICE-ClosedMaterialProcedure.pdf>, Lawrence McNamara and Daniella 
Lock, ‘Closed Material Procedures Under The Justice and Security Act 2013’ (2013) Bingham Centre <http://www.
biicl.org/documents/284_CMPs_the_first_year_-_bingham_centre_paper_2014-03.pdf>.
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is safe to assume that the recommendations of the CAC have not been 
heeded seriously enough.
Martin Chamberlain, a well-known and experienced special advocate, has 
voiced his concern regarding there being no balance between national 
security and fairness in the current regime.87 We can safely assume that this 
line of thought stretches across the special advocates’ community since 57 of 
the 69 special advocates,88 who responded to the Justice and Security Green 
Paper, termed the use of CMPs as ‘inherently unfair.’89 
The general discontent with the existing special advocates’ procedure, 
especially from those who actually perform the role itself, seems to be 
premised on the entrenched principle of a right to a fair trial, or lack thereof 
in the case of the existing procedure, which is a cardinal rule in both EU law 
as well as UK human rights jurisprudence. It appears that an overwhelming 
number of special advocates agree with the fact that even though the 
rational extension of CMPs is understandable, further extension in civil 
litigation is not.90 From a practical viewpoint, the special advocates’ body 
feels that CMPs are rightly restricted to national security grounds91 and 
more importantly the government should act responsibly and not ask for an 
expansive interpretation of national security. The pragmatism v principle 
87. K Walker, ‘With ‘no balance’ between national security and fairness, serious doubts remain over ‘secret 
justice’ plans’ MailOnline (England 27 June 2012) <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2165393/
Why-doubts-remain-Secret-Justice-plans.html#ixzz3LO4rwSdb> accessed 17 January 2014.
88. Most of the Special Advocates questioned were those with considerable experience. Typically, only those 
barristers are appointed as special advocates who have sufficient legal experience.
89. Justice and Security Green Paper: Response to Consultation from Special Advocates, 16 December 2011, 
[15].
90. Special Advocates’ Memorandum on the Justice and Security Bill submitted to the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights, 14 June 2012 (Special Advocates’ Memorandum).
91. Justice and Security Act 2013, s 6.
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debate again assumes a significant undertone in the special advocates’ 
procedure, where the special advocates were unequivocal in their stance 
that CMPs are inherently unfair and against the common law tradition.92
VI. COMPATIBILITY OF CMPs WITH ECHR AND EU LAW
The Tariq93 case involved an interesting departure from a line of UK and 
Strasbourg court cases, in that the court rejected as necessary the basic 
requirement of providing the outline of the case to the accused. Tariq was 
an immigration officer who challenged, as discriminatory, the removal of his 
security clearance following a terrorism investigation. He challenged the 
statutory CMP applied in the employment tribunal and asked for at least 
the ‘A-Standard’ of disclosure94 in relation to his discrimination claim. The 
Supreme Court upheld the CMP without providing the A-standard of 
disclosure and also found compliance with his rights under Article 6 ECHR.95 
This aspect of the judgment rekindles the debate regarding the compatibility 
of CMPs with ECHR and EU principles. The Grand Chamber in A v United 
Kingdom96 reaffirmed this principle stating that Article 5(4) ECHR requires 
that the detainee be ‘provided with sufficient information… to enable him 
to give effective instructions to the special advocate.97 Subsequently, the 
House of Lords in the sequel to the MB decision, AF98 subscribed to the 
92. Special Advocates’ Memorandum (n 92).
93. Tariq (n 58).
94. The A-standard disclosure principle is the ‘core, irreducible minimum of procedural protection,’ which 
means that at least the ‘gist’ of the case against the party must be disclosed to him. see MB v Security of 
State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 46, [43] (Lord Bingham).
95. M Fordham QC, ‘Secrecy, Security and Fair Trials: The UK Constitution in Transition’ (2012) 17 Judicial 
Review 3, 18.
96. A v United Kingdom [2009] 49 EHRR 65.
97. ibid [220].
98. Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF (No 3) [2009] UKHL 28.
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European Court’s decision in applying the same A-Standard to Article 6 
(the right to a fair trial) and the standard of being given ‘sufficient information 
about the allegations against him to enable him to give effective instructions 
in relation to those allegations.’99 This is now referred to commonly as the 
AF Principle. It has been applied to cases of deprivation of liberty100 and 
control orders. 101 The JCHR felt that it should be applied to all proceedings 
in which CMPs are employed,102 but in Tariq, the immigration officer was 
not entitled to this protection because: i) in certain security and surveillance 
cases, an individual is not entitled to such information where such rights 
would obstruct the security and vetting procedure itself103 and ii) Mr Tariq 
sought employment, of his own volition, to a post that required a security 
clearance.104 In the Tariq case, the Supreme Court held that the requirements 
of article 6 were met due to the aforementioned two reasons and therefore 
the case was not seen as an aberration outside the scope of article 6.105
In Tariq, the bench held that AF principle was inapplicable to proceedings 
before the Employment Tribunal.106 Lord Hope differentiated the AF case 
in so far as no fundamental right was being breached in Tariq, nor was he 
faced with criminal proceedings – it was merely a civil claim for damages.107 
We must note that in Tariq, CMP had specific statutory authorisation,108 
99. ibid [59] (Lord Philips).
100. A v UK (n 98).
101. Secretary of State for the Home Department (n 100).
102. Joint Committee on Human Rights, HL session 2009-10 paper 86, [14, 106].
103. Tariq (n 58) [148], [158].
104. ibid [75], [159].
105. The European Court had already held in the Chahal case that article 6 of the ECHR is compatible with 
the use of a CMP.
106. Tariq (n 58) [69].
107. ibid (Lord Hope).
108. Employment Tribunals Act 1996, s 10.
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while in Al Rawi,109 the Supreme Court denied it under common law (in the 
absence of an existing statutory provision). This exact requirement is what 
the government was trying to fulfill by passing the Justice and Security 
Bill.110
The government argues against the use of the AF principle and, prior to 
Tariq, the courts always rejected the plea, subject to one exception found 
in deportation proceedings before SIAC (where Article 6 is inapplicable).111 
The obvious reason for the government’s stance against disclosure of even 
the outside of the case to the accused is to protect the intelligence it has 
received along with its sources. Nevertheless, this Supreme Court decision 
can influence future litigation in a manner such that, where issues of liberty 
and ‘ordinary’ control orders are present, the AF principle will apply and in 
other cases, such as Tariq, they will not.112
In civil claims, Her Majesty’s Government (HM) is mostly the defendant 
and hence cannot withdraw from the case (unlike in criminal cases) to avert 
disclosing the closed material. This is the basic hurdle the government wants 
to overcome by providing for CMPs in ordinary civil claims.
The JSA 2013 only focuses on civil litigation and not on criminal trials. After 
various amendments by the House of Lords and the Commons during the 
Bill stages, the eventual Act fortunately restricts the application of CMPs 
in civil court cases to those concerning national security interests. Further, 
109. Al Rawi (n 13) [41] (Lord Dyson delivering the majority judgment).
110. Justice and Security Green Paper (The Stationer office, 2011) Cm 8194.
111. RB (Algeria) v Secretary of State for Home Department [2009] UKHL 10.
112. The AF principle will be inapplicable under the TPIM regime as they impose a ‘less onerous’ nature of 
obligations.
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it does not extend to inquests113 and is strictly confined to litigation. Thus 
the Act does not extend to police cases, such as Carnduff v Rock114 which 
concerns sensitive material other than in the national security context. 
However, a significant omission is the absence of the Wiley balance from 
section 8 of the Act. Section 6 is the triggering section while section 8 sets 
out detailed rules regarding the courts discretion in permitting a CMP.115 
Section 8(1)(c) should have included the ‘Wiley balance’ as a check on the 
erosion of the right to a fair trial, rather than providing a blanket rule of 
non-disclosure, where the material impinges on national security without 
any other consideration. This means, according to section 8(1)(c), that as 
long as the court feels that certain information is going to harm national 
security to any extent (even minimally), it can only order for withholding 
disclosure of such material and more crucially, that it has not been conferred 
the power to exercise its discretion in carrying out a balancing of rights 
exercise as in the Wiley balance.  
Therefore, although the ECHR compatibility principle has been given 
central significance in terms of interpretation, it does not extend to all cases 
such as Tariq and other cases beyond its reach.116 The A-standard has been 
incorporated into statutory CMP regimes in cases like AF. But ultimately, 
the ECHR principle is a starting point, with article 6 not being a universal 
requirement in every case.117 The ECHR has adopted a balanced approach 
in the pragmatism v principle debate, by holding the procedures of closed 
evidence and special advocates as compatible with article 6.118 However, 
113. As suggested in the Justice and Security Green Paper, October 2011.
114. ibid 37.
115. A Tomkins (n 33) 305.
116. Such as deportation cases.
117. Tariq (n 58).
118. A v UK (n 98).
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the Court in A v United Kingdom said that adequate information must be 
given to the parties in order to enable them to give effective instructions 
for their defense.119 The ECtHR has managed to adopt a balanced approach 
notwithstanding the deficiencies inherent in the systems and procedures 
governing the conduct of secret evidence. Undoubtedly, the ECtHR, being 
the final and more importantly, binding, arbiter of compatibility of UK 
legislation with the rights provided under the ECHR, does afford a certain 
level of conclusiveness to any issue in conflict before it. Any procedure 
that may infringe rights guaranteed under the Convention is subject to the 
touchstone of dicta emerging from the ECtHR. 
VII. PASSAGE OF THE JUSTICE AND SECURITY BILL 
The main objective the government was trying to achieve through this Bill 
was to heighten judicial scrutiny of intelligence services providing sensitive 
information to the courts, which would otherwise be excluded altogether 
under a successful PII application.120
The Government’s Green Paper121 had proposed to extend CMPs beyond 
national security cases122 as well as leaving the trigger in the hands of the 
executive alone, whose decision would only be subject to judicial review.123 
119. ibid [220].
120. In a departure from the objective of enabling courts of law to rely on material that was altogether removed 
in a PII application, the government proposed to introduce CMPs to ordinary civil litigation claims, sparking 
outrage amongst civil liberty groups, the legal fraternity etc.
121. Justice and Security Green Paper, October 2011: Cm 8194.
122. The Government wanted to extend CMPs to civil or tort claims to deal with cases where it relies on 
intelligence inputs and those cannot be revealed to the public. For example, in claims by Guantanamo Bay 
detainees, the government would want to lay a lot more of the blame at their American counterparts doorstep 
but this would cause problems in international relationships if it were to come out in the open.
123. Justice and Security Green paper, October 2011: Cm 8194, 22, [2.7].
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This attracted wide criticism from a group of all substantially experienced 
Special Advocates who termed it as ‘fundamentally unfair’ and saw no 
reason for an extension to any civil claim.124 David Anderson QC conceded 
to using CMPs only when all other established means such as PII and 
confidentiality rings had been exhausted.125 The JCHR report126 on the 
Green Paper condemned this proposal and felt that no ‘real and practical 
problem’ existed to justify the said extension. In view of this antagonistic 
response, the government published a Response Document127 as well as the 
Justice and Security Bill.128 It reaffirmed its position in Al Rawi where a 
court should determine the requirement of a CMP and ‘restrict’ their use to 
national security grounds. Since ‘national security’ is not defined, it leaves 
open the possibility for broad interpretation of the same. Other aspects such 
as clause 6 restricted the discretionary power of the judge by forcing him to 
declare all material against national security as ‘closed’ irrespective of 
whether it can be withheld under PII rules. The direct consequence of this 
clause was the subversion of judicial discretion in restricting the court from 
carrying out a balancing act (of competing public and national security 
interests) in arriving at a conclusion of disclosure or non-disclosure. However, 
the most important objection was against the exclusive power of the 
government to apply for a CMP, especially without any clause requiring the 
excluded party to be given the outline or summary of the case against him. 
124. See, for example, Response to Consultation from Special Advocates (16 December, 2011). This was a 
response to a public consultation process initiated by HM’s Government. <http://consultation.cabinetoffice.
gov.uk/justiceandsecurity/responses-to-the-consultation>.
125. The Justice and Security HC Bill 2012 (370-i) < http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/
human-rights/Uncorrected_Transcript_Justice_and_Security_Bill_David_Anderson_19062012.pdf>.
126. Joint Committee On Human Rights Legislative Scrutiny: Justice and Security Bill, Ninth report; HL Paper 
157/ HC 107, 15 April 2013. See 25 [72].
127. HM Government Response to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, Fourth Report of Session 2012-13: 
Legislative Scrutiny: Justice and Security Bill (Cm 8533)
128. HM Government, Justice and Security Bill, May 2012.
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Even Article 6129 cases will then have to be ‘read down.’130 The reasoning in 
the Green Paper for this ‘recalibration’ is threefold: a) to allow security 
agencies to rely on information, which would otherwise be caught in the PII 
vacuum; b) to allow security agencies to argue a case on its merits instead 
of having to settle; c) to prevent disclosure of sensitive material not caught 
by the PII process.131 These very points form the crux of the pragmatic side 
of the debate around CMPs. The urgent need to protect national security 
interests in times of rising terrorism and espionage is what prompted the 
Government to introduce these changes. Nevertheless, in order to give due 
weight to the different voices of society, the Justice and Security Act 2013 
has taken into account the principled objections or deficiencies voiced by the 
opposition. 
One of the arguments forwarded by the government in support of CMPs 
is that a PII exercise would be much more time-consuming than a CMP,132 
which has been rebuffed by a Angus McCullough, a seasoned special advocate, 
who believes that a CMP would not take any less time and even if it were 
to, it will undermine the cornerstone of the justice system- open and natural 
justice.133 The crucial aspect of judicial balancing of public interests, absent 
from CMPs, promotes fairness and allows a balancing of rights, different 
from the unprecedented step of allowing ‘…one party to a civil claim to 
decide unilaterally that a procedure which favours his own case should be 
adopted for the trial of the claim.’134 From an open justice point of view, the 
129. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on 
Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR) article 6.
130. MB (n 78); Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 was ‘read down’ [44].
131. See generally, Justice and Security Green paper, October 2011: Cm 8194.
132. Al Rawi (n 13) [54].
133. Joint Committee on Human rights, Justice and Security Green Paper Cm 8194, [81, 98].
134. Joint Committee of Human Rights, Twenty Fourth report of Session 2010-12, HL Paper 286, 4 April 2012. 
Dinah Rose QC opinion, [100].
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PII procedure seems a lot more just than a CMP.
VIII. JUSTICE AND SECURITY ACT 2013
It was estimated that between 1997 and 2009, Parliament had legislated 14 
times to permit the use of secret or closed evidence in civil and administrative 
proceedings.135 For example, the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation 
Measures Act 2011 (TPIM 2011), Schedule 4,136 or the Counter-Terrorism 
Act 2008, Part 6;137 however no specific statutory provision applicable to 
civil cases was present.
The Justice and Security Act, 2013 received Royal Assent on 25 April 2013. 
The Bill had undergone extensive debate before enactment and therefore 
vociferous critics such as Amnesty International continued to hold their 
positions on the opposite side of the government. Tim Hancock, Amnesty 
International’s UK campaign director, termed it as ‘a terrible day for British 
justice.’138 Other human rights charities such as Reprieve said that ‘secret 
courts will not make us any safer.’139
Section 6(1) of the Act permits the use of CMPs in civil actions and section 
6(11) allows for their use in all courts up to the Supreme Court. This was 
particularly important as it cleared the confusion and the alleged overreach of 
the Supreme Court in the Bank Mellatt case.140 In Bank Mellat, the Supreme 
135. Justice (n 45) [79].
136. Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, Sch 4.
137. Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, Part 6.
138. N Watt, ‘Last-ditch bid to dilute secret courts plan fails,’ The Guardian (27 March 2013) <http://www.
theguardian.com/law/2013/mar/27/secret-courts-plan-fails> accessed 17 January 2014.
139. ibid.
140. Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 1) [2013] UKSC 38.
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Court held that, even in the absence of an express statutory warrant, it did 
indeed have the power to order a CMP. This was exactly what the court had 
refused in Al Rawi and curiously enough, the Supreme Court (in a majority) 
in Bank Mellat held that it was not departing from its earlier dictum in Al 
Rawi. The reasoning behind this conclusion is interesting. In Al Rawi, Lord 
Dyson, giving the lead judgment, acknowledged the absence of an express 
term permitting the use of CMP in civil actions for damages and went on 
to say: ‘In my view, it is not for the courts to extend such a controversial 
procedure beyond the boundaries which Parliament has chosen to draw for 
its use thus far.’141 Therefore, in the absence of a clear statutory provision, 
the Court decided that it could not read-in such a procedure.
In Bank Mellat, the Treasury had passed an order142 that, in effect, suspended 
or shut down the operation of Bank Mellat (Iranian) and its subsidiary in 
the UK. This order was made under section 62, Schedule 7 of the Counter-
Terrorism Act 2008143 that, inter alia, allowed the Treasury to shut down 
any operation that ‘… poses a significant risk to the national interests of the 
United Kingdom.’144 Bank Mellat challenged this decision via a statutory 
procedure of judicial review provided in section 63 of the 2008 Act. At 
first instance, Mitting J found in favour of the Treasury in that the use of 
a CMP (provided for in Part 6) with respect to certain information was 
appropriately demanded. The Court of Appeal dealt with the matter in a 
similar, albeit small, closed session.
Then the appeal found way to the Supreme Court, whose justification for 
141. Al Rawi (n 13) [47] (Lord Dyson).
142. Financial Restriction (Iran) Order 2000.
143. Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, Sch 7.
144. The Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 [United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland], Chapter 28, 26 
November 2008 <http://www.refworld.org/docid/496718af2.html> accessed 17 January 2014.
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the vires of its decision was found in the extensive jurisdiction of the Court 
as provided for by section 40(2) and 40(5) of the Constitutional Reforms 
Act 2005.145 Section 40(2) says that an appeal lies to the [Supreme] Court 
‘from any order or judgment of the Court of Appeal’.146 Section 40(5) says 
that the [Supreme] Court has the power to decide any question ‘necessary 
to be determined for the purposes of doing justice in an appeal to it under 
any enactment’.147 Therefore, Lord Neuberger reasoned that these sections 
provide the Court with a very wide inherent jurisdiction and thus to deal 
with an appeal of a closed or partially closed judgment would require the 
use of a closed material procedure by the Supreme Court as well.148 It would 
be an odd situation if the proceedings in a case at the Court of Appeal 
stage were conducted in closed proceedings and which would not be followed 
when the case is admitted to the Supreme Court by way of a statutory 
appeal. This presents a very compelling argument in favour of the use of 
the Court’s wide jurisdiction, for how could the Supreme Court provide 
justice in an appeal where a closed material procedure was used in either the 
Court of Appeal and at first instance, without itself perusing the material 
in closed proceedings? The alternatives of allowing the suspect full view of 
the material at the Supreme Court stage or ignoring it entirely are also not 
particularly inviting. 
However, Lord Kerr in his dissent was not persuaded by these ‘pragmatic 
considerations’ and bluntly stated (referring to Schedule 4 of the Terrorism 
and Prevention Investigation Measures Act 2011) that Parliament had not 
intended to include the Supreme Court in the list of courts having the power 
145. Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (Commencement No 6) Order 2006.
146. ibid s 40(2).
147. ibid.
148. Bank Mellat (n 143) [37] (Lord Neuberger).
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to apply for CMPs.149 He also said that at the time of writing section 40(5) 
it was not contemplated for it to be used in this manner. 
While referring to Al Rawi he reiterated that this [Supreme] Court had 
clearly stated that any ‘… attempt to graft on to a statutory provision a 
purpose which Parliament plainly never had in order to achieve what is 
considered to be a satisfactory pragmatic outcome is as objectionable as 
expanding the concept of inherent power beyond its proper limits (emphasis 
added).’150 Parliament was unmindful of Al Rawi and therefore only refers to 
the High Court, Court of Session and Court of Appeal in the Terrorism and 
Prevention Investigation Measures Bill (‘TPIM’). Presumably, the Court will 
refer to section 40(2) and 40(5) to do ‘justice’ in TPIM cases. The minority 
placed much reliance on the oft-quoted canonical principles laid out by Lord 
Hoffmann in ex parte Simms,151 that ‘in the absence of express language or 
necessary implication to the contrary, the courts therefore presume that 
even the most general words were intended to be subject to the basic rights 
of the individual.’152 
One last reflection prompted by Bank Mellat is based not on anything 
said by the learned judges during the course of their judgments but in the 
dictum of Laws LJ in R v The Lord Chancellor, ex parte Witham,153 where 
he postulated that common law constitutional rights could only be removed 
149. ibid [124]-[125] (Lord Kerr).
150. ibid. In my respectful submission, the court in Bank Mellat had no option but to expand the purport of 
sections 40(2) and 40(5) to include the Supreme Court, the highest court of the land, as a court capable of 
hearing a CMP. It would be a rather anomalous situation if it did not have the inherent power to do so. I 
believe that in this case, the court has surely reacted pragmatically to preserve the principles of justice and 
to keep the parties on an equal footing.
151. R v Home Secretary, ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 1.
152. ibid 131.
153. R v The Lord Chancellor, (ex parte Witham) [1998] QB 575.
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by express words in legislation.154 Although he was referring to the right of 
access to courts, the cardinal right to open and natural justice would be 
encapsulated within this as well.155   
Undeniably, the Bank Mellat case has clearly demonstrated the preference 
of the highest court of the land to view the debate from a pragmatic point 
of view. The reconciliation of the two interests, protection of national 
security and protection of fundamental rights, will always face an acute 
clash. However, from this case it is clear that the pragmatists are on the 
ascendancy; if the court was inclined towards a stricter approach based on 
principle, their Lordships would never have expanded (as mentioned earlier) 
the purport of sections 40(2) and 40(5) to include the Supreme Court within 
the ambit of the legislation. In this instance the Court was willing to import 
an intention of Parliament in reading a piece of legislation for the purposes 
of maintaining parity in the hierarchical court structure in the UK as well 
as preserving the interests of the parties.
An important criticism of the Bill has been clarified through an amendment 
made by the House of Lords during the passage of the Bill, whereby section 
6(1) and 6(4) now enable either parties to the litigation to initiate a CMP 
and the court can accept the application of the non-government party or 
even launch a CMP on its own motion. This has done away with some 
measure of arbitrariness which some believe was the underlying theme of 
the Act. The courts have also been given the power under section 7 to 
revoke section 6 declarations if it is in the interest of ‘fair and effective 
154. ibid 586 [G] (Laws LJ).
155. C Forsyth, ‘Principle or Pragmatism: Closed Material Procedure in the Supreme Court’ UK Const L Blog 
(29 July 2013) <http://ukconstitutionallaw.org> accessed 17 January 2014.
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administration of justice.’156 Thus, the power to terminate a CMP also 
has the same criterion of fair and effective justice. A review or monitoring 
provision has also been introduced through section 12, which requires the 
Secretary of State to report on the number of cases that used a CMP and on 
whose application. Section 13 requires the Secretary to appoint a person to 
review the provisions governing CMPs after every 5 years. These measures 
provide a certain amount of transparency and fairness to the regime and 
also marginally diminish the image of the government being a bully in cases 
of protecting their intelligence agencies at the expense of a citizen and his 
fundamental rights. Importantly, the implementation of sections 12 and 13 
will act as a deterrent in the use of CMPs, hopefully restricting their use by 
the government.157 Whether these checks and balances are enough to preserve 
the values of justice enshrined in our common law can only be determined 
by the frequency of the use of CMPs in coming years. The government 
will have to exercise caution in applying for CMPs in the first place, but 
more importantly, the presence of sections like 7, 12, and 13 must act as 
a deterrent in a substantive sense. For them to act as effective safeguards, 
they must be implemented seriously and in an independent manner.
IX. CONCLUSION
In summary, there are a few points that can be made regarding the existing 
law on CMPs. First, it must be conceded that the safeguards included in 
the Act are quite a step-up from those in the Bill. The government accepted 
recommendations of maintaining judicial discretion, equality between parties 
156. The Justice and Security Act 2013, s 7(2).
157. T Hickman ‘Turning out the lights? The Justice and Security Act 2013’ UK Const L Blog (11 June 2013) 
<http://ukconstitutionallaw.org> accessed 17 January 2014.
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in making an application for a CMP and the review mechanism.158 The 
Government took into account the views of different human rights groups 
and special advocates for the purposes of upholding of fundamental rights. 
For the purposes of equality and fairness, the government incorporated the 
suggestion that either party can ask for a CMP. This was a step taken to 
placate the opposition groups in the direction of preservation of justice as 
opposed to state highhandedness.  Second, the government was able to hold 
its redlined position on the non-application of the ‘Wiley balance.’ Third, 
even if the government has to go through a PII process, it can always 
press the eject button by conceding the entire claim if asked to disclose the 
sensitive information. This was not possible in the Binyam Mohamed case 
because that involved a third party disclosure according to the Norwich 
Pharmacal rules. In any case, now the Act includes section 17 that immunises 
intelligence agencies from the Norwich Pharmacal principle. However, in R 
(Omar) & Ors v Foreign Secretary,159 the Court of Appeal overruled the 
Binyam Mohamed case by holding that the court should not have allowed 
the application of the above principle. Fourth, the key issue introduced in 
the Act (as distinct from the Bill) is that the ‘fair and effective’ criterion is 
to be used both in permitting an application for CMPs [section 6(5)] and in 
its termination [section 7(2)].160  
The government argues that it is faced with a catch-22 in fighting cases 
where it must hold back key arguments or not litigate a case in the absence 
of a CMP. In an age of increasing national security threats and terrorism, 
the government’s position to think of the larger interests of its people cannot 
be termed as unreasonable. Yet the aforementioned fundamental principles 
158. ibid.
159. R (Omar) & Ors v Foreign Secretary  [2013] EWCA Civ 118.
160. T Hickman (n 160).
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being compromised through the existing CMP regime does not tilt the 
‘balance’ in their favour either. It is important to remember that judges 
have been given the discretion to decide whether material is harmful to 
national security interests or not. They are only restricted once they make 
that declaration, meaning they are not restricted from using the ‘Wiley 
balance’ in making that first conclusion in terming the material as sensitive 
material.161 Our predicament lies in deciding the fate of our long treasured 
principles of open and natural justice; are we prepared for this conceivable 
Pandora’s box which might result in turning the above principles of justice 
into a cloistered virtue?
161. Section 6(11) of the JSA 2013 defines ‘sensitive material’ as, ‘material the disclosure of which would be 
damaging to the interests of national security.’
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the present state of international law, there is an ever-increasing number 
of treaties governing a great scope of international relations and playing a 
more significant role for dealing with the problems that humanity faces.1 
Therefore, although not all treaty breaches are intentional, nor are they of 
the same gravity,2 the breach of a treaty acquires even more importance, as 
it becomes a more frequent phenomenon, at times with serious consequences.
The singularity of the legal regulation governing the breach of a treaty is 
that it is effected through the combination of provisions from two different 
bodies of rules of international law: the law of treaties, governed by the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),3  and the law of State 
responsibility, governed by the International Law Commission’s (ILC) 
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.4 
Thus, the problem arises of the relationship between these two regulations.
1. K Sachariew, ‘State Responsibility for Multilateral Treaty Violations: Identifying the ‘Injured State’ and Its 
Legal Status’ (1988) 35 NILR 273.
2. Bruno Simma and Christian Tams, ‘Reacting Against Treaty Breaches’ in Duncan B. Hollis (ed), The 
Oxford Guide to Treaties (OUP 2012) 576-577.
3. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (signed 23 May 1969), 1155 UNTS 331.
4. Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the International Law 
Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, UN GAOR, (56) Supp No 10, 43 UN Doc A/56/10 (2001), 
available <http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_6_2001.pdf> (Hereinafter 
referred to as the ILC Articles on State responsibility).
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II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
RESPONSES TO TREATY BREACHES
1. The regulation in the VCLT and the International Law 
Commission (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility
It is noteworthy that the VCLT contains only one provision on the breach of 
treaties, that of Article 60 (‘Termination or suspension of the operation of 
a treaty as a consequence of its breach’) in Part V, which reads as follows:
 
1. A material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to 
invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in 
whole or in part.
2. A material breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles:
(a) the other parties by unanimous agreement to suspend the operation of the 
treaty in whole or in part or to terminate it either:
(i) in the relations between themselves and the defaulting State; or
(ii) as between all the parties;
(b) a party specially affected by the breach to invoke it as a ground for suspending 
the operation of the treaty in whole or in part in the relations between itself and 
the defaulting State;
(c) any party other than the defaulting State to invoke the breach as a ground 
for suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part with respect to 
itself if the treaty is of such a character that a material breach of its provisions 
by one party radically changes the position of every party with respect to the 
further performance of its obligations under the treaty.
3. A material breach of a treaty, for the purposes of this article, consists in:
(a) a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention; or
(b) the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object 
or purpose of the treaty.
4. The foregoing paragraphs are without prejudice to any provision in the treaty 
applicable in the event of a breach.
5. Paragraphs 1 to 3 do not apply to provisions relating to the protection of the human 
person contained in treaties of a humanitarian character, in particular to provisions 
prohibiting any form of reprisal against persons protected by such treaties.
The legal regime set out by the VCLT in Art 60 is supplemented by 
cumbersome procedural conditions stipulated in Arts 65-68 VCLT, and lays 
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down permissible reactions to the material breach of a treaty, providing  for 
either the suspension or for the termination of the breached treaty.5 These 
reactions depend on the material character of the breach, the bilateral 
or multilateral character of the treaty and on the parties affected by the 
breach. Moreover, Art 60 of the VCLT reserves special provisions in the 
relevant treaty applicable in the event of a breach and excludes from its 
scope provisions relating to the protection of the human person contained 
in treaties of a humanitarian character.6
The reason for the inclusion of this provision in the VCLT is obvious. Since 
the breach of a treaty affects treaty obligations, the VCLT, which is the 
body of rules that contains the general law on treaties, would be incomplete 
if it did not address the matter.7 As Simma and Tams note with regard 
to the purpose of Art 60, ‘drafters had to strike a balance between two 
conflicting interests: while, generally, they intended to promote the stability 
of treaty relations, they also had to accommodate the interest of States to 
free themselves, temporarily or permanently, from treaties that have lost 
their benefit due to a prior breach by a defaulting State.’8
Art 60 of the VCLT refers to a particular form of breach, the material 
breach of a treaty as defined in its paragraph 3, without defining the general 
notion of the breach. It is the law of State responsibility which defines 
the breach of an international obligation: indeed, in Art 12 of the ILC 
5. Thomas Giegerich, ‘Article 60’ in Oliver Dörr and Kirsten Schmalenbach (eds), Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, A Commentary (Springer 2012) 1023; According to Brunno Simma and Christian Tams, 
‘Article 60 (1969)’ in Olivier Corten and Pierre Klein (eds), The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties, 
A Commentary vol 2 (OUP 2011) 1377) it ‘has been ground-breaking and has had an important influence on 
the future development of treaty law and the law of State responsibility generally.’
6. Giegerich (n 5) 1024.
7. Simma and Tams (n 2) 580.
8. Simma and Tams (n 5) 1353.
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Articles on State responsibility it is stipulated that ‘there is a breach of 
an international obligation by a State when an act of that State is not in 
conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of its 
origin or character.’ It is notable that the law of State responsibility does 
not distinguish according to whether the origin of the breached international 
obligation is a treaty or custom. 
According to the ILC Articles on State responsibility, when conduct consisting 
of an action or omission is attributable to a State under international law 
and constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State, there is 
an internationally wrongful act of that State,9 which entails its international 
responsibility.10 This responsibility can take the form of cessation, non-
repetition and reparation,11 but it can also take the form of countermeasures, 
consisting in the temporary non-performance of international obligations of 
the State taking the countermeasures towards the responsible State, pursuant 
to Arts 49-54 of the Articles on State responsibility. Art 49 (‘Object and 
limits of countermeasures’) stipulates that:
1. An injured State may only take countermeasures against a State which is responsible 
for an internationally wrongful act in order to induce that State to comply with its 
obligations under part two.
2. Countermeasures are limited to the non-performance for the time being of international 
obligations of the State taking the measures towards the responsible State.
3. Countermeasures shall, as far as possible, be taken in such a way as to permit the 
resumption of performance of the obligations in question.
The main characteristic of countermeasures, which differentiates them from 
9. Art 2 ILC Articles on State Responsibility.
10. Art 1 ILC Articles on State Responsibility.
11. According to Arts 28 to 33 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. Therefore it should be emphasised 
that the treaty law responses to the breach of a treaty do not preclude the general consequences of the breach 
of an international obligation according to the law of State responsibility, regardless of whether the breach is 
material or not.
Queen Mary Law Journal Maria Xiouri 67
the responses to breach contained in the law of treaties, is their flexibility,12 
namely the possibility of taking countermeasures against any treaty breach, 
material or non-material; the wide discretion of States in their response, 
which can consist in the non-performance of any international obligation 
of the State resorting to countermeasures, not only of obligations arising 
from the breached treaty,13 limited by the condition of proportionality14 and 
by exclusionary provisions protecting particularly important obligations;15 
and the less strict procedural conditions.16 If however the conditions for the 
taking of countermeasures are not met, their wrongfulness is not precluded 
and the State taking them bears international responsibility.
Therefore, the relationship between the law of treaties and the law of State 
responsibility as far as the breach of treaties is concerned lies at the heart of 
the problem of whether international law deals adequately with the problem 
of the breach of treaties. 
2. Main points of this relationship according to the preparatory 
works of the International Law Commission, the international 
law doctrine and international case law
12. Simma and Tams (n 2) 595.
13. Bruno Simma, ‘Reflections on Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and Its Background 
in General International Law’ (1970) 20 ÖZöR 5, 12; Linos-Alexander Sicilianos ‘The Relationship Between 
Reprisals and Denunciation or Suspension of a Treaty’ (1993) 4 EJIL 341, 354; Simma and Tams (n 5) 1354; 
Giegerich (n 5) 1045.
14. Art 51 ILC Articles on State Responsibility.
15. Art 50 ILC Articles on State Responsibility.
16. Art 52 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, according to para 1 of which before taking countermeasures, 
an injured State must call upon the responsible State to fulfil its obligations under part two, and notify the 
responsible State of any decision to take countermeasures and offer negotiations with that State. On the 
contrary, Arts 65 to 68 of the VCLT provide for the notification of any claims, the lapse of a three-month 
period during which another party can object, dispute settlement by a method chosen by the responding and 
objecting parties; lastly, if there is no agreement between them on a method of dispute settlement, there is 
resort to mandatory conciliation according to Annex 1 to VCLT.
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The difficulties in the relationship between the law of treaties and the law of 
State responsibility were emphasized by Simma in his leading article, who 
observed that:
Article 60 constitutes one of the provisions [of the Vienna Convention] with regard 
to which- aside from the procedural shortcomings-the limited scope of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties will be felt most clearly and painfully. While Article 
60 and its related provisions carefully and equitably regulate the application of the 
reactions to breach having their sedes materiae in the law of treaties, any examination 
of the breach situation limited to an analysis of the rules of the Vienna Convention will, 
due to the exclusion of the similar reactions having their sedes materiae in the law of 
international responsibility, provide the observer with an incomplete picture.17
In the past the view had been supported that the termination or suspension 
of a treaty on account of breach constituted a form of countermeasures, in 
other words countermeasures are the genus and termination or suspension are 
the species.18 This view has been criticised in theory as blurring the necessary 
distinction between the law of treaties and the law of State responsibility.19 
It has been stressed that the term countermeasures must be used strictly 
for the measures laid down in the law of State responsibility20 and that ‘the 
transposition of institutions of the law of State responsibility to the law of 
treaties cannot be justified. Such reasoning ignores the doctrinal differences 
between measures having their source in the law of treaties and those having 
their source in the law of State responsibility […].’21
In fact, the view of the overwhelming majority of the doctrine is that there 
is a distinction between the termination or suspension of a treaty and 
17. Simma (n 13) 83.
18. Georges Abi-Saab, ‘General Course of Public International Law’ 207 RDC (1987-VII), 15, 463; similarly 
Sicilianos (n 13) 359.
19. Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Olufemi Elias, Contemporary Issues in the Law of Treaties (Eleven International 
Publishing 2005) 147.
20. ibid 146.
21. ibid 145.
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countermeasures.22 Moreover, this is also the conclusion drawn from the 
works of the ILC. Waldock, the fourth Special Rapporteur of the ILC on the 
law of treaties, stated that the article on material breach of a treaty is ‘not 
intended to exclude whatever other rights may accrue to the non-defaulting 
party by way of countermeasures.’23 The relationship between Article 60 and 
countermeasures was also explained by Special Rapporteur Crawford in his 
third Report on State Responsibility as follows:
It is clear that there is a legal difference between the suspension of a treaty (or a 
severable part of a treaty) and the refusal (whether or not justified) to comply with 
the treaty. The suspension of a treaty (or of a severable part of a treaty) if it is legally 
justified, places the treaty in a sort of limbo; it ceases to constitute an applicable legal 
standard for the parties while it is suspended and until action is taken to bring it back 
into operation. By contrast, conduct inconsistent with terms of a treaty in force, if it 
is justified as a countermeasure, does not have the effect of suspending the treaty; the 
treaty continues to apply and the party taking countermeasures must continue to justify 
its non-compliance by reference to the criteria for taking countermeasures (necessity, 
proportionality, etc.) for as long as its non-compliance lasts. Countermeasures are no 
more ground for suspension of a treaty than necessity.24
22. See indicatively Simma (n 13) 56; Sicilianos (n 14) 341; Mohammed M. Gomaa, Suspension or Termination 
of Treaties on Grounds of Breach (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1996) 44; Fitzmaurice and Elias (n 19) 131; 
Simma and Tams (n 5) 1354.
23. Sir H Waldock, Second Report on the Law of Treaties, ILC Yearbook 1963, Vol. II, 76, [14].
24. Third Report on the Law of Treaties by Mr J Crawford, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc A/CN 4/507/Add. 
3 (1999), [324]; See also Simma (n 13) 55, who observes that ‘replication to a breach in form of suspension 
according to article 72 deprives the actions or omissions of the treaty violator ex nunc of their illegal character 
because it discharges both parties from the obligation to continue the performance of the treaty concerned. 
Replication in form of retaliatory suspension, on the other hand, does not only not affect the illegality of 
the breach, but is on its part justified only as long as the treaty infringements by the other party have not 
ceased’; Willem Riphagen, ‘State Responsibility: New Theories of Obligation in Interstate Relations’ in R 
St. J Macdonald and D M. Johnston (eds), The Structure and Process of International Law: Essays in Legal 
Philosophy, Doctrine and Theory (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1989) 581, 601, who however used the term 
‘countermeasures’ in relation to the treaty law responses according to Art 60 VCLT; Simma and Tams (n 
5) 1354, ‘[…] a countermeasure constitutes the (justified) violation of a binding norm; it has no effect on the 
continued existence of the norm as such. In contrast, reactions under Article 60 involve the temporary or 
permanent extinction of a norm; i.e. they- at least temporarily- remove the underlying legal bond between 
the parties to the dispute.’
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Relevant to the problem of the relationship between Art 60 VCLT and 
countermeasures is the fundamental distinction between primary and 
secondary rules of international law.25 This distinction was introduced by the 
Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, Roberto Ago, and constituted 
the basis on which the rules on State responsibility were elaborated. 
According to it, primary are the rules imposing on States obligations whose 
breach can be a source of responsibility, while secondary rules are the rules 
aimed at determining the legal consequences of failure to fulfill obligations 
established by the primary rules.26
Along these lines the difference between the law of treaties and the law of 
State responsibility was explained by Special Rapporteur Crawford, as far 
as the breach of a treaty is concerned:
There is a clear distinction between action taken within the framework of the law 
of treaties [..], and conduct raising questions of State responsibility […]. The law of 
treaties is concerned essentially with the content of primary rules and with the validity 
of attempts to alter them; the law of responsibility takes as given the existence of 
the primary rules (whether based on treaty or otherwise) and is concerned with the 
question whether conduct inconsistent with those rules can be excused and, if not, 
what the consequences of such conduct are. Thus it is coherent to apply Vienna 
Convention rules as to materiality of breach and the severability of provisions of a 
treaty in dealing with issues of suspension, and the rules proposed in the Draft articles 
as to proportionality etc., in dealing with countermeasures.27
Moreover, it has been supported that the aim of the termination or suspension 
of a treaty is mainly corrective, in the sense that their main purpose is to 
restore the balance of rights and obligations between the State or States 
which have been affected by the breach and the defaulting State, while the 
aim of countermeasures is coercive, as their main purpose is to exercise 
25. See also Fitzmaurice and Elias (n 19) 146.
26. Report of the ILC, 32nd Session, ILC Yearbook 1980, vol II (2), 27 [23].
27. Crawford (n 24) [325]. See also Fitzmaurice and Elias (n 19) 134.
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pressure on the State responsible for the breach of the treaty to resume its 
performance.28
Another question which has been dealt with in the doctrine is whether the 
adoption of Art 60 VCLT modified or restricted the right not to perform 
treaty obligations by countermeasures. It has been argued that the regime 
of responses codified in Art 60 VCLT is either exclusive, thereby prohibiting 
resort to countermeasures in response to breaches of treaties, or that it at 
least modified their regime, precluding resort to countermeasures in case of 
immaterial breaches.29 In support of this view, reference has been made to 
Art 42 paragraph 2 VCLT that prescribes the exclusivity of the suspension 
and termination mechanisms provided for in the Convention or the relevant 
treaty itself.30 However, better arguments speak against the exclusivity of Art 
60,31 based on Art 42 paragraph 2 combined with Art 73 VCLT, according 
to which ‘the provisions of the present Convention shall not prejudge any 
question that may arise in regard to a treaty from […] the international 
responsibility of a State […].’; namely that, on the one hand, according to 
Art 42 paragraph 2, the VCLT deals with the conditions for the termination 
or suspension of a treaty as a result of its material breach, and that, on the 
other hand, according to Art 73, it does not preclude countermeasures in 
case of breach of a treaty, material or non-material. Most importantly, the 
28. Simma (n 13) 20-21; Sicilianos (n 13) 344-345; Simma and Tams (n 5) 1354. Nonetheless, it has been noted 
that the suspension of a treaty is also aimed at inducing the defaulting party to cease the violation of the 
treaty and act in conformity with it, as otherwise it is not only released from its obligations but also deprived 
of its rights arising from the treaty (Simma (n 13) 39-40, who refers to them as measures of suspension of 
mixed character; Giegerich (n 5) 1041).
29. Derek William Bowett, ‘Treaties and State Responsibility’ in Daniel Bardonnet, Jean Combacau, 
Pierre-Marie Dupuyand Prosper Weil (eds) Mélanges Virally (Pedone 1991) 139; D W Greig, ‘Reciprocity, 
Proportionality, and the Law of Treaties’ (1993-1994) 34 VJIL 295, 356-60 and 369-82.
30. Bowett (n 29) 139.
31. Simma and Tams (n 5) 1376.
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parallel existence of countermeasures and reactions based on Art 60 VCLT 
is recognized by international courts and tribunals when called upon to 
determine the consequences of treaty violations.32
3. Problems in the relationship
In spite of the legal analyses in the doctrine and the travaux préparatoires 
of the ILC, there still remains confusion on the relationship between the 
law of treaties and the law of State responsibility as far as the breach of a 
treaty is concerned. This confusion is illustrated in the pleadings of States 
before both the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and international 
arbitral tribunals,33 in which there is usually no clear distinction between 
the termination or suspension of a treaty and countermeasures. 
The problem is created by the fact that the conditions of application of 
countermeasures are less strict than those of Art 60, as there is no need to 
prove the existence of a material breach and to comply with the cumbersome 
procedural conditions of Arts 65-68 VCLT. Consequently, the party affected 
by the breach, even if the latter is a material one, will prefer not to invoke it 
in order to release itself more easily from its obligations under the breached 
treaty through countermeasures. In this way, however, Art 60 loses much 
of its importance. This problem becomes even worse given the fact that 
when a party to a treaty resorts to the non-performance of that treaty 
as a reaction to its previous breach by another party, it usually does not 
32. See n 40.
33. See especially the Case concerning the Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946 (United States v France) 
(1978) 54 ILR 338; Rainbow Warrior Arbitration (New Zealand v. France) (1990) 82 ILR 499; Appeal Relating 
to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v Pakistan) (1972) ICJ Rep 46; ICJ Gabčikovo-Nagymaros 
Project (Hungary v Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep 3; clearer is the distinction in the recent Application of the 
Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (FYROM v Greece) [2011] ICJ Rep 644.
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make clear whether it does on the basis of Art 60 VCLT or on the basis of 
countermeasures. Therefore, it is difficult to examine whether it complies 
with the conditions of application of each means of reaction.
The case law of international courts and tribunals, in spite of some useful 
clarifications on the relationship between the termination or suspension of 
a treaty as a result of its material breach and countermeasures, has not 
adequately dealt with the difference in the conditions of application of the 
two kinds of responses to the breach of a treaty. 
More specifically, in the Air Services Agreement case, the arbitral tribunal, 
after having reaffirmed the legitimacy of countermeasures, went on to state 
that it was not important ‘to introduce various doctrinal distinctions and 
adopt a diversified terminology dependent on various criteria, in particular 
whether it is the obligation allegedly breached which is the subject of the 
countermeasures or whether the latter involves another obligation, and 
whether or not all the obligations under consideration pertain to the same 
convention.’34 Therefore, it did not examine the arguments of the US and 
France which were based on Art 60 VCLT.
The arbitral tribunal in the Rainbow Warrior case stated that, apart from the 
Agreements at issue, both the VCLT, as codification of the customary law 
of treaties, and the customary laws of State responsibility were relevant and 
applicable. However, the legal consequences of a breach of a treaty, including 
the determination of the circumstances that may exclude wrongfulness and 
the appropriate remedies for breach, were subjects that belonged to the 
customary law of State responsibility.35 In this way, nevertheless, as it has 
34. Air Services Award (n 33) [82].
35. Rainbow Warrior Award (n 33) [75].
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been stated in theory, ‘if a state wishing to avoid its obligations under a 
treaty can justify breaching the treaty by reference to the full range of 
excuses known to the law of state responsibility, why should it pay any heed 
to the stricter grounds and procedures applicable under the law of treaties?’36
The most important clarification on the relationship between the law of 
treaties and the law of State responsibility was made by the ICJ in the 
case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project. The Court stated, inter 
alia, that these two branches of international law have a distinct scope: ‘a 
determination of whether a convention is or is not in force, and whether 
it has or has not been properly suspended or denounced, is to be made 
pursuant to the law of treaties. On the other hand, an evaluation of the 
extent to which the suspension or denunciation of a convention, seen as 
incompatible with the law of treaties, involves the responsibility of the State 
which proceeded to it, is to be made under the law of State responsibility.’37
Lastly, an important issue which also needs to be examined is the status 
in international law of exceptio non adimpleti contractus principle, in other 
words, the exception of non-performance. According to this principle, the 
performance of an obligation by a party may be withheld if the other party 
has itself failed to perform the same or a related obligation.38 This principle 
has its roots in the notion of reciprocity and is accepted in many national, 
especially civil, legal systems.39 There remains uncertainty, however as to 
the status of the principle in international law. In particular, although 
the exception of non-performance has been recognised to some extent in 
36. Susan Marks, ‘Treaties, State Responsibility and Remedies’ (1990) 49(3) CLJ 387, 388.
37. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Judgment (n 33) [47].
38. James Crawford and Simon Olleson, ‘The Exception of Non-performance: Links between the Law of 
Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility’ (2000) 21 AYBIL 55, 56.
39. ibid 66-73.
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international judicial and arbitral decisions,40 it has not been included either 
in the VCLT as a ground for the suspension of treaty obligations, or in 
the ILC Articles as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness of the non-
performance of an international obligation.41 Therefore, even if it is accepted 
as an international law principle, questions arise as to whether the exceptio 
non adimpleti contractus principle belongs to the law of treaties, as it has 
been supported in the doctrine,42 or to the law of State responsibility; which 
its conditions of application are, applied especially in regards to whether it 
can only be applied with regard to strictly synallagmatic obligations and 
whether it is subject to procedural requirements. Moreover, if the exception 
is a principle of international law, its exact relationship with countermeasures 
or the suspension of a treaty needs to be examined. 
In the FYROM v Greece case, Greece invoked in its defence the principle of 
exceptio non adimpleti contractus, partial suspension under Art 60 VCLT 
and countermeasures. The ICJ considered that Greece had failed to establish 
the conditions necessary for the application of any of its defences and that 
for that reason it was unnecessary for it to determine whether the doctrine 
of the exceptio non adimpleti contractus formed part of contemporary 
international law, or any of the additional arguments advanced by the 
parties with respect to the law governing countermeasures or Art 60 VCLT.43 
However, there was reference to the exceptio non adimpleti contractus in the 
separate opinions of the judges in the case, who expressed opposing views on 
40. See for example the Case Concerning the Diversion of Water from the Meuse (The Netherlands v Belgium) 
[1937] PCIJ Rep Series A/B No 70, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anzilotti (50) and Individual Opinion of 
Judge Hudson (77-8).
41. Crawford and Olleson (n 38) 56.
42. Greig (n 29) 400.
43. Application of the Interim Accord (n 40) [161]-[164].
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the issue.44 Thus, the issue of the exceptio non adimpleti contractus remains 
unsettled.
Consequently, it might be supported that although international jurisprudence 
has offered some important insights into the relationship between the law of 
treaties and the law of State responsibility, particularly into the relationship 
between the termination or suspension of a treaty and its non-performance 
as countermeasure, it has not clarified important aspects of this relationship. 
As a result, there is persisting confusion on the matter.
III. CONCLUSION
It is obvious that the relationship between the termination or suspension of 
a treaty as a result of its material breach and countermeasures is far from 
settled. Although these two responses against treaty breaches may seem 
similar as they both result in the non-performance of obligations of the 
party affected by the breach towards the defaulting party, there are indeed 
differences between them as countermeasures do not affect the legal force of 
the treaty. At the same time, the conditions of application of termination 
or suspension of a treaty are much stricter than those of countermeasures, 
with the result that the non-defaulting party will usually resort to them in 
order to react to the breach of a treaty. Consequently, it might be supported 
that this relationship requires further examination in order to ensure legal 
certainty with regard to responses against treaty breaches. In any event, the 
purpose must be to strike a balance between the stability of treaties and 
effective responses to their breach.
44. Application of the Interim Accord (n 33) Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Roucounas [66] and Declaration 
of Judge Bennouna (p 1); contra Judge Simma in his Separate Opinion, especially [21].
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I. INTRODUCTION 
‘It’s not personal, it’s business’. This well-known saying reflects the traditional 
Western understanding of how a business should be managed.1 However, 
this attitude is not globally shared and East Asian cultures especially 
tend to emphasise the personal aspects of doing business. In fact, guanxi 
(connections), in Confucian societies, is believed to be the key to financial 
success.2 Although this phenomenon is not unique to Asia, as it can, to some 
extent, be found, in the US of the 1950s,3 China remains by far its most 
emblematic illustration considering; as observed by Buttery and Leung, 
‘nothing much happens in China other than through the guanxi network, 
and certainly little is sustainable without it.’4 This has a significant influence 
on a firm’s choice of business strategy, which also affects a multinational 
enterprise’s ability to compete in the Chinese domestic market. 
1. Phil Gerbyshak, ‘It’s Not Personal, It’s Business’ (philGERBYSHAK, 16 April 2009) <http://www.philgerbyshak.com/
its-not-personal-its-business/>  accessed 18 October 2011; ‘It’s Not Personal, It’s Business’ (Business Opportunities, 17 
April 2009) <http://www.business-opportunities.biz/2009/04/17/its-not-personal-its-business/> accessed 18 October 
2011.
2. Jan Selmer, Carolyn Erdener, Rosalie L. Tung, Vernon Worm and Denis F. Simon, ‘Managerial Adaptation 
on a Transitional Economy: China’ in Malcolm Warner (ed), China’s Managerial Revolution, (Frank Cass 
1999) 37.
3. Mei-hui Yang Mayfair, ‘The Resilience of Guanxi and its New Deployments: A Critique of Some New Guanxi 
Scholarship’ [2002] CQ 459, 470.
4. Roger Bennett, ‘Guanxi and Sale-force Management Practices China’ in Malcolm Warner (ed), China’s 
Managerial Revolution, (Frank Cass 1999) 74.
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Therefore, considering the numerous multinational enterprises operating in 
the Chinese market, an understanding of how the guanxi system affects 
competition and the possible legal solutions to this problem, is of the utmost 
importance. While the influence of keiretsu (Japanese Corporate groupings), 
the Japanese equivalent to guanxi, and the US’s ability to use antitrust laws 
to regulate them, have been the subjects of much academic debate, there 
has so far been limited discussion regarding China’s guanxi system and 
competition. This paper will attempt to bridge this gap in the literature, 
by comparing the Japanese and Chinese systems and applying the legal 
theory written about the keiretsu to guanxi. This comparison of Japan 
and China is utilising ‘traditional’ methodology, as many scholars have 
looked to Japan for guidance in explaining and interpreting the Chinese 
economic development model.5 Since most of the academic writers who 
addressed the issue of keiretsu are American, this paper will concentrate on 
American corporations as the Western representative, instead of referring to 
international enterprises in general.  
This paper argues, that the guanxi system manipulates competition in 
the Chinese domestic market, and while some of its effects can be defined 
as illegal under Chinese domestic law, the existence of various loopholes 
around the law decrease a firm’s ability to rely on it, leading firms to seek 
extraterritorial enforcement. First, we will analyse the main characteristics 
of the guanxi system in the light of the keiretsu model, which highlight 
various common features. These similarities will be further discussed in the 
second section of the paper, with particular regard paid to their respective 
influence over competition. Finally, we shall deal with the various legal 
aspects of this problem: application of Chinese laws, the limitation of those 
5. Douglas N Ross, ‘Communitarian Capitalism: A ‘Market’ Model for China?’ in Malcolm Warner (ed), 
China’s Managerial Revolution, (Frank Cass 1999) 12.
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laws, and the possibility for extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
II. STRUCTURE AND CHARACTERISTICS: COMPARING THE 
JAPANESE KEIRETSU AND THE CHINESE GUANXI 
The development of East Asian economies gave rise to new corporate 
structures, which are fundamentally different from their Western counterparts. 
While the guanxi networks in China and keiretsu groups, one of the most 
distinct features of the Japanese economy, can hardly be defined as identical, 
their shared cultural values have nevertheless led to the development of 
similar features. This chapter will present the main features of both systems 
by comparing the guanxi networks and the keiretsu groups. However, it is 
important to note that not all of the system’s features will be examined, but 
only those having an effect on the market.     
a. Structure
The keiretsu is a traditional ‘amorphous corporate grouping’, which evolved 
as an answer to the Anti Monopoly Act 1947.6 Similarly to the Japanese 
keiretsu, the guanxi is also a loosely structured network. Chinese companies 
are often characterised as smaller in size due to their focus on network 
strategy, meaning that ‘profits are not reinvested in existing firms but into 
new firms linked to the parent firm’’, creating business groups (qiye jituan) 
that ‘embody sizeable investments even though the size of any one member 
firm is small.’7 
6. Peter T Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law, (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2007) 63; 
AMA: Antimonopoly Act 1947.
7. David L Wank, ‘Institutional Process of Market Clientelism: Guanxi and Private Business in a South China 
City’ (1996) 147 CQ 820, 837.
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b. Trust & Reputation
Economic sociology explains that trust ‘can institutionally undergird market 
activities’, since it provides assurance for stability and future exchanges.8 
Both the keiretsu9 and guanxi systems attribute a great importance to the 
elements of trust and reputation.10 In Japan, reliance on trust, as corporate 
governance mechanism, significantly decreases fear of opportunism as well 
as minimising transaction costs.11 Japanese suppliers, thus, are far more 
likely to choose to cooperate with Japanese manufacturers, who in their eyes 
are more trustworthy.12 
In China, the fear of opportunism is minimised, due to ‘the pecuniary 
threat of network ostracism associated with opportunistic behaviour.’13 
Since ignoring a guanxi based commitment will result in loss of reputation,14 
firms, by relying on guanxi, guarantee the performance of a commitment.15 
As trust is usually connected to a specific individual/firm, it is not easily 
transferable, which ‘enhances the likelihood of future cooperation.’16 
8. Yadong Lou, Guanxi and Business (World Scientific 2000b) 46-7.
9. James R Lincoln, Michael L. Gerlach and Peggy Takahashi, ‘Keiretsu Networks in the Japanese Economy: 
A Dyad Analysis of Inter-corporate’ (1992) 57(5) ASR 561, 566.
10. Based on research data from WorldWork Ltd. 2010 as presented in ‘Member’s briefing: Can British and 
Chinese Companies Cooperate?’ China-Britain Business Council/ 英中贸易协会 October 20th 2010, 17:00-
19:00); Jeffrey H. Dyer, ‘Does Governance Matter? Keiretsu Alliances and Asset Specificity as Sources of 
Japanese Competitive Advantage’[1996] 7(6)
11. Minimization of information and transaction costs happen due to ‘increasing behavioral transparency and 
reducing information asymmetry’ Lincoln (n 9) 662.
12. Lincoln (n 9) 649, 662-4.
13. Stephen S Standifird and R. Scott Marshall, ‘The Transaction Cost Advantage of Guanxi-based Business 
Practices’ in JT Li (ed), Managing International Business Ventures in China, (Pergamon 2001) 353.
14. Bennett (n 4) 75; Standifird (n 13) 343.
15. John Dixon and David Newman, Entering the Chinese Market: The Risks and Discounted Rewards, 
(Quorum Books (1998) 27.
16. Lou (n 8) 47; Tonny Fang, Chinese Business Negotiating Style, (SAGE Publication, 1999) 120.
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c. Personal Relations: Individuals & Organization
There is a common saying in the business world ‘it is not about what you 
know, but who you know…’17 The keiretsu system is the result of complex 
interweaving relationships, both at the individual level and at the level of the 
corporation.18 This element of personal-relations helps to foster trust,19 which 
in turn ensures that the keiretsu system endures changing circumstances. In 
China, personal affiliations are currently often subordinate to official laws 
and regulations.20 Since guanxi emphasises the concept of human feeling 
(renqing),21 often used as instruments to facilitate economic exchanges,22 
establishing guanxi usually expands on the existence of a common social 
base.23 
d. Long term Strategy
‘The stamina of the horse is tested by distance, the heart of a person is tested by 
time.’24
 
The keiretsu groups tend to prefer long-term commitment to encourage 
mutual obligation25 and stability, which in turn enables them to adopt long-
17. Standifird (n 13) 343.
18. Ely Razin, ‘Are the Keiretsu Anticompetitive - Look to the Law’ (1993) 18(2) NAJILCR 351, 358. 
19. Dyer (n 10) 661-4.
20. Bennett (n 4) 75. One example is the Contract Law, as in China guanxi are often used as an alternative 
mechanism for contractual enforcement. Donald C. Clarke ‘Economic Development and the Rights Hypothesis: 
The China Problem’,  (2003) 51 AJCL 91-2.
21. Mayfair (n 3) 465.
22. Douglas Gurthie, ‘Declining Significance of Guanxi in China’s Economic Transition’ (1998) 154 CQ 254, 
257.
23. Lou (n 8) 4-6; Fang (n 16) 119; Wank (n 7) 829-31.
24. ‘路遥知马力，日久见人心’ (Chinese proverb) Fang (n 16) 110.
25. Lincoln (n 9) 566.
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term strategies26 and decreases the uncertainty most companies face. This 
tendency to rely on long-term strategies leads them to forgo the short-
term strategies of cost minimisation for the development of sustainable 
cooperations.27 
Chinese firms, much like their Japanese counterparts, are long-term 
oriented.28 Guanxi cultivation is a long process, which requires both time 
and patience.29 Even after guanxi is established, maintenance still remains 
a crucial key for success, since a failure to preserve relations may have 
a ‘devastating effect’.30 Firms are constantly seeking to strengthen their 
relations with the bureaucracy by avoiding immediate compensation and 
explicit reciprocity, thus securing their own interests.31 
e. Mutual Obligation and the Concept of Reciprocity 
‘The norm of reciprocity has long been recognized as an organizing principle in exchange 
networks.’32 
One of the key sources for the keiretsu group’s cohesion is the traditional 
value of reciprocal obligation.33 In China, guanxi is seen as social capital 
defined as obligations, social position and trust which generates economic 
value.34 Reciprocity is a concept well known to everyone,35 since it is the 
26. Toby Myerson, ‘Barriers to Trade in Japan: The Keiretsu System--Problems and Prospects’ (1992) 24(3) 
NYULILP 1107, 1107.
27. Razin (n 18) 363.
28. Gurthie (n 22) 23. 
29. Dixon (n 15) 28.
30. Standifird (n 13) 359.
31. Standifird (n 13) 828-34.
32. Lincoln (n 9) 566.
33. ibid.
34. Lou (n 8) 41-2.
35. Ross (n 5) 23.
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cornerstone of every guanxi network based on the concept ‘that all favours 
will eventually be repaid’.36 A failure to live up to the expectations and 
obligations37 created by guanxi can lead to ‘loss of face’.38 
f. Governmental  Involvement
In Japan, the keiretsu acts as an ‘institutional bridge between government 
and business’,39 a role which supports its dominant economic position in 
the market. In China, the government’s role in controlling and directing 
the economy is even stronger.40 Nowadays, although SOEs (State-Owned 
Enterprises) no longer dominate the economy, they remain a key player, 
especially in certain ‘strategic sectors’, where the state ‘exercises very 
significant, or even increased, control.’41 As the importance of guanxi in 
the sector is closely correlated with the level of governmental involvement, 
success in both SOEs dominated sectors and their supplementary industries 
heavily depend on the firm’s guanxi.42 Hence, ‘government protection’, due to 
its control over licensing, resources and funds, can erect significant barriers 
for foreign competitors, where and when it wishes to do so.43 
36. Bennett (n 4) 75.
37. Dixon (n 15) 28; Ross (n 5) 20.
38. Bennett (n 4) 74; Julius C. Ronny, Navigating through Chaos in China (Mentogonost limited, 2006) 62.
39. Ross (n 5) 14
40. Bruce M Owen, Su Sun and Wentong Zhang, ‘China’s Competition Policy Reforms: The Anti-Monopoly 
Law and Beyond’ 75 (2008-2009) Antitrust L.J. 231, 238-9; Dixon (n 15) 54.
41. Owen (n 40) 240-3.
42. Mayfair (n 3) 463-5.
43. Yadong Lou, Partnering with Chinese Firms (Ashgate Publishing Company 2000a) 302.
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III. THE INFLUENCE OF THE GUANXI AND KEIRETSU SYSTEMS 
ON COMPETITION
‘If one has good connections, ones problems will be solved.’44 
In order to determine whether the keiretsu and guanxi systems can be 
defined as anticompetitive practices, two elements must be proven. The 
first is that the structure of the corporate relationships ‘negatively affects 
competition’.45 The second is causation,  the cause for the ‘reduced market 
access must be established’,46 as antitrust law can only apply in cases 
where the corporate relationships ‘constitute actionable anticompetitive 
behaviour’.47 It is commonly acknowledged that keiretsu has a significant 
influence over competition in the Japanese domestic market;48 this influence 
originates from the unique features shared by both the keiretsu and the 
guanxi system. Hence, by connecting the adverse effect of the keiretsu (first 
element) to its structural causation (second element), this section will 
demonstrate how these shared features, as presented in the previous section, 
led to the creation of similar adverse effects within the Chinese domestic 
market.
While in Japan the penetration of foreign manufacturers into the market 
is still considerably low, despite American companies’ best efforts to break 
44. Dixon (n 15) 32.
45. Razin (n 18) 357.
46. ibid 379.
47. Some scholars argue that the keiretsu anticompetitive effect is not due to actionable anticompetitive 
behavior, but due to the keiretsu greater efficiency. Razin (n 18) 357 However, since the SOEs are known to 
be inefficient, especially in comparison to the foreign Enterprises, it is a highly unlikely that the same can be 
attributed to guanxi. Yong Huang, Shan Jiang, Diana Moss and Randy Stutz, ‘China’s 2007 Anti-Monopoly 
Law: Competition and the Chinese Petroleum Industry’ 31 [2010] ELJ 337, 362.
48. Joel Davidow, ‘Keiretsu and U.S. Antitrust’ (1993) 24(4) LPIB 1035, 1039.
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through the keiretsu’s ‘monopoly’;49 in China the percentage of market 
penetration by foreign firms is significantly higher.50 This may lead us to 
question the validity of the keiretsu-guanxi comparison, as one can argue 
that guanxi lacks the keiretsu’s effectiveness in blocking foreign competitors. 
Nevertheless, this argument should not be overstated, as the higher rate of 
foreign investment in China can be attributed to various reasons other than 
gaunxi’s lack of effectiveness. 
The first possible explanation is the difference of market size; as China is 
currently considered to be the second largest economy in the world,51 it 
stands to reason that the amount of FDI in China shall be higher. Hence, the 
gap between China’s and Japan’s FDI may be mitigated by examination of 
the percentage of investment out of GDP.52 The second explanation suggests 
that guanxi’s effectiveness, much like the keiretsu’s,53 is sector-dependent, 
as certain sectors54 are more susceptible to guanxi-based competition 
49. Kiyoshi Mori, ‘Industrial Sea Change: How Changes in Keiretsu Are Opening the Japanese Market’ (1994) 
12(4) BR 20, 20; Eleanor M. Fox, ‘Toward World Antitrust and Market Access’, (1997) 91(1) AJIL 1.
50. China’s 2013 GDP is about 90% higher than Japan’s GDP for the same year. ‘GDP Ranking’ (The 
World Bank, 24 September 2014) <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GDP-ranking-table> accessed 
7 November 2014; ‘Foreign Direct Investment Japan’ (ieconomics) <http://ieconomics.com/foreign-direct-
investment-china-japan> accessed 9 November 2014.
51. China GDP is 2nd only to the USA, making it the 2nd largest economy in the world. ‘GDP Ranking’ (The 
World Bank, 24 September 2014) <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GDP-ranking-table> accessed 7 
November 2014.
52. China: 1.27%, Japan: 0.02%. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS.> accessed 
7 November 2014; <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/japan/foreign-direct-investment> accessed 8 November 
2014; <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/foreign-direct-investment> accessed 8 November 2014.
53. While American companies are prevented from entering the Japanese customized software market due to 
the dominant presence of keiretsu. Rieko Mashima, ‘Examination of the Interrelationship among Japanese I.P. 
Protection for Software, the Software Industry, and Keiretsu, Part I’, 82(1) [2000a] JPTOS 33. The keiretsu’s 
neglect of the prepackage software enabled the penetration of American companies to the Japanese domestic 
market. Rieko Mashima, ‘Examination of the Interrelationship among Japanese I.P. Protection for Software, 
the Software Industry, and Keiretsu, Part II ‘, 82(3) [2000b]  JPTOS 203-216.
54. Mainly in sectors defined as ‘strategic’ such as: automobiles, steel, technology, telecommunication, 
Queen Mary Law Journal86
manipulation;55 thus, assuring that the percentage of FDI in those strategic 
sectors is significantly lower.56 Therefore, a comparison between keiretsu and 
the guanxi system is valid, as long as we account for variations in market 
size and sectors’ classifications.  
a. Limiting of Market ‘Openness’ by Relying on Long-Term Links
International corporations, in particular American ones, often attribute their 
failure to establish and expand in the Japanese markets to the dominance of 
keiretsu57 and their competition strategies. Keiretsu allegedly rely on personal 
relations of a long-term nature,58 in order to create ‘unofficial but pervasive 
barriers of entrance’59 which limit the market ‘openness’ to foreign investors. 
Foreign firms, looking to invest in China, may face similar obstacles, as 
guanxi are the basic building blocks for securing a long-term agreement with 
suppliers, access to limited resources, winning government contracts and 
obtaining special permits and funds.60 In China, especially in the strategic and 
transportation, utilities etc. and their supplementary industries. Owen (n 40) 243-4; Kenneth J Hamner, ‘The 
Globalization of Law: International Merger Control and Competition Law in the United States, the European 
Union, Latin America and China’ (2001-2002) 11(2) J Transnat’l L. & Pol’y 401-2.
55. Ross (n 5) 4-5.
56. Less than 15% of the total China’s 2012 FDI, <http://www .stats.gov .cn/tjsj/n dsj/2013/i ndexeh.htm> 
accessed November 9 2014.
57. Fox (n 49) 1.
58. Barbara J. Spencer and Larry D. Qiu, ‘Keiretsu and Relationship-Specific Investment: A Barrier to Trade?’ 
(2001) 42(4) IER 871, 882; Razin  (n 18) 9.363, 374.
59. James R Lincoln, Michael L. Gerlach and Christina L. Ahmadjian, ‘Keiretsu Networks and Corporate 
Performance’ (1996) 61(1) ASR 67, 86.
60. Standifird (n 13) 342,351; The founder of Shanghai Qianrui Garment Company explained: ‘It’s almost 
impossible for small, private businesses to get a loan in China, unless you have [connections]’ Mina 
Hanbury-Tenison, ‘Web offers a comfortable fit’ Financial Times (Nov 23, 2010) <http://www.ftchinese. 
com/story/001036011/en> accessed 8 November 2014; Seung Ho Park, Shaomin Li, David K. Tse, ‘Market 
Liberalization and Firm Performance during China’s Economic Transition’, 37(1) [2006] JIBS 130; Yadong
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supplementary sectors dominated by SOEs,61 domestic firms hold the upper 
hand. This is mainly due to the fact that the duration of the relationship 
is crucial in determining the strength and durability of the connections;62 
hence, while domestic companies may utilise their pre-existing networks to 
improve their position within the market and limit or prevent the entrance 
of new competitors,63 foreign firms must build these networks ‘from scratch’. 
Furthermore, firms’ internationalisation strategies include business analyses 
which examines various elements such as: risk, regulation, access to 
information, cost of establishment, market potential and so on; the combined 
value of all of these elements assists the firms in deciding on location and 
mode of entrance64 (assuming that they are rational players). In China 
the nature of the guanxi system facilitates commercial transactions while 
strengthening market opacity, the limiting access to information,65 as well 
as requiring a long-term commitment. Thus creating, similarly to Japan, 
a rather strong and effective barrier of entrance and decreasing market 
‘openness’ as a result.  From past experience it appears that in order to 
succeed in the Chinese market, foreign corporations must be willing and 
able to suffer loses for a relatively long period of time, which most small to 
Luo, ‘Industrial Dynamics and Managerial Networking in an Emerging Market: The Case of China’, 24(13) 
[2003] SMJ 1317, 1325-6; Hanbury-Tenison (n 60);  Lou (n 8) 48.
61. Owen (n 40) 243-4.
62. Lou (n 8) 54.
63. Chenting Su, Zhilin Yang, Guijun Zhuang, Nan Zhou and Wenyu Dou, ‘Interpersonal influence as an 
alternative channel communication behavior in emerging markets: The case of China’, 40(4) [2009] JIBS 
673; Lianxi Zhou, Wei-ping Wu and Xueming Luo, ‘Internationalization and the Performance of Born-Global 
SMEs: The Mediating Role of Social Networks’,  38(4) [2007] JIBS 678.
64. Oliver Burgel and Gordon C. Murray, ‘The international market entry choices of start-up companies in 
high-technology industries’, 8(2) [2000] JIM 35-7; Ryuhei Wakasugi, ‘The Effects of Chinese Regional 
Conditions on the Location Choice of Japanese Affiliates’, Keio University 56(4) [2005] 2 <http://www.
readcube.com/articles/10.1111/j.1468-5876.2005.00337.x> accessed 7 November 2014.
65. Standifird (n 13) 351; Dixon (n 15) 32.
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medium companies cannot withstand.66 Illustrating examples are the cases 
of L’Oreal KFC and McDonnell Douglas. L’Oreal had to wait nine years 
before it became profitable in China while KFC spent ten years perfecting its 
business model before it became the powerhouse it is today.67 Nevertheless, 
these companies have managed to achieve success. The story of McDonnell 
Douglas, in contrast, did not have such a ‘happy ending’, as McDonnell 
Douglas had to leave China in embarrassment after more than two decades.68 
b. ‘Market Foreclosure Effect’ and ‘Vertical Boycott’ 
‘Market foreclosure effect’ is a phenomenon, where ‘a potential or actual 
participant in a market is prevented from participating in the market […] 
[due to] competitive practices’.69 This phenomenon has been associated with 
keiretsu dominated industries, as keiretsu, by relying on ‘reciprocal and 
exclusive dealings, […] erects insurmountable barriers to participants in 
sectors in which the keiretsu are active,’70 as well as diminishes the potential 
for international trade.71 
An additional phenomenon that may result from reciprocal and exclusive 
dealings is a ‘vertical boycott’,72 which is an agreement between a seller and 
66. Burgel (n 64) 36.
67. The Economist, ‘A disorderly heaven: Most foreigners underestimate the eccentric nature of China’s business 
environment - A survey of business in China’ (Mar 18, 2004) <http://www.economist.com/node/2495184> 
accessed 9 January 2011.
68. ibid. 
69. Razin (n 18) 372; Michael A. Salinger, ‘Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure’ (1988) 103(2) QJE 353.
70. Razin (n 18) 373.
71. The automotive industry, for example, is known to be dominated by the keiretsu, using their structural 
advantages to gain ‘a competitive advantage over their U.S. counterparts’; Dyer (n 10) 649.
72. Davidow (n 48) 1043.
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a group of customers not to sell to someone outside that group.73 The reciprocal 
nature of keiretsu exempts corporations from reliance on either ‘official 
agreement’74 or actual vertical mergers, since their intra-keiretsu networks 
provide them with an efficient and exclusive supply system,75 thus making 
both suppliers and retailers (even without officially agreeing to do so) reluctant 
to either purchase from or sell to ‘new companies trying to establish themselves 
in Japan.’76 For example, three dominant Japanese glass manufacturers 
allegedly ‘collaborated to tie up all available distributors’, hence denying 
potential competitors access to the Japanese domestic market.77 
In China, the reciprocal nature of the guanxi system, as mentioned in the 
previous section, makes reciprocal and tie-in dealings fundamental business 
tools. Companies do not focus on obtaining a single sale, but rather on 
establishing a network of frequent buyers.78 This system is effective due to 
the social norms that lie behind them, since a potential buyer may ‘lose 
face’ if they do ‘not buy from someone with whom [they have] a guanxi 
relationship.’79 In fact Chinese businesses will ignore the classical ‘commercial 
rationality’,80 purchasing lower quality product for higher price, in order to 
maintain guanxi.81 Furthermore, as resource allocation is determined and 
73. Richard M Steuerof and Mayer Brown LLP, ‘Executive Summary Of The Antitrust Laws’ (March, 2008) 
<http://library.findlaw.com/1999/Jan/1/241454.html> accessed 8 November 2014.
74. Fox (49) 19-22. 
75. Spencer (n 58) 893.
76. Davidow (n 48) 1043. 
77. Fox (n 49) 19. 
78. Lou (n 8) 138-41. 
79. Bennett (n 4) 76-8; Katherine R. Xin and Jone L. Pearce, ‘Guanxi: Connections as Substitutes for Formal 
Institutional Support’, (1996) 39(6) AMJ 1641.
80. Bennett (n 4) 77; The Economist (n 67).
81. Bennett (n 4) 79; Selmer (n 2) 33. 
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manipulated by guanxi,82 firms with solid connections in the sector can not 
only gain access to limited resources but also prevent their competitors from 
doing so.83 Thus, as multinational enterprises are naturally less ‘connected’ 
than their local counterparts, they might struggle to obtain access to the 
necessary suppliers and distributer (vertical boycott),84 resulting in their 
inability to operate within the market (market foreclosure effect). 
c. Market Allocation
‘Market allocation schemes are agreements in which competitors divide markets among 
themselves… allocate[ing] specific customers or types of customers, products, or 
territories among themselves.’85 
Although keiretsu agreements cannot be directly defined as market allocation 
agreements, nonetheless, ‘under keiretsu agreements business is allocated to 
certain suppliers’ due to their complex connections and the need to maintain 
them.86 In China, market allocation is usually implicit and harder to detect, 
especially since firms often avoid using contracts, and prefer unofficial forms 
of agreements.87 Nonetheless, de facto market allocation often accompanies 
guanxi based marketing strategies. This phenomenon originates from firms’ 
tendencies to concentrate on a group of clients, with whom they are already 
connected,88 limiting firms’ abilities to enter new markets and increase a 
firm’s market share, thus resulting in de facto market allocation. 
82. Xin (n 79) 1644-5; Zhou (n 63) 678; Seung Ho Park and Yadong Luo, ‘Guanxi and Organizational Dynamics: 
Organizational Networking in Chinese Firms’, 22(5) [2001] SMJ 459.
83. Fox (n 49) 22. 
84. Su (n 63) 684; Firms are ‘often careful on who they extend their guanxi to, since they can become a 
potential competitor for the same resources’ Standifird (n 13) 343.
85. ‘Price Fixing, Bid Rigging, and Market Allocation Schemes: What They Are and What to Look For’ 
Department of Justice, <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/211578.htm> accessed 1 March 2011.
86. Davidow (n 48) 1045.
87. Lou (n 43) 50-1.
88. Standifird (n 13) 342-43, 58; Bennett (n 4) 75-7.
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Furthermore, it seems that government officials’ involvement89 may serve as 
a catalyst,90 further strengthening this problem. This is especially true in 
‘sensitive industries such as cars and technology’, where ‘Chinese bureaucracy 
[…] appears to be allocating a share of the market to domestic companies’, in 
addition to the promulgation of new regulations mandatorily requiring 
international enterprises ‘to work with officially designated Chinese partners’.91 
d. Discrimination: Domestic Firms Advantage over Foreign Firms
‘We Westerns… will always remain ‘visitors’ and ‘secondhand people’’.92 
Japanese companies are often reluctant to deal with foreign competitors (both 
for import and export purposes), making international trade in Japan quite 
difficult.93 As previously discussed, ‘Japanese suppliers are more likely to trust 
Japanese’ firms,94 hence foreigners are likely to face more obstacles than their 
local competitors, resulting in significantly higher operational cost; creating, 
therefore, the appearance of a de facto discrimination against foreign firms 
(whether this discrimination is actual or merely an impression is debatable).
In China, firms’ ‘ability to claim preferential treatment regardless of current 
market conditions’, by relying on their guanxi, provides them with a ‘long run 
competitive edge’,95 resulting in the impression of discriminatory treatment.96 
This impression is not entirely un-based. As presented by Luo, ‘foreign 
89. Lou (n 43) 302.
90. Lou (n 60) 1326.
91. The Economist (n 67).
92. Fang (n 16) 231.
93. Razin (n 18) 372-73.
94. Dyer (n 10) 661-62.
95. Bennett (n 4) 75-76; Standifird (n 13) 342.
96. ‘A recent survey by the American Chamber of Commerce in China found that a high proportion of
Queen Mary Law Journal92
companies encounter the liabilities of foreignness in guanxi cultivation and 
development, whereas local firms have an important edge.’97 In addition, Ross 
explains that, ‘Western firms are seen as representatives of their countries’ 
thus subjecting them to additional considerations, other than economic,98 
which contributes to their fear of discrimination. One example for this type of 
national association is the massive Chinese boycott of French firms, such as 
Carrefour and Louis Vuitton in 2008, as a reaction the troublesome passage 
of the Olympic torch through Paris, caused by pro-Tibet protestors.99 
Discrimination against foreign investors is especially likely to occur in pillar 
industries dominated by SOEs (such as vehicles, technology, natural resources, 
telecommunication and so on),100 as well as their supplementary sectors, where 
good relations with the government are paramount.101 In these sectors, 
elements of national security, trust and fear of foreign interests, affects the 
strategic decisions of corporations. In order to assure that Chinese interests 
are being well protected the Chinese government may show domestic firms 
preferential treatment by adopting the specific standards used by the Chinese 
competitor, and rejecting the foreign standard systems. For example, both 
Sony and Intel were forced to ‘rejig their software to a Chinese standard ‘in 
the interests of national security’, as well as requiring them to cooperate with 
‘officially designated Chinese partners’.102 
American firms … feel that they are the victims of discriminatory or inconsistent treatment.’ ‘The panda 
has two faces’ The Economist (31 March 2010) <http://www.economist.com/node/15814746> accessed 9 
January 2011.
97. Luo, Guanxi and Business (n 60) 43.
98. Ross, ‘Communitarian Capitalism: A ‘Market’ Model for China? (n 5) 26.
99. ’Carrefour faces China boycott bid’ BBC (15 April 2008) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7347918.stm> 
accessed 24 November 2011.
100. Ross, ‘Litigation Under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law’ (n 55) 4-5.
101. Hanbury-Tenison, ‘Taxi trip to success in Shanghai’ (n 60); Fox (n 49) 22.
102. The Economist (n 67).
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In addition, foreign investors may experience discriminatory treatment 
through a selective and inconsistent enforcement of corruption related laws. 
Foreign investors have a higher chance to be prosecuted for illegal conduct, 
even in cases where the behaviour in question merely consists of market 
customary practices, commonly performed by the domestic competitors.103 
In fact, ‘in the last decade, the percentage of corruption cases […] aris[ing] 
from international trade or involv[ing] foreign business entities is surprisingly 
high, accounting for almost two thirds of investigations that have resulted 
in a penalty’.104 
IV. ISSUES OF LEGALITY: CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAWS AND 
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION. 
The previous chapters explained what the guanxi system is, and highlighted 
its influence on competition by comparing it to the keiretsu. This section 
will explore different legal issues arising from guanxi system’s adverse effect 
over competition, including the issues of applicability of domestic laws and 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Since the aim of this essay is to illuminate the 
guanxi system, this chapter will focus on the legality of this system, while 
using the keiretsu groups only as a tool for clarification and bridging the 
literature gap. 
103. Ariel Ye and James Rowland, ‘Offering Gifts of Travel and Entertainment in China - What if the Recipient is 
a State Functionary’, King & Wood  (April, 2010) <http://www.kingandwood.com/article.aspx?id=Offering-
Gifts-of-Travel-and-Entertainment-in-China-What-if-the-Recipient-is-a-State-Functionary&language=en> 
accessed 10 October 2011.
104. ibid.; Vivienne Bath, ‘China, International Business, and the Criminal Law’ [2011] APLPJ 7.
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a. The Chinese Competition Laws  
When Razin tried to determine whether the keiretsu’s anti-competitive 
practices could be defined as illegal, she defined three criteria: the existence 
of the effect, the causation (anti-competitive behaviour causing the effect) 
and finally the applicability of domestic competition laws on the questionable 
behaviour.105 The previous chapter proved the first two requirements; 
this part will discuss the applicability of the Chinese competition laws, 
the ‘opting-out’ clauses under the Anti Monopoly Law 2007 (AML), the 
role of the SOEs and problems of enforcement. Is guanxi’s influence over 
competition illegal under Chinese law?
China’s first competition law was promulgated in 1993,106 and though 
it marked a significant step in China’s legal development, it was highly 
flawed.107 A considerably more important legislation is the AML,108 which 
came into effect on August 2008,109 and ‘provides a holistic framework for 
the regulation of competition.’110 In addition, complementary regulations111 
were published by SAIC,112 significantly clarifying some of the vagueness 
105. Razin (n 18) 379.
106. AUCL: Anti-unfair Competition Law.
107. Hamner (n 54) 385, 401-2. The Anti-Unfair Competition Law of 1993 had many limitations, among others 
were the fact that ‘the legal liability system [was] flawed and cannot effectively curb unfair competition 
acts’, <http://eng.hi138.com/legal-papers/economic-law-papers/200910/146466_how-to-improve-chinas-
antiunfair-competition-law.asp>; accessed 19 November 2014 Daniel Sokol, ‘China’s Antimonopoly Law – 
One Year Down’ (Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog, 6 October 2009) <http://lawprofessors.typepad.
com/antitrustprof_blog/2009/10/chinas-antimonopoly-lawone-year-down.html> accessed 20 November 2014.
108. AML: Anti Monopoly Law 2007.
109. Paul Jones, ‘The Anti-Monopoly Law: Still a Work in Progress’ 4(4) [2008] CLR 3, 5-6.
110. Huang (n 47) 337.
111. Monopolistic Agreements (MAR), Abuse of Dominance (ADR) and Abuse of Administrative Power 
(AAPR).
112. SAIC: State Administration of Industry and Commerce
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surrounding the AML.113 This part of the essay will analyse all of these 
legislations, regulations and cases, in order to establish whether the guanxi 
system’s influence over competition can, in fact, be defined as illegal. 
The foreclosure effect and limitations of market ‘openness’, as explained in 
the previous chapter, can be side effects of the guanxi system, since they 
influence access to resources, government contacts, licenses and so on.114 
Many of these practices can be defined as illegal under the chapter V of 
the AML, which stipulates that administrative authorities are prohibited 
from abusing their power to discriminate against non-locals in technical 
standards, licensing, fees, entry and establishment etc.115 For example, the 
practice of agencies issuing marriage licenses to require that license photos 
are to be taken at designated photo studios ‘is declared illegal under Article 
32.’116 Furthermore, the AML proscribes firms from entering into agreements 
which restrict technological development.117 Therefore, Chinese firms with 
less innovative products will not be able to rely on their connections to 
ensure their product triumphs over the competition.
These restrictions are reinforced by Art 17(3) and Art 17(4) of the AML, 
prohibiting firms with a dominant market position from refusing transactions 
and forcing counterparties, to transact only with them, without a valid 
reason. These articles may also apply to adverse competition phenomenona 
113. Susan Ning, Lining Shan, Liu Jia and NG Angie, ‘3 rules which shed light on non-price violations of the 
Anti-Monopoly Law - effective 1 February 2011’, (King & Wood Mallesons, 10 January 2011) <http://www.
chinalawinsight.com/2011/01/articles/corporate/antitrust-competition/procedural-rules-re-administrative-
enforcement-of-antiprice-monopoly-effective-1-february-2011/> accessed 7 November 2014.
114. Standifird (n13) 342, 351; Hanbury-Tenison, ‘Web offers a comfortable fit’ (n 60).
115. AML Art 32, 33, 35; further developed in AAPR.
116. Owen (n 40) 255.
117. AML Art 13 (4). 
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such as vertical boycott and market foreclosure effect, originating from 
guanxi based commercial practices (exclusive and reciprocal dealing, long-
term commitment and so on).118 Furthermore, Art 7(2) and Art 18(2) of the 
Administrative Measures for Fair Transactions By and Between Retailers 
and Suppliers,119 specifically refer to vertical boycott by stating that, neither 
retailers nor suppliers are to engage in restrictions to supply products or 
services to other retailers or suppliers.120 
In the Shanda case,121 Shanda and Xuanting allegedly ‘abused their dominance 
in the Chinese online literature market by restricting the authors of Star 
Change Sequel from transacting with Sursen, without a valid reason’, which 
violated Art 17(4) of the AML.122 
Whereas in the Huzhou TPRI123 case, the TPRI allegedly ‘abused its 
dominance by blocking the [plaintiff’s] access to the market for the supply 
118. AML Art 13 (5) prohibits horizontal collective boycott’s agreements and MAR prohibits participating in 
a joint boycott of customers and suppliers. ‘Briefing:  China issues Guidance on Anti-Competitive Practices’ 
(Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, January 2011) <http://www.Freshfields.com/uploadedFiles/SiteWide/
Knowledge/China%20issues%20guidance%20on%20anticompetitive%20practices.pdf > accessed 9 November 
2014.
119. Administrative Measures for Fair Transactions By and Between Retailers and Suppliers (零售商供应商公
平交易管理办法) [Lingshoushang Gongyingshang Gongpingjiaoyi Guanli Banfa] (promulgated October 12, 
2006, effective November 15, 2006).
120. Ding Liang, ‘The Interplay of Non-compete Covenants under the PRC Anti-monopoly Law’ (King & Wood 
Mallesons, April 2008) <http://www.kingandwood.com/article.aspx?id=The-Interplay-of-Non-compete-
Covenants-under-the-PRC-Anti-monopoly-Law-04-china-bulletin-2008&language=en> accessed 10 October 
2011. This issue was also addressed to in MAR Art 5(4).
121. Beijing Sursen Electronic Technology Co Ltd v Shanda Interactive Entertainment Ltd and Shanghai 
Xuanting Entertainment Co Ltd.
122. Susan Ning,  Liang Ding and NG Angie,  ‘Sursen v Shanda and Xuanting - Abuse of Dominance Case Dismissed’ 
(King & Wood Mallesons, 2 October 2010) <http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2010/10/articles/corporate/antitrust-
competition/sursen-v-shanda-and-xuanting-abuse-of-dominance-case-dismissed/> accessed 3 March 2011.
123. Huzhou Yiting Termite Prevention Service Co Ltd v Huzhou Termite Prevention Research Institute [2010].
Queen Mary Law Journal Emma Raz 97
of termite prevention services.’124 While there is no direct reference to guanxi 
in either of these cases, both of them illustrate that actions can be brought 
against firms for practices associated with guanxi. 
The guanxi system is also notorious for using ‘tie-in’ dealings to sell less-
successful products, which was addressed in the WSC125 case. This was a case 
where the WSC (Wuchang Salt Company) was accused of violating Art 17(5) 
by ‘making their supply of salt contingent on purchase of …washing detergent 
powder.’126 However, it should be noted, that this prohibition refers only to 
firms with a dominant market share, which might be very hard to prove since 
the burden of proof is on the plaintiff.127 Though the SAIC rules name difficulty 
of switching to other trading partners,128 as one the criteria to decide whether 
a business operator has market dominance, it is not clear that the difficulty 
resulting from guanxi based commitments can be a sufficient reason to 
establish dominance. 
Another aspect of the guanxi influence is market allocation. Both the 
124. Susan Ning, ‘China: Termites and Abuse of Dominance’ (Mondaq, 17 October 2010) <http://www.
mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=112960> accessed 4 March 2011.
125. Wuchang Salt Company [2010].
126. Susan Ning, Ziqing Zheng and NG Angie, ‘What Constitutes Anticompetitive Tying in China? The 
Wuchang Salt Company Case’ (King & Wood Mallesons, 30 November 2010) <http://www.chinalawinsight.
com/2010/11/articles/corporate/antitrust-competition/what-constitutes-anticompetitive-tying-in-china-the-
wuchang-salt-company-case/> accessed 3 March 2011.
127. China Netcom case,  Susan Ning, Liang Ding and NG Angie, ‘Li Fangping vs China Netcom - Abuse of 
Dominance Case Dismissed’ (King & Wood  Mallesons, 19 September  2010) <http://www.chinalawinsight.
com/2010/09/articles/corporate/antitrust-competition/li-fangping-vs-china-netcom-abuse-of-dominance-
case-dismissed/> accessed 4 March 2011; and Baidu case Lester Ross, ‘Litigation Under China’s Anti-
Monopoly Law’ 1 [2010] CPIAJ 2, 5.
128. Susan Ning and Jia Liu, ‘Comparison of the NDRC rules and the SAIC rules on Abuse of Dominant’ 
(King & Wood  Mallesons, 1 February 2011) <http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2011/02/articles/corporate/
antitrust-competition/comparison-of-the-ndrc-rules-and-the-saic-rules-on-abuse-of-dominant/> accessed 3 
March 2011.
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AML129 and the MAR130 identify agreements for market and customers 
allocation as illegal.131 In The Concrete Manufacturers case, the Construction 
Machinery Industry Association of Lianyungang City together with sixteen 
concrete manufacturers, were found guilty of allocating market shares 
among themselves, thus breaching the AML Art 13(3).132 Though this case 
demonstrates that the law may be enforced on market allocation agreements, 
since guanxi based agreements are implicit, they will be very hard to detect, 
and therefore very hard to prove. 
The issue of discrimination is regarded as one of the most urgent problems 
deriving from guanxi, especially for foreign investors. Discriminatory 
treatments133 have generated the most litigation so far. It is prohibited 
both under Art 17(6) of the AML, in cases of abuse of dominance, and 
under Art 33, which refers to abuse of administrative power. Both in the 
China Netcom case134 and the China Mobile case135 the defendant allegedly 
discriminated against customers by implementing ‘differential treatment’. 
Both of these cases refer to general sale strategies taken by companies for 
private customers. However, business-to-business strategies will be harder to 
129. AML Art 13(3).
130. MAR: SAIC Regulations on Prohibiting Monopoly Agreements Art 2 prohibits the division of the market 
by neither the sellers nor the buyers.
131. ‘Briefing:  China issues Guidance on Anti-Competitive Practices’ Freshfields (n 118); As some market 
allocation agreement can de facto function as a ‘non-compete clause’, they may be rendered illegal under 
AML Art 13 which defines monopoly agreements as ‘agreements, decisions or some concert of action that 
eliminates or restricts competition’; Liang (n 120).
132. 李方平诉中国网通集团 (Li Fangping v China Netcom) [2010].
133. 周泽诉中国移动 (Zhou Ze v China Mobile) [2009].
134. Ning, ‘Li Fangping vs China Netcom - Abuse of Dominance Case Dismissed’ (n 125). 
135. Susan Ning, Liang Ding and NG Angie, ‘Zhou Ze v. China Mobile Beijing - Alleged Abuse of Dominance 
Case’ (King & Wood  Mallesons, 29 October  2010) <http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2010/10/articles/
corporate/antitrust-competition/zhou-ze-v-china-mobile-beijing-alleged-abuse-of-dominance-case/> accessed 
4 March 2011.
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prove, since one client may not be aware of the deal offered to another. The 
Yuyao136 case is a more representative case for guanxi-based discrimination. 
In this case, the plaintiff accused the defended, while referring to chapter 
V of the AML, for discriminating against him, by preventing him from 
establishing a service centre when its competitor was allowed to.137 Though 
this type of behaviour was considered to be part of the norm in the past, it 
seems that the introduction of the AML might have started to change this 
perception.
(i) Restriction to the application of Anti Monopoly Laws
While guanxi practices could be seen as illegal under some articles of the law, 
the law also provides articles that exempt firms from legal liability, even when 
they de facto violate it. Both the articles regarding monopolistic agreements 
and abuse of dominant market share include ‘opt-out’ clauses. Art 15 of the 
AML exempt firms from legal liability when the monopolistic agreements are 
made in order to improve technologies, develop new products, upgrade the 
quality, reduce production costs and so on. In addition, small and medium 
business sized operators are also exempt from legal liability when the agreement 
is made for the purposes of improving efficiency and enhancing competitiveness.138 
When taking into consideration the fact that 97.3% of the enterprises in 
China are small or medium size,139 it appears that the law provides firms with 
a big loophole,140 enabling them to rely on guanxi based monopolistic 
136. 浙江余姚名邦税务师事务所诉余姚市政府 (Zhejiang Yuyao Mingbang Tax Accountants v Yuyao City 
Administration) [2008].
137. Jones (n 109) 10-11.
138. AML Art 15(3).
139. ‘China’s Statistical Yearbook 2013’, China Statistics Press <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2013/
indexeh.htm> accessed 18 November 2014.
140. Owen (n 40) 250.
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agreements, as long as their purpose falls under the Art 15’s ‘protective 
umbrella’. 
In addition, Art 17 of the AML, prohibits non-price related practices when 
they lack a valid reason ‘which is self evidently open to subjective interpretation.’141 
Hence, firms hold a large manoeuvring space to abuse their dominant position. 
The ADR, on the other hand, provides two standard definitions of what 
constitute a ‘valid reason’. The first, whether or not they are part of the 
normal operating activities, the second, their impact on ‘the economic 
operation efficiency, social public interests and economic development.’142 
Although these provisions provide some degree of clarity, the final interpretation 
is left to the courts,143 which have determined that both ‘operational risk’144 
and defending intellectual property rights145 constitute ‘valid reasons’.  
(ii) SOEs and Problems of Enforceability
The law firm ‘Lovells’, in an early report regarding the AML, stated that: 
‘the most worrying aspect of all the AML is the lack of effective safeguards 
to protect foreign and domestic investors from abuse of dominant market 
position by SOEs.’146 This fear is not completely without its basis, since 
141. Lovells, ‘The Anti-Monopoly Law of the PRC-Caveat Who?’ (2007) 1 AF <www.lovells.com> accessed 4 
March 2011, 5.
142. Ning, ‘Comparison of the NDRC rules and the SAIC rules on Abuse of Dominant’ (n 126); Ning, ‘3 rules 
which shed light on non-price violations of the Anti-Monopoly Law - effective 1 February 2011’ (n 113).
143. ‘In the Tencent case, the court made a lengthy analysis of justification possibilities…the court referred to 
general civil law and tort law rules about justifiable ‘self-defense’ and ‘damage avoidance’ measures.’ Adrian 
Emch and Jonathan Liang, ‘Private Antitrust Litigation in China—The Burden of Proof and Its Challenges’ 
(Competition Policy International, April 2013) 1 CPI Antitrust Chronicle 11 <http://awards.concurrences.
com/IMG/pdf/private.pdf>  accessed 19 November 2014.
144. China Netcom case. Ning, ‘Li Fangping vs China Netcom - Abuse of Dominance Case Dismissed’ (n 125). 
145. Shanda case; Ning ‘Sursen v Shanda and Xuanting - Abuse of Dominance Case Dismissed’ (n 122).
146. Lovells (n 138) 8.
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although China has privatised many economic sectors, certain key sectors 
still remain under state control.147 While some interpretations claim that 
Art 7 of the AML exempts SOEs from the full application of the law, others 
have determined that Art 7 is not exhaustive, hence AML should apply.148 
In reality, it seems that the latter is applied, since there have already been 
several cases regarding the enforcement of the AML on SOEs.149 Nonetheless, 
it is highly unlikely that many foreign investors will be willing to take 
‘action against any part of the Chinese government when they trade in the 
area under administration.’150 
In addition, the extent to which the law will be enforced on SOEs, is still 
unclear.151 In 2013 there have been two cases in which SOEs were found 
guilty of anticompetitive behaviour, namely RPM,152 both of which in the 
premium liquor industry.153 While, these two cases can be seen as a sign that 
the SOEs are not ‘immune’ to the AML, the limited number of cases, as 
well as the high similarity between them, make predictions regarding future 
enforcement of the AML on SOEs rather vague.
As for the question of enforceability, it is often said that ‘China’s written laws 
do not necessarily reflect what happens in practice’,154 and the Chinese legal 
147. Owen (n 40) 243.
148. Huang (n 47) 347.
149. WSC case, China Mobile case and Huzhou TPRI case.
150. Lovells (n 138) 2.
151. Owen (n 40) 246.
152. RPM: Minimum Resale Price Maintenance.
153. Ning (March 1, 2013) Susan Ning, Liu Jia and Hazel Yin, ‘Chinese Antitrust Authorities Imposed Large 
Fines on Kweichow Moutai and Wuliangye for Resale Price Maintenance’ (King & Wood Mallesons, 1 
March 2013) < http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2013/03/articles/corporate/antitrust-competition/chinese-
antitrust-authorities-imposed-large-fines-on-kweichow-moutai-and-wuliangye-for-resale-price-maintenance/>.
154. Hamner (n 54) 401-2.
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system is considered to be weak and unreliable.155 Many foreign firms find it 
impossible to enforce an award,156 especially since officials are reluctant to 
expose information.157 Enforcement of the AML is bound to be even more 
difficult. Not only do China’s enforcement agencies have limited resources, 
but China also utilises a dual enforcement system, combining both Civil 
Action and Administrative Review;158 causing jurisdictional overlaps.
It should be noted, that of the 643 cases cleared by MOFCOM159 from 2008 
to 2013, the MOFCOM imposed conditions on only 18 of them (2.8%) and 
rejected just one case (0.16%).160 The majority of these 19 cases dealt with 
the issue of acquisition (89.5%) and all involved foreign enterprises.161 Even 
155. Lou, Partnering with Chinese Firms (n 43) 50-51; Stanly Lubman, ‘The Study of Chinese Law in the 
United State: Reflection on the Past and Concerns about the Future’ 2(1) [2003] Wash U Global Stud L Rev 
1, 26. 
156. In 1994, 31 foreign banks failed to collect $600 million from SEOs; Dixon (n 15) 31.
157. For example: officials may refuse to divulge the company’s assests, making enforcement of an award 
against it close to impossible. Randell Peerenboom, ‘Seeking Truth from Facts: An Empirical Study of 
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the PRC’ 49 [2001] Am. J. Comp. L. 249, 292-3.
158. Susan Ning, Kate Peng, Jia Liu and Rui Li, ‘The Dual System of Anti-monopoly Law – The Interplay 
between Administrative Enforcement and Civil Action’ (King & Wood Mallesons, 12 September 2013) 
<http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2013/09/articles/corporate/antitrust-competition/the-dual-system-of-
anti-monopoly-law-the-interplay-between-administrative-enforcement-and-civil-action/> accessed November
8 2014.
159. MOFCOM: Ministry of Commerce People’s Republic of China.
160. ‘The merger which was not approved was Coca-Cola Company’s (Coke) proposed acquisition of China Huiyuan 
Juice Group Limited (Huiyuan).’ Susan Ning, Jiang Liyong, Zheng Ziqing, and Angie Ng, ‘Merger Control Review 
2009 – China’ (King & Wood  Mallesons, September 17, 2010) <http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2010/09/
articles/corporate/antitrust-competition/merger-control-review-2009-china/> accessed November 8 2014. 
161. When comparing the MOFCOM to the USA Bureau of Competition and Antitrust Division it is quite 
clear that the MOFCOM still has a long way to go; in the fiscal year 2013 alone 1,326 transactions were 
reported to the 2 American agencies, 23 mergers were enforced by the Bureau of Competition and another 
15 cases by the Antitrust Division. Thus it appears that in 2013 alone the two agencies handled more than 
twice as many cases as the MOFCOM did in 5 years. Bureau of Competition and Antitrust Division, ‘Hart-
Scott-Rodino Annual Report’ (Fiscal Year 2013 Thirty-Sixth Annual Report) Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust 
Improvements Act of 1976 Section 7A of the Clayton Act pp. 1-2, 5 < http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/reports/36th-report-fy2013/140521hsrre port.pdf > accessed 9 November 2014.
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in cases where conditions were made, proper supervision was often proven 
to be challenging at best,162 thus rendering the conditions as ‘somewhat 
irrelevant’. Furthermore, from 2008 until 2012, China’s civil courts have 
accepted 107 AML related cases163 of which only few were resolved in a 
verdict in favour of the plaintiff.164 This can be seen as another indication 
for the law’s limited enforceability.  
b. Extraterritoriality Jurisdiction: application of American antitrust laws 
The above part showed that although guanxi influence may be defined as 
illegal under AML, the ‘opt-out’ clauses, as well as questionable status of 
the SOEs, makes the application of this law unreliable. Hence, American 
firms, in order to protect their interests, might want to apply their domestic 
antitrust laws. While there has been no legal research regarding application 
of US antitrust laws on the guanxi system, many has been written on its 
application on the Japanese keiretsu, mainly due to pressure exerted by US 
companies on the government for legal assistance.165 The strong similarities 
between the two systems allow us to examine the potential application 
of antitrust laws on the guanxi system through the existing theoretical 
framework. 
162. Susan Ning, Hazel Yin, Ziqing Zheng and Kailun Ji, ‘Review of Merger Control and Merger Remedies 
Regime in China: From 2008-2013’ (King & Wood Mallesons, 23 August 2013) <http://www.chinalawinsight.
com/2013/08/articles/corporate/antitrust-competition/review-of-merger-control-and-merger-remedies-
regime-in-china-from-2008-2013/> accessed November 8 2014.
163. Susan Ning, Hazel Yin and Yunlong Zhang, ‘The Anti-Monopoly Law of China: What We Have Seen in 2012?’ 
(King & Wood Mallesons, 8 February 2013) <http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2013/02/articles/corporate/
antitrust-competition/the-anti-monopoly-law-of-china-what-we-have-seen-in-2012/> accessed November 8 2014.
164. ibid; Susan Ning, Li Rui and Hazel Yin, ‘Chinese Consumer Wins Abuse of Dominance Civil Action against 
Tie-in Sales in Program Bundling’ (King & Wood Mallesons, 6 April 2013) <http://www.chinalawinsight.
com/2013/04/articles/corporate/antitrust-competition/chinese-consumer-wins-abuse-of-dominance-civil-
action-against-tie-in-sales-in-program-bundling-2/ > accessed November 8 2014. 
165. Davidow (n 48) 1035.
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American antitrust law is aimed at ‘protecting the national economy against 
both domestic and international restraints on competition’.166 The effect 
doctrine, a central principle in the antitrust law, was established in the 
Alcoa case, where the Judge stated that: ‘any state may impose liabilities, 
even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders 
that has consequences within its border…’167 However, this interpretation 
was soon limited by the balancing test, which requires courts to consider 
the interest of international comity,168 introduced and developed in the 
Timberlane case169 and the Mannington Mills case.170 The effect doctrine 
was further limited in 1982 with the FTAIA enactment,171 which referred 
to non-import trade or commerce. The FTAIA stated that federal courts 
had jurisdiction on business activities outside of the US, only when there 
was a ‘direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect’ on the domestic 
market.172 
It is this ‘jurisdictional hurdle’ that led most researches to conclude that the 
application of antitrust to keiretsu is not probable. Davidow claims that the 
‘American antitrust role will … be limited for the foreseeable future’, and 
that the issue of the keiretsu will ‘most likely will be solved by changes in 
corporate practice in Japan.’173 Tamura argued that the application of the 
166. Jiro Tamura, ‘US Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Law to Japanese Keiretsu’ 25 [1992-1993] 
NYUJLIP 385, 386. 
167. Muchlinski (n 6) 134; US v Alcoa 148 F 2d 443 (2d Cir 1945).
168. Tamura (n 164) 389-90.
169. Timberlane Lumber Co v Bank of America 459 F 2d 597 (1976 Ninth Circuit).
170. Mannington Mills Inc v Congoleum Corp 595 F 2d 1287 (1979).
171. FTAIA: Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982.
172. Tamura (n 164) 390; Though the FTAIA have significantly limited the extraterritorial application of 
antitrust laws, American courts still managed to assert their jurisdiction over foreign entities; as was the case 
in the Hartford Insurance Case, where the US supreme court applied US laws on activities occurring for the 
most part on British soil, Muchlinski (n 6) 138-39.
173. Davidow (n 48) 1050. 
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antitrust law is not likely to ‘reach Japan domestic activity’174 and that ‘it 
would be unwise to attempt to apply American law to keiretsu.’175 
In China, Western firms might be frustrated by the fact that ‘competitors 
lacking any commercial business advantage succeed at [their] expense solely 
because they have better connections.’176 However, the ability to apply 
extraterritorial jurisdiction to guanxi is even more unlikely than to the 
keiretsu, as the guanxi system is even less direct and more flexible than the 
keiretsu. Guanxi ties rely on the implicit understanding between the parties; 
furthermore, defining the system’s boundaries is next to impossible, as the 
system is best described as a ‘spider-web’. This differentiation, thus, re-
enforces the difficulties faced by American companies when attempting to 
apply extraterritorial competition laws in the Japanese domestic market. 
Therefore, relying on American laws to insure a foreign firm’s interests seems 
to be an improbable and impractical solution.  
V. CONCLUSION
Though some people are inclined to believe that with the economic 
development guanxi will become a thing of the past,177 reality teaches us 
differently, since guanxi remains one of the keys to success.178 This paper shows 
that the guanxi and keiretsu systems share common features, resulting in 
similar adverse influences over competition. The guanxi system manipulates 
competition in the Chinese domestic market limiting market ‘openness’, 
especially to foreign competition.  
174. Tamura (n 164) 392.
175. ibid 399.
176. Dixon (n 15) 28.
177. Selmer (n 2) 37.
178. Hanbury-Tenison, ‘Taxi trip to success in Shanghai’ (n 60).
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Since foreign companies often struggle to build their own guanxi, which 
would enable them to compete on equal terms, as those require both time 
and a common social base,179 they may wish to turn to the law to ‘level the 
playing field’. However, though many of the guanxi originated practice can 
be defined as illegal under the domestic law, the various loopholes combined 
with the ambiguity surrendering the status of SOEs and enforceability 
problems decreases firms’ abilities to rely on the domestic legal system. 
Thus, leading firms to seek protection elsewhere, thereby; exploring the 
possibility of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Yet, while the possibility of relying 
on extraterritorial jurisdiction for protection may seem enticing, further 
examination of American companies’ past experience in attempting to utilise 
this tool against the keiretsu, demonstrates the futility of this solution.
As both solutions fail to offer proper protection to international enterprises 
operating within the Chinese domestic market, those may wish to look into 
future developments. Recently, many Chinese firms started looking to the 
West, in the hope of expanding their markets abroad.180 This aspiration of 
Chinese firms can have unpredictable consequences, since US courts will not 
only have jurisdiction over behaviour within their forum jurisdiction, but 
they may also assert jurisdiction over ‘non-resident unit acts outside the 
jurisdiction’,181 when those have a damaging effect on the domestic market.182 
The second possible development is bilateral antitrust cooperation, which 
179. Lou, Guanxi and Business (n 8) 4-6; Fang (n 16) 119; Wank (n 7) 829-31.
180. Duncan Hollis, ‘What will a U.S.-China BIT do to Investor-State Arbitrations?’ (Opinio Juris, 22 March 
2010) <http://opiniojuris.org/2010/03/22/what-will-a-us-china-bit-do-to-investor-state-arbitrations/> 
accessed 1 March 2011.
181. Muchlinski (n 6) 140.
182. ibid 141.
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aims at promoting coordination and harmonization.183 The US signed 
several agreements of this nature as part of the US’ attempt to solve the 
jurisdiction problem. Hamner argues that by adopting an international 
antitrust regime, countries will be able to reduce both conflicts in laws and 
the costs of compliance.184 This might be a possible solution to the problem 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction, which will improve the ability of American 
firms to protect their interests, without alienating the Chinese authorities. 
In fact, China has already made some progress in this area, by establishing 
such an understanding with the EU.185 However, the effectiveness of both of 
these developments in regards to guanxi, is left to be seen.
183. Tamura (n 164) 398.
184. Hamner (n 54) 403.
185. ‘Bilateral relations on competition issues’ (European Commission, 11 June 2014) <http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/international/bilateral/> accessed 18 November 2014.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Following the Kantian and Hegelian philosophy,1 the protection of moral 
rights is underpinned by the often romanticised notion that creative 
works are an extension of its creator. Accordingly, ‘to mistreat the work… 
is to mistreat the artist [and] impair his personality.’2 Moral rights, as 
distinguished from economic rights, reflect the idea that the author’s interest 
in the work transcends beyond his motives of financial gain. Parting with 
the copyright has no effect on the author’s personal attachment to the 
work. This indissoluble connection of the creator with his work forms the 
background against which moral rights provisions have been formed, and 
sits uneasily with the orthodox view of copyright as a tradable commodity, 
an economic right.
The lack of statutory protection for moral rights has been the defining 
feature of the Anglo-American copyright tradition, which tends to be heavily 
contrasted with, and criticised by the Continental copyright systems. The 
elimination of such dichotomy between the Anglo-American and Continental 
systems through the introduction of the Copyright, Designs and Patents 
Act 1988 provisions caused some commentators to consider the adoption 
1. For a Kantian approach, see Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, ‘Kant on Copyright’ (2008) 25(3) AELJ 1059.
2. P Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of Authorship, 1991(2) Duke LJ (1991) 497.
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of statutory moral rights as one of the most noteworthy developments.3 
Undoubtedly, the protection of moral rights portrays a society that values 
creation and authorship. It chimes with popular attitudes. In the legislative 
schemes of France and Germany, moral rights rank as a category equal 
to economic rights.4 The terminology of moral rights itself suggests an 
unconditional entitlement rather than a right that must be legally acquired 
subject to limitations.5 Provisions in the 1988 Act resembled the already 
existing rights afforded by the common law. This made their acceptance into 
English national law a logical development, particularly in view of the moral 
rights obligations imposed by article 6bis of the Berne Convention.6 Such an 
acceptance, however, was made without inquiry into the effectiveness of the 
provisions and without thought as to how those provisions would interact 
with its parallel right of copyright (i.e. an economic right). 
This paper will argue that the nature and scope of the moral rights regime 
reveals an embarrassing nod towards droit moral, the orthodoxy of which 
considers the authors of copyrightable works to have inalienable (non-
transferable to third parties nor relinquished altogether) rights. The UK 
still preserves the prevalent reluctance towards moral rights from the earlier 
years, leaving the regime, as Vaver (1999) notes, in an ‘impoverished state.’7 
Such an attitude is a reflection of the wider distaste felt towards subjugating 
the marketplace to higher dictates of good faith, propriety and principles of 
fairness.8 It is of no surprise then that a host of limitations and exceptions 
3. see P Rigamonti, ‘Deconstructing Moral Rights’ (2006) 47 Harv Int’l LJ 353.
4. William Cornish, David Llewelyn and Tanya Aplin, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks 
and Allied Rights (7edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2010) 513.
5. For terminological and conceptual difficulties regarding the expression moral rights, see David Vaver, ‘Moral 
Rights Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow’ (1999) 7(3) IJL & IT 271-272.
6. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Art 6bis, Sept 9, 1886, 828 UNTS 211.
7. Vaver (no 5) 272.
8. see Cornish (n 4) 514.
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has been introduced to reduce the scope of moral rights applications to the 
point where they begin to occupy a mere symbolic existence. Independent 
rights such as defamation, economic torts and contract were already (and 
still are) available to aggrieved persons prior to the enactment of section 80 
(right of integrity).9 While this means that the authors may be no worse off 
under the new regime so long as there is a common law alternative, it raises 
questions as to: (i) whether the provisions should be retained given that 
they offer no real improvement from the common law that preceded it, and 
(ii) whether there is any other workable framework that will offer a more 
agreeable approach between copyright and moral rights provisions. 
In view of the above, it is thought that greater harmonisation between the 
two entities of moral rights and copyright may be advanced by softening the 
dichotomy between economic rights and moral rights. Perhaps only then will 
the provisions not be treated as mere ‘tokenism.’10 This radical proposition 
has been largely left out from the majority of the intellectual property 
moral rights literature, which tends to ignore the political and economic 
dimensions at play. This paper, on the contrary, acknowledges and embraces 
the fact that the 1988 Act was the product of a political process that shaped 
the law according to the interests of the relevant parties.11 Furthermore, 
while moral rights by their nature are considered non-economic, it will be 
shown that this does not render them void of significant economic benefit. 
A case will be made for looking at moral rights as not only an extension of 
9. This paper only explores the common law alternatives which relate to the right of integrity. Other actions 
such as passing off, breach of confidence and more are available as alternatives for other CDPA moral rights 
provisions (sections 77-79 and sections 84-85).
10. William R Cornish, Moral Rights under the 1988 Act, (1989) 11(12) EIPR 449, 452.
11. The 1988 Act has 305 sections and eight schedules. This in itself illustrates the possible acquiescence of the 
legislative body to political pressures from copyright industries groups. There is also the grant of immunities 
to large classes of work.
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natural law (personal right) but also as an extension of the economic rights 
in copyright law. 
The arguments framed will operate in relation to one of the moral rights 
most commonly afforded at a national and international level, the right of 
integrity (i.e. the right to object to derogatory treatment).12 The justification 
for this particular focus resides in scholarly opinion that has conceived 
the right as being the most important of the moral rights,13 as well as 
one that has ‘aroused the most bitter antagonism.’14 The right of integrity 
also encounters similar problems as the other rights afforded by the 1988 
Act (right of attribution (section 77), right to object to false attribution 
(section 84) and the right to privacy (section 85)). This widens the future 
applicability of this paper.  
It must be noted that those who have acquired copyright rights before 1989 
are protected under Schedule 1 of the 1988 Act. Accordingly, the right of 
integrity applies to acts succeeding the August 1, 1989 Act’s commencement. 
This caveat may lead to the arguments of this paper being condemned as 
premature conjectures, since many activities will remain untouched by the 
1988 Act. However, Schedule 1 does not erase the possibility of providing 
a good indication as to where the future of moral right provisions in the 
CDPA 1988 lies. 
12. The paper will omit UK’s disregard of the Berne Convention. The focus is paid to national obligations and 
case law only. The subject of Berne and the UK forms another paper on its own.
13. Cyrill P Rigamonti, ‘Deconstructing Moral Rights’ (2006) 47(2) HILJ 364.
14. Martin A Roeder, ‘The Doctrine of Moral Right’ (1940) 53 Harvard Law Review 565.
Queen Mary Law Journal Angelika Bialowas 113
II. INTERPRETING THE STATUTORY LANDSCAPE
Protection of integrity gives the author of a copyright literary, dramatic, 
musical or artistic work, and the director of a copyright film the right not 
to have his work subjected to derogatory treatment (section 80(1)), to the 
extent that they are subject to and remain in copyright (section 86(1)). 
‘Treatment’ encompasses the addition to/deletion from/alteration to/and 
adaptation of the work (section 80(2)(a)). It is ‘derogatory’ if it amounts 
to ‘distortion or mutilation of the work or is otherwise prejudicial to the 
honour or reputation of the author’ (section 80(2)(b)). The right of integrity 
lasts for as long as copyright in the work. In the case of literary, dramatic 
and artistic works this usually means 70 years from the end of the year in 
which the author dies (see section 12). 
The right does not extend to the preservation of the work nor does it 
protect the work from total destruction by another since no personality 
can be projected through a non-entity. The reputation or honour of the 
artist, likewise, cannot be affected, if no one can experience it, and so, 
‘if you receive a sculpture…you cannot paint it a new colour without the 
artist’s permission. You can, however, smash it into unidentifiable pieces.’15 
Considering that the total destruction of a work erases the artist’s efforts 
in its entirety, this to some, if not the majority, is just as harmful as any 
undesirable alterations, particularly in cases where the work is not widely 
reproduced. 
The large number of exceptions to the right of integrity further curtails 
its scope of application. Computer programs and computer-generated 
15. Susan P Liemer, ‘Understanding Artists’ Moral Rights: A Prime’ (1998) 7 BU PILJ 41, 51.
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works do not qualify for protection16 nor does any work used for reporting 
current events,17 a newspaper or similar periodical or an encyclopedia or 
any collective work of reference.18 The right does not apply in relation to 
translation (section 80(2)(a)(i)). Employees who produce works in the course 
of their employment, likewise, do not fall within the scope of the right of 
integrity. Some exclusions have important implications and doubts have 
been raised as to their justification. An architect of a derogatory building 
may only seek redress by sacrificing the right to be identified (section 80(5)). 
It is supposed then, that the non-attribution of a work will keep intact the 
reputation of the architect where the right of integrity has been infringed. 
This, however, only results in both moral rights being compromised. With 
regards to translations, Cornish is right to point out that ‘of all the ways of 
misrepresenting an author’s true work, poor translation must be easily the 
most unjustifiable.’19 This holds particularly true when translations occur 
with such frequency. 
Those falling within the ambit of such exceptions are left with no other 
alternative but reliance on common law.  The fact that since coming into 
force, the 1988 Act has generated only four reported decisions where section 
80 (right of integrity) is has been considered,20 confirms the allegation that 
the route of litigating moral rights is not one usually sought. The exceptions 
may be seen as a result of greater weight given to economic rights and 
16. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 s 81(2).
17. ibid s 81(3).
18. ibid s 81(4).
19. Cornish (n 4) 451.
20. Morrison Leahy Music Ltd v Lightbound Ltd [1993] EMLR 144; Tidy v Natural History Museum Trustees 
[1995] 39 IPR 501; Pasterfield v Denham [1999] FSR 168; Confetti Records v Warner Music [2003] EWHC 
1274.
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commercial considerations that enable the copyright owner21 to exploit 
the work. Yet, Cornish positively maintains that while ‘the new statutory 
provisions lay very considerable constraints on the operation of the new law, 
there also remains room for manoeuvre by the courts.’22 Perhaps then, only 
the courts could address the imbalance between the personal and commercial 
interests. 
III. COURTS APPROACH TO THE RIGHT OF INTEGRITY
Following from Cornish, the approach of the courts suggests little inclination 
to press moral rights liability beyond common law. From the above provisions, 
the success of the right of integrity will depend on whether the act done 
(i.e. the treatment) to the author’s work will be (i) prejudicial to honour or 
reputation, and (ii) will amount to distortion or mutilation. 
Rattee J in the case of Tidy v Trustees of the National History Museum 
held that the question of prejudice ought to be decided through the eyes of the 
reasonable person.23 However, the question of whether the reasonable person 
is to be the reasonable artist or a reasonable member of the public was left 
undefined. The former would expand the instances where prejudice to honour 
or reputation would be recognised. Without a doubt, creators would be in a 
better position to understand the possible varieties of prejudice, which members 
of the public may regarded as trivial. However, it is clear that it is ‘not 
sufficient that the author is himself aggrieved by what has occurred.’24 This 
21. Note that who holds the copyright may not necessarily hold moral rights to it, though the author of a work 
is usually the first owner of the copyright (see also section 11(1)).
22. Cornish (n 4) 452.
23. [1995] 39 IPR 501.
24. Pasterfield v Denham [1999] FSR 168, 181.
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is made even more difficult where prejudice is not to be inferred by the courts 
as such, but must be established by evidence. Lack of evidence for Lewison J 
in Confetti Records was ‘the fundamental weakness in this part of the case.’25 
Evidence of status is also a prerequisite to establishing prejudice. Lewison J 
continued to say that if ‘I have no evidence about Mr Alcee’s honour or 
reputation… I have no evidence of any prejudice to either of them.’26 The 
ramifications of this approach are that many new authors who are yet to 
establish their reputation will fall outside of the scope of the section 80 
protection entirely. Many will also have their right circumvented if their injury 
is identified in terms of emotions, which will in turn prove to be too subjective 
to rule on (see Pasterfield below). A lower, perhaps more accessible threshold, 
would infer prejudice from the presence of a distortion of the author’s 
expression.  
The threshold for establishing derogatory treatment is even higher than that 
of establishing prejudice. In Tidy, the exact but miniature reproduction of 
work was not considered a mutilation. This is despite the fact that the 
originally black and white work was given a background colouring of pink and 
yellow and an additional text. Rattee J considered the text not to be part of 
the drawing, and so it fell outside of the ‘treatment’. In Pasterfield, colour 
variations between originals and reproductions were, likewise, insufficient to 
fall within the meaning of mutilation. Such conclusions were reached despite 
the fact that both were not as aesthetically successful as the originals. 
Pasterfield suggested that only ‘gross differences’27 would qualify. At this 
point, the author’s access to recourse against those that presented the work 
25. Confetti Records v Warner Music [2003] EWHC 1274.
26. ibid.
27. Pasterfield (n 24) 182.
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differently from the way he originally intended will only be available if the 
alterations and mutilations manifest themselves to be obvious and extreme 
examples of infringement upon the artist’s creative work. Yet, given that the 
concepts of ‘treatment’, ‘prejudice’ and ‘derogatory’ are subjective this would 
inherently mean that the courts, in some cases, involve themselves in making 
aesthetics evaluations.28 Such variables used to establish infringement and the 
judicial discretion granted in the area creates inconsistencies. Morrison did 
not require prejudice and Tidy required prejudice or distortion, but not both. 
This is contrary to Pasterfield and Confetti; both of which failed on the 
reasons of not having both elements present. 
Given the above difficulties, it would be unreasonable for those authors that 
previously relied on common law to prevent alteration of their works to change 
that practice and rely on the provisions set out in CDPA 1988 instead. The 
author remains free to impose restrictions on his transfer of copyright. The 
copyright law would then become subdivided and would enable the author to 
retain some aspects of it and transfer the rest. Through this, the author may 
decline to transfer the right to alter or adapt the work. He may insist that it 
binds subsequent third parties to protect him against any potential future 
harm. Such an alternative would go beyond the right of integrity as it does 
not require the treatment of the work to be derogatory in the event of litigation. 
There is also a strong positive attitude to protect the obligations of the parties 
to the contract. However, since in most cases this can only be done under 
contract law, for most authors, it will be an uncertain source to be relied 
upon. While breach of contract was used to prevent derogatory treatment in 
28. Dangers of making aesthetic evaluations were discussed in George Hensher Ltd v Restawile Upholstery 
[1976] AC 64. Cornish dubbed this ‘aesthetic prejudice’ in ‘Moral Rights Under the 1998 Act 12 EIPR 449 
(1989) 451.
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Frisby v BBC,29 in Barnett v Cape Town Foreshore Board,30 no express or 
implied terms could be determined for an architect to prevent alterations to 
his design. This reflects the idea that much is dependent on judicial discretion 
and the market reality where authors may form their own contractual terms 
only to the extent of their own individual bargaining power, which in turn 
will determine whether and to what extent the integrity interest is protected. 
Yet, even with the above in mind, the courts appear to be more inclined to 
imply terms to limit the right to make alterations in contract in the absence 
of express terms. This was the case in Joseph v National Magazine Co where 
the court upheld the author’s right not to have his article revised, declaring 
that the author was ‘entitled to write his own article in his own style.’31 
The author was also awarded damages for the lost opportunity to enhance 
his reputation. Indeed, the courts invariably first attempted to reach a 
decision based on the construction of any existing contract, as opposed to 
any consideration of moral rights. Tidy was successful in mounting an action 
against the museum for breach of copyright, but the defendant’s subsequent 
application for a summary judgment on the basis that the museum’s 
publication constituted derogatory treatment was refused. In a similar vein, 
in Morrison, the infringement to the right of integrity was not dealt with 
at length since a copyright violation had already been established. The 
suggestion here is that a hierarchy between copyright and moral rights is 
observed by the courts, with copyright having precedence over moral rights 
issues. 
29. WLR 1204.
30. [1978] FSR 176.
31. [1959] 1 LR Ch 20.
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While critics observed that ‘laws sometimes happened to protect it [i.e. 
moral rights],’32 the law of defamation shows itself as more than a rough 
analogy to the right of integrity. The court in Pasterfield approved of 
Laddie’s characterisation of section 80 as protecting reputation, akin to 
the law of defamation.33 The object of protection is therefore the same. 
Relief under section 80 requires injury to reputation,34 the same element of 
proof required for establishing defamation. An offensive cover in Moseley 
v Stanley Paul was stopped pending trial by an interim injunction, ‘for 
the plaintiff to have it associated with his name or his book…would be a 
scandalous state of things.’35 In Lee v Gibbings,36 the author’s original work 
was republished in a cheaper, smaller form with no preface, introduction 
or bibliography. The court held an action in defamation to be proper and 
prevented alterations to the work that diminished the author’s reputation 
(for similar case see Humphreys v Thompson).37 Such protection existed not 
only under common law, but also under section 43(4) of the Copyright Act 
1956, which prohibited, amongst other things, publishing an altered work 
or a reproduction of it, as the unaltered work of the artist. The alteration, 
like the requirements of defamation and section 80, need to be material.38 
A paradox emerges since in Carlton the court allowed damages for the 
enlargement and addition of colour to a drawing, yet under the right of 
integrity in Pasterfield, the same variations and an additional text failed to 
fall within section 80 for want of major differences between the original and 
32. W R Cornish and J Phillips, ‘Copyright in the United Kingdom’ (1984) 119 Revue Internationale Du Droit 
D’Auteur 59, 115.
33. Pasterfield (no 24) 181; see H Laddie, P Prescott and M Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs 
(3rd edn, Butterworths, 2000).
34. s 80(2)(b) and Confetti Records [2003].
35. [1917-1923] 19 MCC 341, 342.
36. [1892] 67 LT 263.
37. [1905-1910] 18 MCC 148.
38. Carlton Illustrators v Coleman [1911] 1 KB 711.
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altered work.39 This suggests that the standard of section 43(4) of CA 1956 
was in fact lower than that of the current section 80 in CDPA 1998. 
The above cases would acquire no greater benefits under section 80. 
Infringement of moral rights is actionable as a breach of statutory duty 
(section 103(1)). The damages recovered on the sole basis of moral rights 
would be inadequate, as was emphasised in Morrison. The effect of 
distortion or mutilation, even if found, could not be quantified. There is 
also a derogation whereby an injunction will be refused where the defendant 
includes a disclaimer disassociating the author from the allegedly derogatory 
treatment of the work.40 There is, however, a statutory guarantee by virtue 
of section 171(4) CDPA 1988 allowing authors to rely on rights other than 
moral rights.41 Though, it is not clear whether this principle can be used 
to award additional damages for infringement of moral rights. Section 
103 suggests that this is unlikely as it establishes a separate heading for 
infringements of moral rights itself. 
The only reasonable case that can be made in support of section 80 is that 
authors are able to benefit from section 80 for as long as copyright exists in 
the work, whereas defamation, for instance, could only be asserted during 
the life of the author. The right of integrity also creates a default rule under 
which it is presumed that the author retains the right to object to certain 
treatments of his work, unless that right is specifically waived in whole or in 
part.42 The default rule, however, if of marginal significance in view of the 
waiver regime. 
39. ibid.
40. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 s 82(2).
41. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 s 171(4).
42. No need to assert the right (cf. right of attribution).
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IV. EROSION OF MORAL RIGHTS THROUGH A WAIVER REGIME
 
While the above represents restrictions and difficulties in making the right of 
integrity actionable, the waiver regime contained within the moral rights 
provisions gives way to commercial and economic interests in favour of the 
rules of the market. While moral rights cannot be assigned (section 94), this 
holds little importance when they can be affected by consent to acts which 
would otherwise constitute infringement (section 87(1)) or when they can be 
waived (section 87(2)). Lord Beaverbrook distinguished: ‘consent in respect of 
moral rights [is] to operate like a license in respect of copyright; that is, it may 
be implied, expressed or signified by conduct… waiver is the giving up of 
rights in whole or in part… in favour of particular people or in favour of the 
world.’43 However, there is little use of this distinction since the waiver, like 
consent, does not need to be permanent. Waivers, in the majority of cases, 
will be found in contract, but upholding the distinction between consent and 
waiver may open up possibilities of abuse since ‘consent to the doing of 
particular acts ought to be given in any way whatever’ (Lord Beaverbrook).44 
Though note that there are wider notions of fiduciary responsibility, duties of 
care, and unconscionability to soften some of the potential hostilities of the 
marketplace. 
The existence of waivers, particularly when they are embedded as a prerequisite 
to any contractual agreement, leaves the author at a disadvantage. Although, 
a waiver must be in writing and signed by the person giving up the rights, 
which may offer comfort to some, this too is soon diminished by the fact that 
informal waivers under contract law and estoppel are permissible (section 
43. HL Deb 10 December 1987, vol 491, col 395.
44. ibid.
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87(4)). In business reality, most would be forced and the majority prepared 
to waive all moral rights in exchange for work with a desired company. Some 
would possibly lose moral rights by ignorance. This bargaining inequality 
would leave only the well-established authors in a position to negotiate and 
resist the demand for a waiver. Nonetheless, it may be specified whether the 
waiver is to be revocable or irrevocable by virtue of section 87(3)(b). It is 
unclear, however, whether in the absence of an intention to the contrary, a 
waiver that has no indication of revocability is automatically presumed to 
be revocable or otherwise. Unless the contract can be invalidated through 
some other means such as duress, undue influence, or restraint of trade, 
there is nothing to stop contracts containing standard clauses that insert 
the waiver of all moral rights. The author, accordingly, does not survive 
market exploitation.
The breadth of waiver provisions extinguishes any theoretical suggestions 
of the inalienability of moral rights. In fact, it is possible to contend that 
it transforms moral rights from what is meant to be a personal right to a 
property right, which is seen as being capable of having a market value. 
Such a contention is even more accurate when appropriate remuneration 
can be received in return for a signed waiver. It changes the non-economic 
character of moral rights. The Supreme Court of Canada in Desputeaux 
held that the Canadian Copyright Act 1985 ‘does not prohibit artists from 
entering into transactions involving their copyright or even creating revenue 
from the exercise of the moral rights that are part of it…an artist may even 
charge for waiving the exercise of his or her moral rights.’45 In Britain, the 
House of Commons revealed that ‘it should be made an offence…to offer 
a financial inducement or commercial advantage for the waiving or non-
45. Desputeaux v Editions Chouette (1987) Inc [2003] 1 SCR 178, 57.
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assertion of any moral right or to penalise an author who asserts or refuses 
to waive any such right.’46 This concern, however, was not addressed in the 
final provisions. The renunciation of moral rights through a waiver would 
remove the opportunity to defend any future honour and reputation of 
the author in exchange for financial inducement. This brings moral rights 
closer to being associated with economic rights that can be bought or sold 
protecting commercial interests, rather than the personal rights of authors. 
Here, under the waiver regime, moral rights operate similarly to other forms 
of property. This contributes to the argument that is about to follow. 
V. RECONCILIATION
The outlined inadequacies highlight the importance of reconceptualising 
moral rights in such a way as to produce a beneficial cooperation between 
copyright law as it exists and the moral right provisions in intellectual 
property law. Section 80 rights, which were designed to be rooted in the 
personality of the author proved to be rooted in commercially dictated 
considerations guided by economic interests. Moral rights are conventionally 
viewed as an extension of natural law, as a personal right. This convention, 
however, is not only limiting but also does not reflect the other side of moral 
rights identity. It is important to note that the personality argument itself 
is void of any broader social and economic context in which moral rights are 
asserted.47 
A substantial body of literature exists on the economic aspects of intellectual 
property, yet none of these address moral rights and how the interaction 
46. HC Deb 28 April 1988, vol 132, col 570.
47. see also David Vaver, ‘Authors’ Moral Rights: Reform Proposals in Canada: Charter or Barter of Rights 
for Creators?’ (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 754: analysis.
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between the two (economic and moral rights) may be improved. Hansmann 
and Santilli are perhaps the only exception offering the most comprehensive 
economic analysis,48 yet they too fail to elucidate as to what such an approach 
may offer with regards to the current state of moral rights.
The right of integrity is not void of economic benefits. In the context of 
waivers, it was seen how they operate as forms of property when they can 
be exchanged for remuneration. The right of integrity also has important 
commercial value to the creator and third parties. The art collector’s 
investment will be devalued if the original artist’s work is mistreated in 
such a way as to impact on his reputation. The artist himself, following any 
such incident, may receive less remuneration for future works and would 
be less susceptible to attracting new purchasers. Moral rights can therefore 
inadvertently protect pecuniary interest, which is traditionally left to the 
economic instruments. This function of moral rights has been largely ignored. 
While ‘it may be distasteful to equate artistic endeavour with trade… the 
analogy is appropriate for the many authors who rely on their creative 
talents for their livelihood.’49 It is suggested here that a creator who enforces 
his moral rights is also enforcing his economic interests, the interests of 
other owners of his work as well as the interests of the public at large who 
may potentially benefit from the work. This leads to the claim that the 
exceptions to the right of integrity outlined in the earlier part of this paper 
will diminish the potential economic benefit that can otherwise be derived, 
making a case for moral rights stronger. 
48. Henry Hansmann, Marina Santilli, ‘Authors’ and Artists’ Moral Rights’ (1997) 26(95) JLS .; see also 
Michael Rushton, ‘The Moral Rights of Artists’ (1998) Journal of Cultural Economics 15.
49. Vaver (n 47). For art enthusiasts see the background to The Death of Chatterton painting by Henry Wallis 
(1856).
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Both entities of copyright and moral rights are unlikely to achieve perfect 
symmetry, but the dichotomy between them becomes less distinctive by 
shifting the perception of moral rights away from viewing them in isolation 
to recognising them as ‘species’ of personal rights as well as economic rights.50 
An acknowledgement of the convergence between the two would be the first 
step in improving the understanding of the conflicts to which moral rights 
give rise.51 Given the political dimension of law, where the legislators are 
not the only arbiters of policy, but as some have strongly termed, ‘hostages 
of strong lobby groups,’52 bringing moral and economic rights into the same 
discussion would also ease the acceptance of moral rights, if they were 
more related, at least in theory, to economic considerations which are the 
guiding principle of the majority of copyright laws. Shifting the moral rights 
discourse to an economic level may well be one underexplored method that 
has the potential to have a progressive effect on the future development of 
moral rights and on the harmonisation of copyright and moral rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
While some commentators (Porter (1989), Stamatoudi (1997), Rigamonti 
(2006) et al).53 conclude that moral rights are no longer seen as the anathema 
to the copyright system, critical examination of the right of integrity in 
this paper reveals that such conclusions are unfounded. The introduction of 
moral rights has not only deluded those commentators but also the creators 
50. This avoids simple analogies of the obvious elements such as acquisition and duration, both of which are 
the same for moral and economic rights.
51. Marina Santilli, ‘Moral Rights Developments in European Perspective’ (1997) (1)1 Marq. Intell. Property 
Law Review 90.
52. Lior Zemer, ‘Rethinking Copyright Alternatives’ (2006) 14(1) IJL & IT 140.
53. Vincent Porter, ‘The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988: The Triumph of Expediency Over Principle’ 
(1989) 16(3) Journal of Law and Society; Rigamonti (n 3) 353.
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of works. Comments in the parliamentary debates themselves indicate that 
while the introduction of moral rights is not objected to in principle, it would 
not be allowed to interfere with commercial practices.54 The preservation of 
this is reflected in the shortcomings of the right of integrity that is riddled 
with exceptions, which would otherwise be troublesome to the exploiters of 
works. The combination of statutory provisions and courts’ interpretation 
of them has been demonstrated to further limit the scope of section 80. 
Though it is not always clear as to whether the authors would be successful 
at common law for moral-type grievances, the courts appear to be less 
reluctant to imply terms and generally rule over common law principles, as 
opposed to statutory provisions that are still perceived as ‘newcomers’55 to 
the UK. 
However, despite the current failures, some enthusiasm for the future 
development of moral rights exists. Comfort may be sought in that ultimately 
‘moral rights did not emerge in their full glory in a single triumphant burst. 
They were the product of an evolution.’56 While this may explain some of the 
shortcomings of moral rights protection in intellectual property, incremental 
developments will mean little in a system where the copyright law and the 
courts are reluctant to depart from commercial considerations. With this 
in mind, it has been suggested that a reconceptualisation of moral rights 
is needed. On the basis that moral rights are consistent with the common 
law position on economic and property rights, by having the ability to 
protect pecuniary interests, moral rights will be freed from the dichotomy 
between it and economic rights. As such, they can, for the first time, act as a 
complementary force to economic and commercial considerations. Until such 
54. see HC Deb 25 July 1988 vol138cc 177-84 (182), Mr Fisher, Member for Stoke on Trent.
55. Vaver (n 5) 271.
56. Cornish (n 4) 452.
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a position is acknowledged academically and achieved in practice, authors 
will remain vulnerable to exploitation and moral rights will retain their 
exclusionary, inapplicable and largely symbolic existence. 
 


